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Résumé 
 
 
Quel est le sens donné à l’art par la minorité palestinienne d’Israël dans un contexte où 
l’État se définit uniquement en termes ethno-nationaux et religieux ? Les écrits sur l’art 
en contextes coloniaux et postcoloniaux ont tendance à considérer l’art comme une 
ressource de revendication identitaire face à une situation de domination. Autrement dit, 
l’art est souvent présenté comme un acte politique de reconnaissance à travers 
l’affirmation d’une contre-identité. Suite à un travail intensif de terrain ethnographique 
dans la région, cette recherche démontre que pour les artistes palestiniens en Israël, 
l’aspect politique de l’art ne vient pas de sa capacité à exprimer des revendications 
identitaires. À travers l’observation des pratiques et l’analyse des discours des artistes, 
elle remet en question la relation présumée entre l'art et l'identité. Plus concrètement, 
elle analyse les pratiques d’un groupe d’artistes issus d’une minorité nationale indigène 
dont le travail artistique constitue une interruption des régimes spatiotemporels 
d'identification. L’aspect politique du travail des artistes palestiniens en Israël s’exprime 
à travers un processus de désidentification, un refus de réduire l’art à des catégories 
identitaires dominantes. Les œuvres de ces artistes permettent l’expression d’une 
rupture esthétique, manifestant un « ayant lieu » politique qui se trouve entre l'art et le 
non-art. Il s’agit d’un espace qui permet la rupture de l’ordre sensible de la société 
israélienne à travers l’affirmation et la vérification d’une égalité qui existe déjà. 
 
Mots clés : 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores what it means for the Palestinian indigenous minority in Israel to 
produce art in a setting that has simultaneously controlled their movements and 
excluded them from full citizenship. It takes on the question of how Palestinian artists 
face discrimination within a monolithic state structure that defines itself primarily along 
religious and ethno-national lines. Most writing about art in colonial and postcolonial 
contexts tends to see art as a resource for asserting repressed ethnic, racial and 
indigenous identities in the face of ongoing control and domination. Art, in other words, 
is considered a political act of recognition through the assertion of a counter identity. 
The central question of this thesis concerns what happens when artists contest the 
colonial conditions within which they live without having recourse to identity-based 
claims about equality and rights.  Based on intensive ethnographic fieldwork in the 
region, this research demonstrates that for Palestinian artists the political aspect of art is 
not related to claims about identity and that the relationship between art and identity is 
not homologous. Specifically, it explores artistic processes within a context in which 
spatiotemporal regimes of identification are being disrupted by an indigenous national 
minority. It establishes that politics in the case of Palestinian artists in Israel is a form of 
disidentification that is articulated through the figure of the present absentee. The 
central tropes found within the works of these artists can be seen as disruptive aesthetic 
acts, a “taking place” of politics that is between art and non-art, and outside of given 
identities; that is, a scene for the rupture of the “sensible order” of Israeli society through 
the affirmation and verification of an already existing equality. 
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Maisa Azaizeh: Distancing 
 
For some time already I had been asking Maisa about these four mysterious white lines in 
one of her paintings, what she intended by them, what they meant. I was genuinely 
obsessed: What were these white lines that vertically crossed and cut across the canvas? 
Were they bars of a prison? Empty and void spaces? Were they spaces of separation? 
These four crisp and sharp white lines, which connected with the white outer border, 
hovered mysteriously above the canvas, becoming the screen by which the spectator was 
forced to see the view of the town behind (Figure 1). Every time she would start to offer 
me an answer, she’d hesitate, saying, “I forgot, I’ll need to think about it, I’ll tell you next 
time.”  
She never told me the next time, or the time after that, or the time after. Instead, 
after the first few meetings, as I began to realize that she might again have me wait until 
the next time, I decided to take the initiative and prepare my own interpretation with the 
far-fetched hope she’d disagree and thereby be compelled to finally tell me. There we’d 
be, having another beer at Elika, and I’d ask, again, “So, did you figure out what you 
meant by the white lines?” “I don’t know, I hadn’t thought about it, what do you think?” 
she’d reply, turning the conversation back to me. “Well,” I’d start, thinking what I was 
about to say was finally going to have her reveal to me the mystery, “they seem to be…” 
Obviously she’d agree with all my interpretations, often enthusiastically, sometimes with 
surprise followed by the exclamation, “Yes, I’d never thought of that, but yes.” Finally, one 
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day, when I decided to press her more than usual, she told me that these lines were what I 
wanted them to be, that she’d prefer to know what I thought they were. 
Was this just another instance of aloofness on the part of the artist in thinking they 
didn’t need to explain their work, that the work of art is somehow self-explanatory?1 This 
idea had initially crossed my mind, but after getting to know Maisa I realized that her 
unwillingness to get into discussions about her work had less to do with their being “art” 
than her own disposition regarding her status as an artist, or, in this case, her refusal to 
consider herself an artist, with all that entailed. When I first met Maisa in 2010, her work 
was being exhibited at Azad, a recently opened Arab restaurant and bar in the 
neighborhood where I was working.2 The work on exhibit consisted of a handful of 
paintings and small sketches, one specific work a series of small sketches framed 
together (Figure 2). Creating an almost mosaic effect, what was most striking about these 
small sketches was the incompleteness and fragmentary quality of the images: headless 
bodies, legless torsos, unattached feet and hands, some bounded (Figure 2 detail). 
Despite their utter simplicity, I was moved; the spectator is never offered a full and 
complete body, not in any one sketch or as a whole. Neither is there a discernible face, 
someone recognizable with whom we might identify. When we met one evening at Azad 
to see a performance of Darwish poetry, only the second time I had met with her so far, I 
asked Maisa about the sketches, but she was reluctant to talk about them, telling me I 
                                                
1 Of all the artists with whom I met and talked during my fieldwork, Maisa was the only one not to 
2 Azad was an Arab owned restaurant and bar on Hillel Street, one street north of Massada. Within 
6 months of opening it became the target of a right-wing Zionist Youth organization for refusing to 
serve a uniformed soldier. See Chapter 1 for a more thorough account of Massada neighbourhood 
as field site.  
3 
 
was free to tell her what I thought. I chalked this response up to her shyness and our 
having just met. But this wasn’t the last time she was going to resist talking about her 
work. 
Maisa and I would meet every few weeks for a beer and, after the perfunctory back 
and forth about the white lines, we’d talk about her work, what she’d been up to and 
when I might see something new. “Soon,” she’d say. “You always say soon!” I quipped. “I 
don’t really have a schedule for painting, it’s not something I do regularly, only when I get 
an idea, or I have to paint, then I’ll sit down and paint,” she responded. During one of our 
last beers together I told her matter-of-factly that this is unfortunate because she’s a very 
good artist. I was stunned by her response, which I had never heard before in all our 
conversations: “I don’t want to be an artist.” “What do you mean you don’t want to be an 
artist?” I retorted. “I mean, I don’t want to get into the whole game of producing and 
selling, it’s not what I want. I’m happy doing what I do.” This was all the more surprising, 
as not a few minutes earlier Ahmad Canaan, one of curators at the Jaffa Salon for 
Palestinian Art,3 had sold two of her paintings that morning. “Isn’t this good news, selling 
some of your work?” I asked? “Of course!” she replied, “but it’s not what I want to do.” 
This wasn’t the first time Maisa’s work had sold; the year before, when the Salon first 
opened and when Ahmad took a selection of works to other galleries in Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories, all of her works were bought within the opening days and she was 
asked to make more. So what did Maisa want?  
                                                
3 The Jaffa Salon for Palestinian Art opened in 2010 and was the only gallery in the Tel Aviv/Jaffa 
area dedicated solely to Palestinian art. I discuss the Salon further in Chapter 1.  
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On the weekends Maisa would return to her village, Dabburiya,4 to teach the local 
children art. On a number of occasions she suggested I join her, but as I would have had 
to stay overnight, we agreed the circumstances were not amenable; as a man – a foreign 
man to boot – coming to her village would have prompted, well, talk and most likely a few 
misguided assumptions. Asking her why she returned to her village on weekends to teach 
art, Maisa said, “this is a very poor village and many children have never been exposed to 
art.” “So what do you teach them? I inquired. “I give them basic technical lessons, 
drawing, painting, sculpture,” she replied. I continued, “And since they have little 
exposure to art, do you also teach them a bit of art history?” “Yeah, I show them art from 
around the world, like Picasso, Van Gogh, Cezanne,” she said. “Do you also show them 
Palestinian artists?” I asked. “Of course!” Maisa ardently responded, “They all know Asim 
Abu Shaqra, Abed Abedi Asad Azi, Ibrahim Nubani.” Of course, Maisa’s time in her village 
teaching art was voluntary, something she did for her village but also, as she put it, to “let 
kids know about art.” This penchant for working with children and youth went beyond 
her village: she also worked with Baladna, a Haifa-based NGO for Arab youth5 and also 
volunteered with the community in the Wadi Jemal, an area of Haifa near the sea where 
                                                
4 Dabburiya is an all-Muslim Palestinian town just east of Nazareth with a population of around 
8500. Dabburiya recently made headlines in Israel due to its outdated and poorly funded 
educational infrastructure. See http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/in-arab-village-
dabburiya-the-classroom-is-the-hallway-to-the-toilet-1.385659 (last accessed 18.03.12). 
5 Baladna works to “enable and strengthen the Arab youth’s understanding and application of the 
principles of democracy and gender equality, pluralism and tolerance, youth empowerment and 
community building, as it is part of a growing trend towards building independent institutions 
and striving to equalize the Palestinian community’s relationship with the State. In conjunction to 
this, Baladna engages the youth with discussions and debates concerning the history, grievances 
and culture of Palestinians in Israel, the occupied territories and Diaspora.” See 
http://www.momken.org/ (last accessed 18.03.12). 
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together with members of the community she would coordinate various public art 
projects as part of the municipal effort to beautify the area.  
The last time I saw Maisa, sitting again at Elika over a beer, she told me about a 
recent project she had been working on in the Wadi Jemal. For a number of years she said, 
she had been working with children from the area to paint various walls around the area, 
mural depicting the lives of the Wadi Jemal inhabitants. Her latest project, which the 
municipality had requested, was to paint a mural on the wall of the pedestrian overpass 
between the Wadi and the sea. Maisa completed a plan for the mural and submitted it to 
the members of the municipality council. “I got the idea to do a mural that would reflect 
the history of the Wadi, so I came up with a scene of a valley with camels, as Wadi Jemal 
means Valley of Camels.” This seemed to me a good idea, nothing provocative, nothing 
overtly political. As it turned out, the municipality rejected outright Maisa’s plan: “They 
said it was too political.” As she then explained, the municipality of Wadi Jemal, which is 
Jewish, has been slowly erasing the Palestinian history of the area through the process of 
“Judaization.”6  
                                                
6 The term “Judaization” was the term used by various Israeli governmental and non-
governmental organizations over the last sixty plus years to refer to the process of establishing a 
Jewish demographic majority in Galilee area of Israel. The exact term used by the Jewish Agency, 
the Interior Ministry and the IDF was “Judaization of the Galilee” (Yehud ha-Galil).  As Lustick puts 
it in his discussion of the Military Administration (1948-1967): “The ‘Judaization of the Galilee’ has 
been an ongoing program of the regime undertaken by various governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies” (Lustick 1980, 129). The term is now used to refer more broadly to 
any process of erasing the Palestinian presence inside Israel, from changing street names and 
names of neighborhoods to evictions and the destruction of homes. See also Rabinowitz (1997) 
for an ethnographic and historical account of this governmental program in Nazareth during the 
1950s to present.  
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It would appear that to paint a mural of a valley of camels would to easily recall 
the Arabic name of the area and, more disconcertingly, visually portray the Palestinian 
historical presence in the area. “I was asked to come up with something less controversial 
and more visually appealing: sun, sea, children,” Maisa said. “And what did you come up 
with in the end?” I asked. “Well,” she said, “I proposed a mural looking from the village 
out to the sea, where there are lots of boats with people in them.” “And they were happy 
with that?” I replied. “Yes, they thought it was very beautiful,” she answered. “But?” I 
asked? I got a sense that Maisa hadn’t quite said everything, that the council of the 
municipality finding her proposal “beautiful” wasn’t the whole story. “Well,” she 
continued, “there are boats with people on them, but they are Palestinian refugees 
returning!” “Wow,” I declared. “And I’m guessing the council didn’t notice this detail?” 
“No, not all of them,” Maisa said proudly and with a grin: “Mostly they saw what they 
wanted to see: the sea, the sun and people. Some people noticed, mainly the Palestinians, 
and they liked it but didn’t tell anyone.” She knew her proposal for a mural of a valley of 
camels had a political edge to it, but, being fully aware of what was afoot in the Wadi 
Jemal, she wasn’t prepared to appease the council with something merely “visually 
appealing.” This was the first time I had ever seen Maisa be openly political in her work. 
When I first met her she told me: “My work isn’t political. I don’t have a political idea and 
then make an artwork. The politics comes out naturally, it is not something I think about 
when I paint, it’s there because it’s part of my world. Everything is political here for 
Palestinians.” Yet, with this mural for the Wadi Jemal, Maisa clearly chose to be explicitly 
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political. When I asked her directly about this change of approach, she simply confidently 
retorted, with a smile: “I didn’t have a choice.”  
As was our custom by this point, I had again asked Maisa about the white lines that 
last day we met. While Maisa was still no more willing to offer an explanation, I was ready 
to push further given her revelations about her work at the Wadi Jemal: “So what is 
political about these lines?” I inquired. “What do you mean?” she asked. “Well, I suppose I 
was thinking that their ambiguity might be what makes them political. They seem to have 
multiple interpretations, even, at times, opposing interpretations. I suppose in this way 
they resist being read in any one way, sort of like the people on the boats. Is that what you 
are maybe hoping for?” Maisa was silent for a moment and then looked at me intensely, 
as if she was about to finally reveal the secret of the white lines: “I guess I want people to 
make their own interpretation; it is up to them to decide what they mean. I don’t know if 
this makes them political, but that’s how I see what I do.” At this point I couldn’t help but 
point out that this ambiguity, or incompleteness, was a quality I noticed in almost all of 
her artwork: “I see this same openness in your other work too. For instance, in the portrait 
of the young man with the red kuffiyeh (Figure 3): he’s presented in fuzzy black and white 
while the kuffiyeh is crisp and a vibrant red. Or the various incomplete bodies in a number 
of your sketches and paintings.” “Yes, I suppose that’s true. But really, it’s still up to you to 
interpret them. And I’ll be curious to hear what you write!” 
  
 
Figure 1: Maisa Azaizeh, Untitled, 2010 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Maisa Azaizeh, Untitled, 2009 
  
 
 
Figure 2 (detail 1): Maisa Azaizeh, Untitled 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 (detail 2): Maisa Azaizeh, Untitled
  
Figure 3: Maisa Azaizeh, Untitled, 2008 
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Chapter 1: Art, Politics and the Palestinians in Israel 
 
“Art that tries to be political becomes cliché and boring.” - Eyas Salman, filmmaker 
(personal communication) 
 
Kull shi siyaasi: Everything is Political 
 
Maisa and I agreed to meet each other at Elika in the early afternoon. It was early March 
2010 and I had recently returned to Haifa after a few months away and was eager to start 
meeting with artists in the area. I had heard about Maisa from friends, everyone 
describing her as a highly talented up and coming young artist. I had seen a few of her 
works at a local Palestinian-owned restaurant the week before and was quite excited to 
meet her. When I arrived Maisa was already there, sitting by the window, a beer in hand. 
My friend Riyad introduced us and I sat down. Our conversation started slowly, Maisa 
being shy and this being one of my first interviews. I started by asking her about her art, 
where she had gone to school and what she had recently done, and, as the conversation 
progressed, she in turn asked me about my research. What interests me, I said, is the 
relationship between art and politics, specifically how Palestinian artists in Israel think 
their work is related to such issues as the struggle for equality. 
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My questions seemed to fascinate her. When I asked her if she considered her work 
to be political, she turned toward me and confidently responded: “My work isn’t political: 
I don’t have a political idea and then make an artwork. The politics comes out naturally, it 
is not something I think about when I paint, it’s there because it’s part of my world. 
Everything is political [Arabic: Kull shi siyaasi] here for Palestinians.” Her response 
intrigued me. “So, your art is political by the fact of being where you are, the situation 
within which you live and work? Because you’re Palestinian?” Maisa seemed to agree with 
what I said and repeated what she had already told me: “I never do a painting to make a 
political statement, but what comes out will be political.” I felt as if what she was telling 
me I should understand, it seemed uncomplicated, yet for some reason I was unable to 
appreciate what made her art political for her. I understood that it was not a matter of 
setting out to convey a pre-existing political message or statement; what I did not 
understand was how, if she had no intention of being political, in the end her art was 
nonetheless political. As I was to learn during my fieldwork, art is political because 
everything is political.  
Maisa’s responses to my questions were important at this early stage of my 
research, and her way of expressing the relationship between art and politics in her work 
had a significant impact on the direction of my research to come. Over the coming 
months, as I met with other artists and asked the same question, I heard more or less 
similar versions of what Maisa told me. As Michael Halak put it: “I don’t do politics, it’s 
about art. I want people to appreciate my art for its aesthetic quality.” I was not 
10 
 
convinced: “What about the politics that I so clearly can see in your work?” I asked. “It’s 
there of course, you can’t avoid it. There will always be something political. I paint what I 
see.” When I sat with Durar Bacri in his studio in Tel Aviv he told me: “Of course, being 
Palestinian and living in this city [Tel Aviv] it [art] is going to be political.” Nardeen Srouji 
expressed the idea this way: “My art is personal, but here [Israel] that’s political.” 
Although each artist had a unique way of expressing this idea, each with their own 
inflection, all agreed that everything is political.  
 But what does it mean to say: “everything is political”? Whether in the Occupied 
Territories, the refugee camps, the diaspora or in Israel, it is an idea that many 
Palestinians agree with, young and old, men and women, Muslim and Christian. Yet, while 
kull shi siaasi is not an idiomatic expression or an adage, it is a commonly occurring idea 
that is communicated in different ways in various settings. Be it land or food, speaking or 
listening, the conflict of identities and histories, where you go or who your friends are, 
there is nothing that isn’t political. Yet, in some sense these things are not political as 
such, but rather become political. In other words, everything is not always already 
political; politics emerges when choosing to live in a specific town or city as the only 
Palestinian Arab, to speak Arabic on the train from Tel Aviv to Haifa on a Thursday 
afternoon,7 to teach Palestinian culture and history to one’s students in direct defiance of 
the curriculum guidelines of the Israeli Ministry of Education as was the case with a 
primary school teacher I met during the Land Day March in 2009. These acts become 
                                                
7 Thursday afternoons are the start of the weekend in Israel, during which time soldiers crowd the 
buses and trains on their way home.  
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political because they take place in the context of a society that attempts to keep 
Palestinians unseen and unheard. Art, as a form of cultural production and expression, is 
a prime example of a space where everything becomes political. As Helga Tawil-Souri has 
recently argued, for Palestinians the very act of creating culture or art is a political act, in 
this case an act of resistance:. 
… given Palestinians’ political condition, their cultural praxis – whether of 
the everyday, the institutional, the mundane, or the monumental – is an act 
of resistance, because it de facto attempts to reverse [Golda] Meir’s 
proclamation that Palestinians do not exist; more complicated than that, it 
attempts to negate subjugation and silencing” (Tawil-Souri 2011, 5). 
Given the prohibitions on all forms of Palestinian cultural expression between 1967 and 
1991 in the West Bank and Gaza, Tawil-Souri notes that any effort to counter these 
prohibitions is impossible to read outside of politics. She is referring here to Edward 
Saïd’s “permission to narrate,” for Palestinians to tell their story in the face of their 
silencing and erasure. Indeed, Tawil-Souri (2011, 11) goes on to note that cultural 
expression is “not only about commemoration of the Nakba, but the desire to be visible, 
to be heard, and to be documented”. In this sense, what Maisa appeared to be saying is 
that her work is naturally going to be political because it is an act of appearing, of being 
heard and seen. 
 For Tawil-Souri and others (see Davis 2006, 4), cultural production, whether visual 
art, music, cinema, or literature, is a form of political resistance in so far as it allows for 
the expression of a Palestinian identity that has been denied, subjugated and silenced 
through the policies of the Israeli state. Indeed, across these various forms of cultural 
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expression one often finds assertions of Palestinian identity that counters the Zionist 
narrative of “a land without a people for a people with a land.” As Maisa’s work made 
increasingly obvious and as this thesis will explore, however, there was no identity being 
asserted, there was no self-realization. To be sure, none from this younger generation of 
artists with whom I worked seemed to be creating art in order to assert an identity. Rather, 
as I will argue, each of them was undoing identity; their works serving as acts of what 
Jacques Rancière calls disidentification. Through looking at the work of the artists who 
participated in my research, talking with them, and telling them what I saw, it became 
apparent that the desire to be visible and to be heard was far more complex and 
subversive than the mere expression of a Palestinian identity. As I learned from these 
artists, to be political meant to be visible and audible in ways that disrupted the world in 
which they lived and worked. Thus their art can be seen as acts of politics not in the sense 
of resistance or identity, but primarily as acts of presence.8 
 
Art and Politics in the Colony 
 
This thesis is about what it means for the Palestinian indigenous minority in Israel to 
produce art in a colonial setting that has simultaneously controlled them and excluded 
them. It takes on the question of how Palestinians face discrimination and 
marginalization within a state that defines itself along religious and ethno-national lines 
                                                
8 Johannes Fabian has written extensively on the notion of presence (1991). I have been 
influenced by his writing on this topic, but also by his work on popular painting and memory 
(1996). 
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without making sweeping claims in the name of identity. Most writing about art in colonial 
and postcolonial contexts tends to see art as a resource for asserting repressed ethnic, 
racial and indigenous identities in the face of control and domination. Art, in other words, 
is a political act of self-realization through the assertion of a particular (counter) identity. 
This approach largely follows thinking across art history, art criticism and anthropology 
since the 1980s, which assert that with the globalization of contemporary art there has 
been an unprecedented rise of identity related issues across the art world. Relying on the 
modernist belief in the “universal language” of Western art, colonial and postcolonial 
artists, the argument goes, are afforded a medium within which to demand recognition of 
their identity, be it cultural, ethnic, racial, gender or religious. The central question of the 
present thesis concerns what happens when artists contest the colonial conditions within 
which they live and work but do not demand recognition on the basis of identity.  
More specifically, it explores artistic processes within a context in which 
spatiotemporal regimes of identification are being disrupted by an indigenous national 
minority. With the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 a far-reaching apparatus of control 
and regulation was put into place for the indigenous Palestinian population that 
remained within its borders. By limiting Palestinians’ movements and their ability to 
organize, this apparatus of control had significant impact on social mobility and political 
cohesion among Palestinians. A key component of this apparatus was a series of policies 
that most prominently included a breaking down and dividing of the Palestinian 
population along ethnic and religious lines. This was further coupled with a process of de-
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Palestinianization that separated and divided Palestinians in Israel from the Trans-
Jordan, Gaza and refugees in neighboring Arab countries. I argue that this apparatus of 
control, which exists until this day, is fundamentally a regime of identification that is 
rooted in space and time.9 The space of the state of Israel, according to Zionist ideology, is 
a Jewish space that upon its redemption will suture the temporal rupture of Jews with 
the biblical land of Israel. Thus, the containment and displacement of the Palestinians in 
Israel spatially, through access to land, resources and mobility, is also a temporal 
dislocation, their removal from time. It is against this spatio-temporal displacement that 
the struggle for equality among Palestinians in Israel has been waged since 1948. 
The analysis presented in this research takes its starting point from the 
spatiotemporal organization of Israeli society, how it is, following Jacques Rancière, a 
specific sensible configuration, that is, a distribution of what can be said, heard, thought, 
and done. I argue that Palestinian artists in Israel recognize this sensible order as 
something that is configured to keep Palestinians out of place and out of time, and they 
seek to disrupt and reconfigure it. Yet, given the regime of identification this sensible 
order sustains, Palestinian contemporary artists are also aware that the assertion of 
identity and the demand for its recognition is always in danger of being recuperated and 
neutralized, a point made to me on numerous occasions by the artists who participated in 
my research. Thus, the analysis presented here sets out to show how these Palestinian 
                                                
9 Both Neve Gordon (2008) and Eyal Weizman (2007) offer important studies on the infrastructure 
of control and its spatial dynamics in the Occupied Territories since 1967. Gordon in particular 
notes the historical connection between these infrastructures of control in the Occupied 
Territories and their development in Israel under the Military Administration prior to 1967, a 
glaring omission in Weizman.  
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artists in Israel are engaged in a form of politics as disidentification even though they 
resist the notion of “political art”. Instead, I would argue, Palestinian art in Israel can be 
seen as a “taking place” of politics; that is, a scene for the rupture of the spatio-temporal 
organization of Israeli society and public culture. 
Because of this insistence that their art is neither about identity nor about politics, 
I have found the work of philosopher Jacques Rancière particularly helpful in developing 
the core arguments of this thesis. Coupled with careful and detailed ethnographic 
fieldwork with artists and others in the Palestinian community in Israel, this theoretical 
framework has been especially productive in allowing me to develop how art is not 
invariably tied to identity politics. Importantly, Rancière’s work on aesthetics and politics 
was not unknown to some of the artists with whom I worked, or to other cultural workers, 
such as curators. In this sense, my fieldwork with Palestinian artists was in many ways a 
series of discussions about our mutual interest in certain ideas or philosophical 
perspectives, collaborative in the sense of “co-philosophers” as set out by Paul Radin (see 
Lassiter 2005). Together with these artists, the theoretical framework I set out below 
allows for understanding the “taking place” of the politics of art outside of the 
conventional art as identity paradigm.  
The ethnographic material in this research challenges the notion of a particular 
relationship between art and politics, one that remains largely unexamined in the 
contemporary literature on the anthropology of art, namely, the homologous relationship 
between art and identity. Thus, a major thrust of this thesis is to critically explore the 
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limits of this relationship through an ethnography of art and artists who, living in a 
colonial context and struggling for equality, refuse any such identification. As such the 
thesis is itself an attempt to work with and alongside these artists in their politics. The 
literature on the relationship between art and anthropology has underlined how the two 
practices are both concerned with the examination of culture in contemporary life 
(Marcus and Myers 1995). This literature demonstrates how both are practices of identity 
making, each “tracking, representing, and performing the effects of difference” (Marcus 
and Myers 1995, 1). This affinity between art and anthropology, in other words, points to a 
homologous relationship between art and identity. Yet, if this homologous relationship 
between art and identity is applicable in other cases, for Palestinian artists in Israel a 
different approach is necessary. 
The point of departure for this thesis, then, is how Palestinian artists living in Israel 
are engaging a politics without having recourse to notions of identity. My analysis 
proceeds by considering the figure of the “present absentee,” a legal category created by 
the Israeli state in the 1950s to designate those Palestinian Arabs remaining within the 
newly established state but not on their property. The problems facing the present 
absentees in Israel, often neglected in discussions of the larger refugee question, became 
a topic of debate throughout the 1990s, including the formation of local NGOs who 
became involved in the expression of various forms of public outcry (Masalha 2005). 
Although the present absentee has gained a visibility in Palestinian and Israeli political 
discourse over the last 20 years, when a Palestinian friend, who is not a present absentee, 
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announced one night, in English, that “we are all present absentees,” I was both surprised 
and intrigued. In this seemingly simple statement, which was echoed and amplified by 
many of the people with whom I worked, an impossible identification was made patent. 
Palestinians in Israel who were not present absentees had aligned themselves with a 
minority within a minority, with those whom the state had deemed out of place and out of 
time. The paradox within my friend’s announcement was a political gesture in so far as in 
aligning the struggle of all Palestinians in Israel with the present absentees it overturned 
the regime of identification within this colonial category, disidentifying both those it was 
meant to contain and those who aligned with it. For my research, I considered this to be a 
breakthrough, the disclosure of a figure by which to frame the work of artists whose work 
refused any form of identification, and thus a way of thinking the politics of art without 
identity.  
 
Palestinian Art in Israel, Brief History10 
 
The emergence of Palestinian art within Israel is a relatively recent phenomena, 
beginning at the end of the Military Administration in 1967. With the establishment of the 
Israeli state in 1948 the Palestinians in Israel were put under a Military Administration that 
forcibly contained their movements and controlled their activities. The goal of this 
containment was also to restrict expression, and artistic expression was no exception. It 
                                                
10 For a general history of Palestinian art see Ankori (2006), Boullata (2009) and Shammut (1989). 
Of these, Boullata’s is considered the most comprehensive, though he gives very little attention to 
Palestinian art in Israel.  
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also served to undermine, even deny, Palestinian history and belonging, such that until 
the 1990s Palestinian artists were defined as “Arab Israeli” artists. Thus, it was not until 
the early 1970s that Palestinians in Israel began to enroll in art schools in Israel and 
abroad.  
These early years were quite difficult for Palestinian artists, the institutions within 
which they found themselves marked by a Zionist framework whose visual culture was 
hostile to (or at least excluded) Palestinian history and presence. Working within a 
colonial context has meant not only that the language of instruction is in Hebrew, and 
thus the linguistic setting for the development of creative expression limited, but also the 
visual field available to the artist is also accordingly arranged and distributed: 
This forcible injection of the Jewish into the Palestinian has had a clear 
place within the Zionist visual arts movement since its inception. 
Everything was turned into part of the artificial Jewish inheritance, which 
transformed all aspects of the Palestinian environment – houses and faces, 
clothing and customs, light and sea, shepherd and olive, hills and cacti – 
into part of a Zionist legacy, in a conscious and concerted intellectual effort. 
This is the legacy that the student of the arts imbibes from the Israeli 
academies. Naturally, Arab Palestinian artists must contend with this 
school of thought (Shehada 2012, 2). 
The place and land within which the Palestinian lives is transformed. In this manner the 
Palestinian is not simply “other” but, following Zionist logic of waiting for the arrival of a 
Jewish Messiah, a figure that is out of place and out of time, having passed through 2000 
years of history without leaving any footprint. As Tal Ben-Zvi (2009, n. p.), the director of 
Bezalel Academy, notes:  
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This built-in negation is intertwined and assimilated into the inner logic of 
the Israeli art field, which was shaped as part of the broader logic of the 
developing Israeli nation-culture from the establishment of the Bezalel 
School of Arts and Crafts to the present. 
In contrast to the Palestinian artist in the Occupied Territories or refugee camps or 
diaspora, the Palestinian artist in Israel is embroiled in a state of collusion with Zionist 
thought. It is a relationship of dependence and attachment in which the colonized is 
forced to live side-by-side with the colonizer, and forced to accept the colonial regime 
(Nashif 2012). The place of Palestine, from the land to its history, has been redistributed 
according to a Zionist legacy such that the very body of the Palestinian in Israel, its 
spatial-temporal existence, is structurally predetermined. Contemporary Palestinian 
artists in Israel, despite this impossible complicity, aim to free themselves from this 
legacy. 
 For those artists with whom I worked, this collusion was recurring theme 
throughout our conversations. As Durar explained to me, it was a matter of accepting his 
exclusion as one of the only Palestinian Arab students during his years at Bezalel.11 
Interestingly, on the other hand he countered this by telling the story of how he was 
excluded from the Palestinian art scene in Ramallah because of the fact that he was a 
Palestinian from Israel.12 Michael Halak told the story of how half of the students, all of 
whom were Jewish, enrolled in his course in basic art techniques at the University of Haifa 
decided to abandon the course upon finding out he was an “Arab.” This problem of 
                                                
11 The Bezalel Academy, located in Jerusalem, is considered the most important and prestigious 
art school in Israel. Established in 1906 the aim of the school was to foster a national style of art 
using Biblical and Zionist themes. See Manor (2001). 
12 See chapter 4. 
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collusion and complicity also split many artists when it came to seeking funding, with 
some refusing any money from the Israeli state and others arguing that, as part of the 
society, they have a right to these funds as much as any Jewish Israeli.13 
 The lack of financial support for Palestinian art is felt widely across the nearly 180 
Palestinian cultural associations in Israel. From 2010 to 2012 the Ministry of Culture has 
allotted less than 2% of the annual budget to the Palestinian community (Zaher, personal 
communication). Funding is further regulated by local councils who decide which of those 
cultural associations are to receive funding. As Jamal Hasan, the director of Ibda’a (The 
Arab Association for Plastic Arts) in Kufir Yasif and one of first cultural associations with 
an educational and gallery space, explained to me, the increasing cuts in funding have 
put most of the Palestinian cultural associations in Israel on the verge of collapse. It is 
therefore not difficult to imagine that the Palestinian artistic community is deeply 
fragmented, with many artists working in isolation and little coordination between 
associations and galleries. In 2010 there was a brief moment of hope that a space for 
Palestinian art in Israel had arrived to finally bring together artists and public. 
 Through the work of Ahmad Canaan, a visual artist from Tamra, and Amir Neuman 
Ahuvia, an entrepreneur and social activist, in 2010 the Jaffa Salon of Palestinian Art was 
set up in the Jaffa port. With Canaan as curator, the salon opened in May 2010 to large 
                                                
13 One of the artists I had hoped to include in this study was Ahlam Shibli. Ahlam Shibli, a 
Palestinian of Bedouin descent, is an internationally recognized art photographer who lives in 
Haifa. In 2003 she was awarded the prestigious Gottesdiener Israeli Art Prize. When I contacted 
her in 2010 she firmly refused my invitation to meet on the grounds that my research focused on 
artists that are Palestinian citizens of Israel. In her reply she stated: “I am from Palestine and that 
doesn’t fit with your research.” 
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crowds and was generally considered to be a great success. The salon was the first gallery 
space dedicated to Palestinian art in Israel, to encourage and exhibit young and 
upcoming artists and to foster sales of works. In 2011 Canaan and Neuman, along with 
the support of Serge Tiroche, a prominent art dealer in Tel Aviv, established an annual 
prize for the best Palestinian artist, with the winner receiving 20,000 NIS prize and an 
exhibition.14 For reasons unknown, the salon closed its doors in the fall of 2011, with 
Ahmad Canaan also closing his gallery in Tamra soon thereafter. 
 Today the Palestinian art scene in Israel remains as fragmented as ever. As several 
artists told me, exhibition opportunities are rare and when the opportunity does arise it is 
often as part of group shows with Jewish Israeli artists. These exhibits usually have a 
distinctly political tone to them with the Palestinian artist included as a token 
representative (a “pet Arab”), a demonstration of Israel’s democratic character (see 
Barsky 2011). Therefore, when it comes to defining Palestinian artists in these exhibits, 
whether in Israel or internationally, the colonial regime of identification is invoked in clear 
and uncertain terms. It is the contestation of this regime of identification through their art 
practices and works that this thesis will discuss. 
 
                                                
14 Rumors surrounding the closure of the Salon included mismanagement of funds and a 
dwindling willingness of established artists to participate. A few artists mentioned to me their 
decision to withdraw from the Salon due to Ahmad Canaan’s undervaluing of their works, but, 
more significantly, the choice to create an award for a Palestinian artist which would have an 
exhibition of their work take place in a confiscated refugee property, where the gallery of Serge 
Tiroche, ST-ART, is located.  
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Evolution of the Research Project 
 
This project started with an inquiry into the state of cultural rights among the Palestinians 
in Israel. In 2009 I left for the field15 with the idea that the struggle for Palestinians in Israel 
concerned two core demands: equality and cultural autonomy. My particular interest was 
in how cultural rights were being formulated and practiced within Palestinian NGOs in 
Israel and their impact on the demand for equality.16 My questions focused on how 
individuals involved in the work of NGOs defined culture and in what way these 
definitions were being translated in the practices of local organizations and communities.  
The core demands of equality and autonomy were articulated in the 1990s by Azmi 
Bishara, the founder of Balad (or the National Democratic Assembly), one of the most 
prominent Palestinian political parties in Israel [Arabic: al-Tajamu al-Watani al-
Ademucrati).17 The question of equality is a demand that stems back to 1948 and the 
granting of citizenship to those Palestinians remaining within the Israeli state. For the 
most part this citizenship was largely formal: the right to vote and to stand for election. In 
                                                
15 Fieldwork was carried out for 15 months between February 2009 and June 2011. 
16 Palestinian Israeli NGOs are the key players in the civil and political demands of Palestinians in 
Israel and have close relationships with most of the Palestinian political parties in Israel, both 
practically and ideologically. As of 2005 there were over 700 registered local Palestinian NGOs in 
Israel. See Payes (2005). 
17 In 2007 Azmi Bishara went into exile after being accused of treason. Today any party or party 
member that openly challenges the definition of Israel as a Jewish state is subject to being 
banned from the ballot list, both individually and/or as a party. Over the years, numerous 
Palestinian political parties have been removed by the Elections Committee only to be reinstated 
by the Israeli High Court. The most recent instance was the ban of Haneen Zuabi of the Balad 
party in December 2012, which the Israeli High Court overturned in a unanimous ruling on 30 
December 2012: http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/30/257826.html (last accessed 30 
December 2012).  
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most circumstances, Palestinians in Israel were excluded from social and political spheres 
through a system of widespread discrimination and segregation. The demand for equality 
that Bishara put forward goes further by calling on Israel to be a “state for all its citizens,” 
where each and every citizen is guaranteed the same rights, regardless of religion or 
ethnicity. Bishara also demanded the recognition of Palestinians in Israel as a national 
and cultural minority with distinct collective rights. These rights include the Palestinian 
community in Israel to manage its cultural activities independently. For Bishara, the 
demand for cultural autonomy is meant to reinforce the struggle against colonization in 
an active way (Bishara 1993). Importantly, the idea of cultural autonomy for Bishara is to 
be buttressed by civic and political equality, and is thus a goal that follows rather than 
precedes or coincides with the attainment of full equality. 
My first four months of fieldwork were devoted to working with members of 
Adalah (English: Justice), a Haifa-based legal NGO.18 As one of the most prominent 
Palestinian NGOs in Israel, Adalah’s work covers a broad range of legal and political issues, 
which also include questions of cultural rights for the Palestinian minority. In my 
meetings and interviews with the director and other lawyers, my queries about the state 
of cultural rights were met with a resounding consensus: Following Azmi Bishara, all 
agreed that cultural rights had to wait, that putting them ahead of more basic civic and 
                                                
18 In addition to my work at Adalah, this period was also focused on language training and getting 
to know Palestinians in the Masada neighborhood where I was living. These daily conversations 
with Palestinians in the area were important in my coming to understand the issues facing them, 
from their relationships with Jewish Israelis, their family villages, other Palestinians to political 
parties and experiences of discrimination. This préterrain was highly formative in understanding 
the issues and struggles facing the Palestinians in Israel, not to mention the obstacles they faced 
in their everyday lives.  
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political rights would not only jeopardize the latter, but more importantly might run the 
risk of ghettoizing Palestinians in Israel. While I understood their arguments and concerns, 
an article by the Palestinian political scientist Amal Jamal (2008) a year earlier had argued 
that despite these concerns a “default cultural autonomy” was in place on the ground. 
That is, a pre-existing cultural autonomy was forming outside of the work of NGOs and 
Palestinian political parties in Israel. To this they agreed, there was cultural activity 
among the Palestinian community, but they had little to add in terms of what this activity 
might have to contribute to the struggle for equality or where these cultural producers 
might be.  
Over the last couple months of this initial stage of research, with my initial project 
in disarray, I was curious where this cultural activity was taking place, who these cultural 
producers might be and what they were doing. I was also unsatisfied with the idea that 
cultural activity had nothing to contribute to the demand for equality among the 
Palestinians in Israel. As I started asking around among friends in Haifa and Nazareth 
about this cultural activity, I discovered that the neighborhood in which I was living in 
Haifa was the central “hub” for Palestinian artists in Israel. This little neighborhood of 
cafés (all life in the area circulated around the cafés) had Palestinian writers, actors, 
painters, filmmakers, musicians, as well as left-wing journalists, academics and everyday 
philosophers. Having spent much of my time in the neighborhood and its cafés, I had 
been aware of these artists in the area, most notably Juliano Mer-Khamis and Salah Bacri, 
but I had little knowledge of how it was a general gathering point for aspiring Palestinian 
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artists from villages and towns across the north of Israel. With the University of Haifa 
nearby, apartments that were generally inexpensive and a bohemian lifestyle many 
Palestinians did not have in their villages, the area attracted Palestinians from all over the 
country. As I soon discovered, there was a vibrant and engaging scene of Palestinian 
cultural production.  
 
Masada Street: The “Field” 
 
As one walks down Masada Street in Haifa it quickly becomes apparent that the 
neighborhood is not in any way characteristic of Haifa or anywhere else in Israel. As my 
friend Bilal once put it, rather matter of factly: “Masada is not Haifa.” In a stretch of no 
more than 100 meters are four cafés, multiple small boutiques and an atypical group of 
residents. Walking on the north side of the street from east to west, from HaShalom 
toward Balfour Street, the first thing one notices is an increase in graffiti on the fronts and 
sides of the buildings along the street. Within a few meters is the Bardo Store, a small 
urban underground boutique for skate, graffiti and urban fashion. Proceeding down the 
street, there is a used bookstore (principally in Hebrew with a few English titles), a 
hairdresser, and a number of other miscellaneous shops and boutiques. Just after these 
shops a large trunk of a tree stretches horizontally a couple meters above the sidewalk 
before returning to a vertical ascent.  
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Upon passing under the hulking trunk is the first café on the street, Elika. A 
Palestinian owned café, Elika calls itself an art bar café, with monthly movie nights 
showing local Palestinian filmmakers, a small gallery space within the café and a popular 
hangout for many Palestinians, from writers, actors, musicians, artists to others. The 
owner is Waheed, a Druze who has spent time in jail for refusing to serve in the military, a 
predicament for many Druze men since 1948 who have been forced to serve (see 
Kanaaneh 2009). A few meters further down the street is Zoom Café, a relatively new 
place that occupies the same space as Café Katan, the first café in Masada that opened in 
the mid-2000s. Across the street is Pazel Coffee, a Jewish only café and the only one on 
the southern side of the street. About 50 meters further down the street is Café Masada, a 
Jewish owned café. The owner, Eran, runs a place where Palestinians and Jews mix freely 
and patrons engaging in anti-Palestinian speech are systematically asked to leave.  
For the Israeli media and visitors to the area, Masada is a symbol of co-existence, 
of Arabs and Jews living and socializing together and more. Outside of the artificial co-
existence communities in Israel, such as Wadi Salaam and Givat Haviva,19 the Masada 
neighborhood is not the result of any formal initiative or planning and thus is totally 
unique. For many Palestinians in the neighborhood it is a place outside of the eyes of their 
village where they can do as they wish. But this seemingly peaceful oasis of co-existence 
                                                
19 While these two are established “co-existence” communities, co-existence in Israel is a loaded 
and contentious idea. For many Jewish Israelis on the left it is an idea espoused and rewarded 
when visible, as in the case of Masada Street and the throng of journalists I witnessed in 2009, 
including one contacting me for an interview about a blog piece I wrote about the area at the time. 
For Palestinians the idea of “co-existence” is a term of amusement and ridicule. See 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-amusing-term-coexistence-1.256042 
(coincidentally, the author lives in the Masada neighborhood). 
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turned out to be no more than an illusion. When Azad, a nearby Palestinian owned 
restaurant refused to allow uniformed soldiers into their restaurant, cleavages erupted 
and lines were redrawn. Not surprisingly, and as I found out first hand, the cafés were the 
most visible barometers of these events: Elika became the Palestinian café and Café 
Masada becoming the Jewish café.  
 
Fieldwork 
 
When I returned to Haifa in the winter of 2010 I asked my friend Riyad to introduce to me 
artists in the area, particularly contemporary artists working in painting, installation, 
photography and video. Within a day of my being back in Haifa I was sitting at a table with 
Nardeen Srouji, an artist from Nazareth now living in Haifa. A week later I was scheming 
with Riyad to “accidentally” run into Sharif Waked, an internationally renowned artist 
who also lived in the area, but who was generally reluctant to give interviews about his 
work. Over the coming weeks, I met numerous artists, both up and coming as well as 
more senior and well established in their fields.  I was visiting galleries and studios, 
discussing with friends the Palestinian art scene, and slowly starting to prepare for more 
formal interviews in the coming weeks. I also met cultural workers, those people running 
the cultural organizations, the curators, the gallery owners and, when possible, the 
buyers of art.   
28 
 
 My research focused on the practices and works of five Palestinian artists living 
and working in Israel. They were chosen with some concern for physical location, gender 
and the content of their work. My first aim was to consider those artists living and working 
in Haifa, as part of this small community of Palestinian artists. This decision was based on 
being able to spend time with these artists both in and out of their studios, to meet for 
dinners, drinks and other people, and be part of their art worlds.20  With the exception of 
Durar Bacri, all of the artists I worked with live and work in Haifa, though each also retains 
a strong tie to their familial villages. In the case of Michael Halak, from Fassouta (a 
Christian village near the border with Lebanon), and now living in Haifa, I was very 
interested to get to know him and his work as he was the only one of the five artists who 
worked in the hyperrealist genre of painting. He was the first Palestinian contemporary 
artist to work in this style, which gave his work a quality that, as he put it, “made the real 
more real.” As the sole non-Haifa resident, Durar Bacri was pointed out to me by friends 
from his home town, Akka, just across the bay from Haifa. While Durar lives and works in 
Tel Aviv, his Akka roots are never far from hand in his practice and work. Durar’s work also 
stood out for his outstanding talent, a painter’s painter if you will. As the first artist I met, 
Nardeen Srouji (a Christian originally from Nazareth) gave me a privileged access to 
Palestinian art world, from other artists to curators and galleries. More importantly, 
however, her work had a personal dimension that underscored a sensibility to issues that 
                                                
20 When I asked a few of the artists if they would prefer I not use their real name in the research, 
they insisted that I must use their real names. I then consulted with the other artists who likewise 
agreed. This is significant as it is again a demonstration of their desire to seen and heard: to be 
present. 
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seemed to go unaddressed by male artists. Similarly, Maisa, from Dabborya (a Muslim 
village east of Nazareth), and now living and working in Haifa, revealed a point of view on 
Palestinian society that was deeply personal, an attentiveness to the body and its 
surroundings. Finally, Sharif Waked, whose family are refugees (present absentees) from 
the Muslim village of Saffuriyya and who now lives and works in Haifa, is an 
internationally recognized artist whose video work instantly entrances the spectator. 
Given the international stature of Sharif’s work, his participation in the research allowed 
me to see how the issues within the works of contemporary Palestinian artists in general 
were being addressed by an artist working in the “global art world.”21 
 Undoubtedly a key factor in choosing these five artists was the impression their 
work made upon me. Well before I had come to understand their works and the issues 
and questions they were addressing, something within each of their works kept me 
wanting to know more. And even though there was considerable divergence in the styles 
and subjects, there was an affinity between them that I felt but could not explain. If this 
type of reasoning seems abstract and enigmatic, when approaching an art object it is 
precisely this sensibility that must be reckoned with. Following Davide Panagia (2009, 2), 
                                                
21 Over the period of my fieldwork I met with other artists, some less often than others, but for 
various reasons was unable to include them in the thesis. Most notably was Mahmoud Kaiss, a 
young artist at the University of Haifa from Nahef, and a student of Michael. I wanted to include 
Mahmoud in my research but our schedules and language barriers ultimately proved 
insurmountable. Mahmoud was more at ease discussing his work in Hebrew (which I did not 
know) than Arabic and he did not speak English. There was also Rana Bishara from Tarshiha and 
now living and working in Beit Jala outside of Bethlehem. Rana and I talked often, meeting a few 
times in Haifa, but were unable to coordinate my visiting her at her home. And there was Raafat 
Hattab, a multimedia queer artist living and working in Tel Aviv, and originally from Jaffa. With 
Rafaat it was mainly due to his overbooked schedule that we were only able to meet a couple 
times during my fieldwork. 
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what I felt was a sensation that interrupted my sensibilities, those conventional ways of 
seeing the world; an experience of what he calls disarticulation or disfiguration as 
collective political moments.  
 My aim for this research was not only to speak with artists and view their work, but 
to meet them in their studios and discuss their art in the context of its production to the 
extent that this would be possible. I wanted to also see and understand the world in 
which they lived and worked. Recalling Howard Becker’s (1982) “art worlds”, this 
approach included meeting and talking with non-artists an other types of artists such as 
musicians, filmmakers, actors, writers. It also included interactions outside of the world 
of art per se, from participating in public talks, political events and demonstrations to 
joining friends with their families for dinners and drinks, birthdays and weddings. These 
“art worlds” were invaluable to my learning and understanding the worlds within which 
contemporary Palestinian artists in Israel live and work.  
 My work with artists in this project included a series of meetings over several 
months, with some constraints depending on schedules. Many of these meetings began 
as conversations, general discussions about them, their work, their influences, as well as 
broader issues of politics and society. As our meetings progressed, I developed a series of 
questions on the basis of these conversations that would be used in a more systematic 
fashion with each of the artists, following a semi-structured interview format.  This 
approach made it possible to compare their individual experiences and responses. The 
questions developed were broad in nature, mainly having to do with the artists’ 
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perceptions of the relation between art and politics, the role of the Palestinian artists in 
Israel, perceptions of their profession and work by family, Palestinian and Jewish society 
and audiences. From this starting point I was able to elaborate a more focused series of 
questions for each artist that were based on the responses of the earlier broader 
questions. 22  These questions focused on particular aspects of their work, their 
backgrounds and experiences, and delved further into their ideas about art, society and 
politics.  Over the last period of my fieldwork in meetings with the artists I reverted to a 
less formal structure, returning to a conversational approach. This allowed breathing 
space and let our discussions become more personal while at the same time allowing me 
to share with them my impressions and interpretations of their work, conceptual issues 
(e.g., Rancière) and the other artists with whom I was working. In some cases these more 
in-depth conversations about other artists led them to establish contact with one other.  
This response was unexpected but very welcome, especially in the context of an artistic 
community that is in many ways a deeply fragmented, as I will discuss below. 
 One of the aspects that came out most clearly in my interactions with artists, 
though perhaps less so with curators and other cultural workers, was the unrelenting 
rejection of identity as a means to understanding and interpreting their practice and work. 
If some of the artists were less vocal about it, others, such as Sharif Waked, were 
confrontational, telling me explicitly to stop bothering with thinking of his practice and 
work in terms of identity. For Michael Halak the reproach was subtler, him sending me the 
                                                
22 This technique is similar to what Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2008), referring to the work of 
Glaser and Strauss on “grounded theory,” discusses as the iterative function of qualitative 
research. 
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text for a show of his work at the Tel Aviv Museum in which the curator struggles with the 
problem of linking his work to identity. This was a point I appreciated early on in my 
fieldwork and it forced me to rethink not only the relationship between art and identity, 
but art and politics as well. It was a point underlined in a recent short text by Husni al-
Khatib Shehada, a Palestinian art historian at Bezalel Academy for Arts and Design in 
Israel. In his text Shehada (2012, 2-3) discusses the world of Palestinian artists in Israel 
today, a world that mirrors developments in the institutions of the global art world: 
There is no doubt that admittance to these institutes requires students to 
probe pain within themselves and to search for a lost and marginalized 
cultural identity, in order to reconcile it with the prevailing political 
“wisdom”: the United States is the ultimate location for self-expression by 
the artist, in a place of freedom and democracy. This educational approach 
is also dominant in Israel, as a “democratic” entity that allows Palestinian 
artists to search for themselves, for their identities and personalities. In 
most cases, what befalls the Palestinian artist in Israel is what befalls him or 
her in the United States, since visual expression necessarily requires a 
negative view of the student’s background. He must therefore confront the 
past with courage and present this negative image in its entirety; if he does 
not, then he is not being “true to himself”. 
Here Shehada is attacking the regime of identification that underlies the global (Western) 
art world, pointing to its demand that one must speak in terms of identity to pass into its 
ranks and that this identity must be rendered as a matter of individual experience or self-
actualization. Shehada’s words on this matter meant a great deal to the artists with 
whom I worked, and is an issue to which I will return to chapter 3.  
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Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, with five extended descriptions about the 
different artists included in the research, interspersed between the chapters as a series of 
interludes. These interludes are based on my interviews and conversations with each of 
the artists, and are oriented toward providing a background to their work as well as a 
view of the production of knowledge itself. The structure of the chapters is as follows: 
chapter two gives the historical background of the social and political conditions of the 
Palestinian community in Israel and the spatiotemporal world within which they live; 
chapter three opens to a discussion of the relationship of art and anthropology around 
the issues of identity, space and place; chapter four develops the theoretical framework 
of the thesis, examining the notion of politics followed by the relationship of art and 
politics; chapter five is an analysis of the findings of my research with a specific focus and 
analysis of the works of the artists.  
 Chapter two is not a historical account of the Palestinians in Israel. It is not, in 
other words, a chronological narrative of events, political parties, social mores, or cultural 
customs. Instead, my aim in this second chapter is to provide an overview of the sensible 
world within which Palestinian in Israel live. I argue that this world is configured as a 
particular spatiotemporal order following the Zionist ideology of Israel as a Jewish state. 
It is a configuration where the Palestinians inside this state are contained and controlled 
to maintain this order.  
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Chapter three considers the claim that culture is the shared object of 
anthropology and contemporary art by exploring the spatial moorings underlying the 
idea of culture as a “site” of difference and contestation. I argue that this spatial 
conception of culture leads to an understanding of anthropology and art as practices of 
place making. In the final part of the chapter, I look to anthropology and art as practices 
of place making and ask whether the continued adherence to culture as the site of 
identity/difference has not led to an over-emphasis on the question of identity politics.  
Chapter four lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis following the writings 
of Jacques Rancière. The first section is focused on the notion of politics as a practice of 
the disruption of the distribution of the sensible [le partage du sensible], or configuration 
of what is visible, sayable, audible, doable. At the heart of this disruption is a verification 
of equality that has been twisted by the sensible order, an equality of anyone with 
everyone. The second section turns to Rancière’s conception of political subjectivation as 
the act of politics in which a political subject takes place. In the third part I then examine 
how this notion of politics is positioned in his understanding of art through the idea of 
aesthetic equality.  
Chapter five delves further into the notion of the present absentee as a polemical 
and political gesture, how this colonial category is being appropriated by Palestinian 
artists in Israel as a figure of political subjectivity, an impossible identification that 
ruptures the sensible order. The next section concentrates on a series of tropes within art 
works from the artists as instances of this alignment with the figure of the present 
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absentee (these tropes are heuristic devices and therefore should not be read as reducing 
the artists and their works to specific motifs).  I then consider how these sensible 
disruptions can be seen as the taking place of politics, that is, how they are stagings for 
the rupture, suspension and interruption of the spatial and temporary configuration of 
Israeli society. In the final chapter I conclude by returning to the idea of the appropriation 
of the category of the present absentee as an act of political subjectivation in which an 
“impossible identification” becomes the condition for reimagining the common and 
being-in-common.   
The conclusion returns to the questions that were set out at the beginning of the 
present chapter regarding the role of cultural production in the struggle for equality 
among the Palestinians in Israel. It also highlights a number of threads not addressed in 
this project as suggestions for future research.  
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Durar Bacri: Interruption 
 
“If you want to meet artists, you must meet Durar!” exclaimed my friend Jamal, “he’s 
important and a really good artist.” “What does he do,” I asked? “Painting, video, 
photography, installation?” “He’s a painter, a very good one,” Jamal replied. “Sounds 
great, where does he live,” I asked? “Tel Aviv. But he’s from Akka, an ‘Akkawi, from the 
Bacri family and a good friend of mine, just tell him Jimmy sent you.” “Hold on, Tel Aviv? 
Really? I didn’t think any Palestinians lived in Tel Aviv,” I quipped, with a smile and a hint 
of sarcasm. The idea that I would be meeting a Palestinian artist living and working in Tel 
Aviv seemed odd, as none of the artists I had met until that point lived or worked in Tel 
Aviv. That said, I knew that Palestinians lived in Tel Aviv, either for school or work, 
notwithstanding Joseph Massad’s misleading claim to the contrary,23 but I was all the 
more intrigued to know that an artist, not to mention an artist from Akka, an ‘Akkawi,24 
was living and working in the heart of Israel’s “global city” whose population is nearly 
                                                
23 In an article for al-Jazeera (18.11.2011), “Truth, Facts and Facts on the Ground,” Joseph Massad 
(Associate Professor of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University) 
writes (my emphasis): “It is Israeli laws that restrict access to Israel's lands to its non-Jewish 
Palestinian citizens, even though 90 per cent of that land was confiscated from the Palestinian 
people. It is also Israeli cities that remain Araberrein; indeed, as many observers have noted, Tel 
Aviv is the only Western city that does not have any Arab or Muslim inhabitants.” We are never told 
who these many observers are, but in my short experience I met many Arab and Muslim 
inhabitants of Tel Aviv. See  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/2011102583358314280.html (last accessed 
14.3.2012) 
24 People from Akka (Acre) often consider themselves to be the most “true” Palestinians. From my 
experience, this wasn’t arrogance but a matter of pride and was expressed by the emphatic 
declaration: “ana ‘akkawi,” (I am an ‘Akkawi, which literally means a person from Akka). For my 
friend Jamal, also from Akka, the status of people from Akka was also present in the Arabic they 
spoke, which he said was much richer in expressions.  
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92% Jewish. A few days later I talked with Durar by telephone and we agreed to meet at 
his studio the following week. 
Following a stop off at the Salon for Palestinian Art in the Jaffa port, and given its 
proximity, no more than a few kilometres, I decided to walk to Durar’s studio on Chlenov 
Street in the Florentine neighborhood in the south of Tel Aviv. The Florentine is a well-
known area with a distinctive assortment of people, from artists to migrant workers, 
ample galleries and generally an evening hot spot. It is also an area that has undergone 
considerable change and development (i.e., gentrification) over the last years. Meeting 
me downstairs, I followed Durar up to the top floor of a relatively non-descript apartment 
building, to his studio, effectively a small 4-room apartment situated across the street 
from his home, where he lives with his girlfriend and her son. Entering the apartment 
directly into the living room, I immediately noticed the art works, small and large, 
originals and photographic reproductions blanketing the walls; to my right a vivid 
painting of young boy, a fisherman, with a downward gaze, standing on a quay, fishing 
rod in hand (Figure 4); opposite, to the left, on the top right of the wall, a shirtless male 
figure at an angle, back to the viewer, his body streaming in what seemed to be a dark oil, 
his hands covering his ears, his head slightly raised, facing a wall: a self-portrait of Durar 
as a muezzin (figure 5).25 On the floor, leaning against the wall directly in front of the 
                                                
25 A muezzin is the person who calls for prayer in Islam. Durar was proud to point out that this self-
portrait is now hanging in the Israeli embassy in Australia. The irony was not lost given recent calls 
by members of the Knesset, with the support of Netanyahu himself, to ban mosques from using 
loudspeakers to call for prayer – ‘to end the suffering from the noise’ as one MK put it. See 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-backs-law-to-ban-loudspeakers-at-
mosques-1.400875 (last accessed 17.03.12). See chapter 2. 
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entrance, across the room, slightly hidden by the coffee table, a plush green Galilee 
landscape against the backdrop of a dark and ominous gray sky (Figure 6). 
I sat on the couch as Durar prepared us two coffees. He asked me about my 
research: Why Palestinian art? What do I want to know? I explained to him my project, my 
interest in understanding the connection between art and politics among Palestinians in 
Israel.  He appeared to understand precisely what I had said, picked up his pack of 
cigarettes, offering me one, and with cigarette and coffee in hand, got up and went to the 
room just to the right of where we were sitting. “Come, look,” he said. I followed into the 
room, cigarette and coffee in hand. Durar sat down on a small stool near the corner of the 
room, hunching over his computer. “What do you think of this?” he asked enthusiastically. 
I looked at the image on the screen, a painting of a young man in a red shirt and jeans 
next to a goat in a rocky landscape (Figure 7). “I just saw this a couple days ago in an 
article about Amos Schoken, with him standing in front of it in his office,”26 I replied. “I like 
it!” “Yeah, he [Amos] bought it a few years ago, he’s a good friend and buys a lot of my 
work,” Durar added. Before I had a chance to get another word in, Durar started to 
breakdown some of the details in the painting: “Look, it’s a self-portrait. Instead of an old 
man in a hatta, it’s a young man, in jeans and t-shirt. But look closely, look at the belt – 
                                                
26 Amos Schocken is the owner and publisher of Ha’aretz, one of Israel’s leading newspapers. The 
article I was referring to is a piece by David Remnick in The New Yorker (28 February 2011: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/28/110228fa_fact_remnick - last accessed 
14.03.12).  
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it’s from Crocker. You know Crocker? It’s a company that won’t hire Arabs. The jeans and 
t-shirt are from Crocker too.”27  
Durar then turned around to show me another painting, an unfinished view of the 
marina in Akka that had been commissioned for a private collector through his Russian 
agent (Figure 8). As I looked at it I was somewhat befuddled, “It’s nice, but there’s 
something missing…” “Ah, yes,” Durar said, “you saw, there’s no minarets!” “But why?” I 
asked. “The person buying the painting asked me to paint Akka without any religious 
symbols,” Durar replied. Why would anyone ask for a view of Akka without the major 
symbols that define it?28 Durar’s answer was referring to the fact that the buyer did not 
want to have a painting that uncovers the history and the original inhabitants of the place. 
In the end he said, “it’s a commission.” However, he did point out, with a grin, that there’s 
very little mistaking the dome in the front right is clearly a mosque, despite the missing 
minaret. I then noticed another painting directly behind us, again unfinished. “Yeah, I 
have a few paintings I’m working on at the same time,” Durar said without my having 
pressed him. This was another self-portrait, this time of Durar sitting in front of an 
unfinished canvas painting, a paintbrush in one hand, a cigarette in the other (Figure 9).  
                                                
27 In 2009, Channel 2 News (Israel) reported that the Crocker chain had fired Arab workers on the 
basis that: “one of the managers was tired of seeing Arabs working in the company’s shops.” In a 
report by Mada al-Carmel, the Arab Center for Applied Social Research: “the Arabs were dismissed 
because they were Arabs. ‘There is no difference between Gaza and Taibeh [Palestinian Arab town 
in Israel in the ‘triangle’],’ the manager was recorded as saying. ‘You can’t find normal people to 
work? I am not willing to have people from Taibeh work in our shops.’” (Israel and the Palestinian 
Minority: Political Monitoring Report Covering September-November 2009, Issue No. 6, 2010, 
Mada al-Carmel, p. 12: http://mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/PMP%20PDF/PMR6-eng/pmr6-
eng-final-final.pdf - last accessed 14.03.12) 
28 The dome is from the el-Jazar Mosque in the center of the old city, which dominates the view of 
Akka. The el-Jazar mosque was completed in 1781 and is the largest mosque in Israel after al-
Quds (Jerusalem). Coincidentally, Jamal’s father is the custodian of the mosque.  
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We slowly returned to the couch and, turning to Durar, I asked him why he felt the 
first painting he showed me, Self portrait with a goat, was political. Almost matter-of-
factly, Durar said it was not “directly political” as in “making a statement,” but more in 
the sense of turning particular representations of Arabs on their head: “The goat is 
important. Israelis like to joke a lot about how Arabs have sexual relationships with their 
goats and other animals. If you see, I’m looking at the goat suspiciously, as if I can trust 
him anymore, as if he has given me a bad reputation. But there’s also a sexual tension in 
my look, something still there, we’re both unsure.” Durar continued, “and the Crocker 
outfit is also subversive. It’s a cliché for younger Arabs to wear Crocker clothes, but we 
can’t work there.” I interject, “is it self-critical too?” “Hmmm, I don’t know, perhaps,” he 
answered: “Yeah, I suppose, it’s about us [Palestinians] being part of society…” At this 
point our discussion veered off the topic of his paintings and more generally about 
politics. He told me about his mother who was a great singer and actress, how he started 
painting at a very young age, 29  about his art school training at Bezalel, the most 
prestigious art academy in Israel, and what it was like to be one of the only Arabs in the 
school,30 to learn art and art history in a language that is not his own, his ambivalence 
regarding the famous film of his cousin, Mohammed Bacri, Jenin, Jenin.31 
                                                
29 “From a very young age I would just paint and draw and already my family saw my talent; my 
mother always encouraged me to be an artist.” 
30 “I was only of a few Arab art students at the academy and we were mostly ignored and 
excluded; but I didn’t care, I was strong, but some of my friends didn’t handle it too well.” 
31 “It wasn’t honest enough; it needed to show what really happened but didn’t.” Jenin, Jenin is 
the controversial documentary about the Israeli invasion of a Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin in 
2002.   
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We both lit another cigarette, and after a few minutes of silence, Durar jumped up 
and pulled out another painting to show me. But before showing me the painting, he 
asked me if I had ever looked closely at the back of the Israeli agora (agorot),32 had I ever 
noticed behind the Menorah that is on the back the map of greater (Eretz) Israel? “Most 
people don’t notice this, don’t even see it,” Durar continued, “which is amazing because it 
tells you exactly what their aims are: Israel from Iraq to Egypt.” Durar started to talk more 
about politics and his belief that the goal of Israel was the disappearance of Palestinians. 
He then turned back to the painting he pulled out (Figure 10). “Look, what do you see?” 
he asked me. “I see a picture of your neighborhood, a cityscape,” I replied, knowing full 
well that I was missing something, that I was supposed to see more. And indeed, there 
was more to see. “No, look more closely!” Durar demanded, but still I did not see what he 
wanted me to see, what he wanted his viewer to see. I was embarrassed; I should see 
what he wants me to see, what he thinks I should see, what all spectators should see. I 
gave up, “ what am I supposed to see?” “In the middle, what do you see?” Durar crisply 
insisted. “I see an old building, seemingly abandoned,” I hesitatingly replied. “Exactly!” 
Durar exclaimed, “but what about it?” Without waiting he straightaway drew my attention 
to the Arab arch in the building at the center of the painting, which I had noticed: “You see, 
an Arab arch surrounded.” He then proceeded to tell me about the mise-en-scène of the 
painting: “Do you see the light coming from behind, moving with the big city behind, 
                                                
32 The agora or agorot is a small copper/nickel/aluminum money unit worth 10 agora or 
1/100 of a shekel. This particular version of the agorot was introduced in the early 1990s. After 
Durar told me this story, I was told by friends of the story of Arafat keeping a pocketful of agora to 
show people how Israel had its sights set on the large swaths of the Middle East.   
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slowly swallowing this building, and everything else, the whole Florentine? This area is 
going to disappear in a few years as it gets developed and they kick out the migrant 
workers and the artists.”  
At 28, Durar is full of confidence, almost arrogant: “I want to be known as a great 
painter!” he said on more than one occasion. As we met over the weeks talking, smoking 
far too many cigarettes and drinking copious cups of coffee, to the point where I was 
unable to sleep at night, Durar’s work undoubtedly left an indelible impression upon me. 
After our last meeting, some weeks before I returned home from my fieldwork, as I took 
the train back to Haifa, I wondered if his aspiration to be a great painter would come to 
fruition or whether, with the eventual fad of Palestinian artists in Israel passed, he would 
disappear. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Durar Bacri,Young fisherman from Yaffa, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Durar Bacri, Self-portrait with a mask, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Durar Bacri, Galilee Landscape, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Durar Bacri, Self-portrait with a goat, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Durar Bacri, Acre’s Marina, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Durar Bacri, Self-portrait, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Durar Bacri, South Tel-Aviv, looking from the roof, Lewinsky St., 2010 
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Chapter 2: Palestinians in Israel: Present Absentees 
 
Are you what you were or what you are now? (Darwish 2011, 135) 
 
“Celui que l’on ne veut pas connaître comme être politique, on commence par ne 
pas le voir comme porteur des signes de la politicité, par ne pas comprendre ce 
qu’il dit, par ne pas entendre que c’est un discours qui sort de sa bouche.” 
(Rancière 1998a, 243)33 
 
In the spring of 2011, MK Anastasia Michaeli, a member of the Israeli Knesset and rightist 
party Yisrael Beiteinu, proposed a law that would require mosques in Israel to lower the 
“noise” of the call to prayer (in Arabic, adhaan). In response to what the local media 
would begin to refer to as the “muezzin law”, she argued that this term was woefully 
inaccurate as the proposed law wasn’t directed at any one group or religion, but was 
about protecting the “quality of life” of Israeli citizens. In other words, it wasn’t political. 
As the debate around the proposed law ensued, Michaeli asserted the following: 
The bill is simple. When a place of prayer becomes a nuisance to those 
around it, anyone who will not consider the way a civilized country should 
run would have to listen to the letter of the law. There are many simple 
options to regulate public address systems, such as directing the system 
into the community, using computer applications or simply lowering the 
volume. The solution is not the problem. Our problem is that half of the 
mosques in the country are working without a license, making their own 
laws and not operating out of religious interests but merely to be defiant of 
the law.34 
                                                
33 "If there is someone you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you begin by not seeing 
him [sic] as the bearer of signs of politicity. By not understanding what he says, by not hearing 
what issues from his mouth as a discourse" (Ranciere 2010a, 38). 
34 See “MK Michaeli: ‘Muezzin Law’ is About Quality of Life” 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150936 (last accessed 3 September 2012). 
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As the debate and reaction to the proposed law gained force, Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu waded into the discussion in support of the bill, stating that Israel 
should not function any differently from countries in Western Europe: 
The same problem exists in all European countries, and they know how to 
deal with it. It's legitimate in Belgium; it's legitimate in France. Why isn't it 
legitimate here? We don't need to be more liberal than Europe.35 
Over the ensuing weeks, following concern from Likud Knesset members who warned 
against the “Arab reaction” that would result were it to become law, the government 
postponed discussion of the bill, instead recommending it to a committee for further 
review. Despite this turn of events, the debate surrounding the bill, from within the 
government and the Israeli public, including the Palestinian community who held 
demonstrations against the bill in Taybeh, raises two important questions.36 The first can 
be gleaned from Netanyahu’s protestation of not needing to be more liberal than Europe. 
Referring implicitly to recent legislation across Europe, Netanyahu’s point is not only to 
align Israel with Europe (again), but to defend the state from accusations of being 
insufficiently liberal or tolerant with respect to its Arab citizens. How could Israel be un-
                                                                                                                                                  
All the mosques in Israel are monitored by the state, a system introduced following the 
establishment of the state in 1948 to monitor political and religious activity.  
35 See “Netanyahu backs law to ban loudspeakers at mosques” http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/netanyahu-backs-law-to-ban-loudspeakers-at-mosques-1.400875 (last accessed 3 
September 2012). 
36 Following the newspapers and television, and talking with friends, I had the impression that this 
bill had considerable support from the Jewish Israeli public, even from towns and areas where 
there were no Palestinians, let alone a mosque. As for Palestinians, it was generally seen 
negatively and again an attempt by the state to erase the Palestinian presence. Nevertheless, 
many admitted that the mosques do at times compete with each other and churches, leading to 
louder and louder prayer calls, and at times to be provocative in mixed towns.  
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liberal or unfair if the same legislation was being passed in Europe, the home of liberal 
democracy? Netanyahu’s point then was that as a liberal democratic state, Israel 
embraces all voices protects the rights of all, and from this point of view the inclusion of 
Palestinian Arabs as members of the Knesset is evidence of this argument. Leaving aside 
Netanyahu’s contentious point about Israel not needing to be more liberal than Europe, 
the second question, and the one I want to focus on, is the so-called “problem,” that is, 
the “noise.” Indeed, with most media commentary focused on the audacity of 
Netanyahu’s claim that Israel does not need to be more liberal than Europe, I will argue 
that there was a failure to consider the issue of describing the adhaan as “noise.”  
Michaeli’s claim that the proposed bill is not political but a matter of “quality of 
life” implies that the problem is the “noise” emanating from the mosques around the 
country and that the solution is a matter of insulating the Israeli public from this 
disturbance. But what is this noise? In making an association between the call to prayer 
and “noise,” Michaeli is effectively saying that what is being broadcast by mosques is 
without meaning. The adhaan is here declared to be nothing more than babble, and thus 
not relevant to the political order. Of course the adhaan is not mere noise or babble, but a 
statement of faith, with Shahada37 or prayer often repeated in silence. In discounting the 
adhaan as mere noise, in effect, Michaeli is disavowing the speech of Palestinians as 
something that Israelis did not want to acknowledge.  
                                                
37 The Shahada, or statement of faith, is what is sung in Sunni Islam as part of the adhaan: “Allah 
Akbar. Ash-hadu an-la ilaha illa Allah wah. Ash-hadu anna Muhammadan-Rasulullah. Hayya ‘ala s-
salah. Hayya ‘ala ‘l-falah. Allaahu akbar. La ilaha illah-Allah.” [“God is great. I bear witness that 
there is no deity except God. I bear witness that Muhammad is the messenger of God. Come to 
prayer. Come to success. God is greater. There is no deity except God.”] 
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At the heart of Michaeli’s proposed law is a fear of the speech of those who are not 
to be seen or heard. The particular historical configuration of Israeli society has been 
focused on creating and maintaining a Jewish state. As I will demonstrate, this 
configuration is, at its core, a spatiotemporal issue, a matter of containing and 
segregating the Palestinians in Israel, ensuring their invisibility and temporal absence. 
Emanating from the speakers of the mosques is the speech of those whom the state has 
attempted to silence and render absent since 1948. While there is little argument that 
many mosques have intentionally increased the volume of their adhaan over the years, 
the issue at hand, I would argue, is not about noise per se, but instead about the speech 
of Palestinians in Israel as the noise of democracy. The current chapter examines the 
dynamics of this spatiotemporality and the emergence of a series of disruptions in the 
figure of the present absentee. In the first section I ask who are the Palestinians in Israel, 
and how have they been identified by the state of Israel as well as by themselves? I situate 
these questions of identity within the establishment of the state of Israel and the 
subsequent Military Administration that governed the Palestinian population for almost 
20 years (1948-1967). The second section explores the policies that emerged within the 
Military Administration and its persisting effects on Palestinian society, well beyond its 
formal abolishment in 1967. I focus on how issues of movement, surveillance and 
containment of Palestinians are central problems for the newly created state by 
examining the various policies and apparatuses invented for these purposes. The third 
section argues that the problems of movement and containment are most visible in the 
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case of those Palestinians who were forced out of their villages in 1948 but remained 
within the state, technically speaking “internally displaced persons”, or, as Israel would 
define them, “present absentees.” In conclusion I point to how this category of the 
“present absentee” is being re-appropriated as a figure of political subjectivity by 
Palestinians in Israel at large as an impossible identification that disrupts the 
spatiotemporal configuration of the Israeli state. It is this figure of the present absentee 
as a form of political subjectivity that will be at the heart of the chapters that follow, and 
which will be elaborated throughout the thesis.  
 
Israel’s Arab citizens 
 
The “invisible man” (Smooha and Peretz 1982), a “trapped minority” (Rabinowitz 2001), 
the “forgotten Palestinians” (Pappé 2011): who are the Palestinian Arabs in Israel? An 
indigenous national minority, the Palestinians in Israel are those Palestinians who 
remained within the boundaries of the newly established Israel state at the time of the 
partition of British Mandate Palestine in 1948. Numbering roughly 150,000 to 160,000 in 
1948, the Palestinians that remained in Israel are comprised of Muslims (including 
Bedouin), Druze, and Christians and are located in three principle areas within Israel, the 
Little Triangle (Muslims), Northern and Western Galilee (Druze, Christians, Muslims), and 
Negev (Bedouin). As of 2011, the Palestinian citizens of Israel make up nearly 20% of the 
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Israeli population and 12% of Palestinians worldwide (Kanaaneh 2009, 2).38 Defined by the 
Israeli government and Israeli Jews as the “Arabs of Israel,” (Hebrew: 3arviye Yisrael) or 
“Arabs in Israel” (Hebrew: ha-3aravim be-Yisrael), a definition that has problematically 
became transformed into English as “Israeli Arabs,”39 Palestinian Arabs in Israel refer to 
themselves as the ’48 Palestinians (Arabic: Falastinyyet El-Thamanyeh w’arb3in), 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, and increasingly today, Palestinians in Israel (Arabic: El-
Falastinyyeh fi Israel).40 These questions of definition are not mere labels but forms of 
contestation within a colonial regime of identification that was born within the first 
months of the establishment of the state, and whose dynamics are still present today.  
For those Palestinians who remained within Israel, and who did not leave their 
homes or lands, citizenship was arranged in 1952, a few years after the establishment of 
the state.41 The rights accrued to the Palestinians in Israel on the basis of their newly 
acquired citizenship included the right to vote, to stand for election, and equality before 
the law; basic political and civil rights guaranteed by citizenship in most liberal 
democracies. Yet, the attribution of citizenship was not without its problems: this group 
of Palestinians was immediately set apart from the Palestinians in Mandate Palestine, 
                                                
38 This does not include Palestinians living in occupied East Jerusalem, who do not hold 
citizenship, and Druze living in the occupied Golan. 
39 According to the Palestinian anthropologist Moslih Kanaaneh, the term “Israeli Arab” is an 
English invention created by Jewish/Israeli anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists. Abner 
Cohen’s Arab Border Villages in Israel (1965) in one well-known example (see Asad 1975). It is a 
term that does not exist in either Hebrew or Arabic, and, according to Kanaaneh, “is most likely a 
politically motivated coercion rather than an ‘innocent’ linguistic mistake” (Kanaaneh, 
unpublished manuscript).  
40 As is the case anywhere in the world, naming is an important political gesture, as what defines 
the non-Jewish citizens of Israel is far from a homogenous or united community with shared 
social, political, and religious outlooks. 
41 For an important study of this period, see Robinson (2005). 
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shunned by other Arabs in neighboring countries, and, given their pan-Arab and 
Palestinian nationalist sympathies, considered an internal threat by Jewish Israelis (a 
potential fifth column). As the configurations discussed above testify, being citizens of the 
state of Israel is not a simple matter.42 
Finding themselves within the newly established Israel state in 1948, in the wake 
of the Nakba (the Catastrophe), the changes for Palestinians in Israel were not only 
dramatic but traumatic. As to be expected, social conditions were extremely difficult, as 
most of the middle and upper classes had left for neighboring Arab countries, taking with 
them political leadership and many of the building blocks of social and economic 
organization (Pappé 2006). Moreover, in a matter of months they were reduced from a 
majority to a minority and put under a “Military Administration” (Memshal Tzvai), which 
included severe limitations on their physical mobility as well as many aspects of their 
political and economic everyday activities.43 In effect, the establishment of the Military 
Administration was premised on the belief that Palestinian Arabs in Israel constituted a 
form of “unfinished business,” that is, a population that represented a significant threat 
                                                
42 Dan Rabinowitz (2001, 73) refers to the Palestinian citizens of Israel as a “trapped minority.” 
Being marginalized twice over by an enclosure that is historical, finding oneself a minority within 
an alien state, and being caught between a host state and a mother nation. 
43 The Military Administration was applied to the Palestinians in the Galilee, the “little triangle,” 
the Naqab and mostly rural areas. In urban areas, such as Haifa and Akka, it was a civilian versus 
military control. The “Military Administration” or “Rule” was based on the British Mandate’s 
Emergency Regulations and came under the Ministry of Defense and the Shabak (Israeli secret 
service). As Pappé (2011, 49) explains: “According to these regulations the governor had the right 
to arrest people without warrant and detain without trial for long periods; he could ban their 
entrance to a place or expel them from their homes; he could also confine [them] under house 
arrest. He could close schools, businesses, newspapers and journals, and prohibit demonstrations 
and protests”. To this day the Emergency Regulations that Israel adopted from the British 
Mandate period are still in place. 
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to national security (Pappé 2011). Beneath this security claim, however, the principal 
objective of the Military Administration was to contain Palestinian Arabs inside the state 
in order to ensure a division of the Palestinian community that has had lasting effects to 
the present day.44 
Despite the formal acknowledgment of Palestinian political and civil rights, the 
Military Administration that was in effect until more or less 1967 curtailed the full 
expression and realization of these rights. Given the physical separation of Palestinian 
villages and the permits required to move between them and (at times) within them, the 
aim of these policies was to thwart political activity and organization in the name of 
guaranteeing security. 45  Indeed, to move from one village to another village, even 
neighboring villages, required proper identification and travel permits, without which one 
was tried in a military court. As Jiryis (1976, 17) explains, Article 125 “grants the military 
governor the power to proclaim any area or place a forbidden [closed] area…which no 
one can enter or leave without…a written permit from the military commander or his 
deputy”, whereby all Palestinian towns effectively become “closed areas”. Worse, 
included in Article 125 was the authority to expel and relocate groups of Palestinians, in 
some cases entire villages, as was the case in the Naqab and border villages, including at 
                                                
44 My analysis will not be an overview of the details of the Military Administration, but a focus on 
its key objectives. For a more detailed legal and juridical account, see Jiryis (1976, 9-35). 
45 However, as Hillel Cohen (2010, 4) has argued, this did not mean that there was no political 
activity or organization among Palestinians in Israel, noting that “despite close surveillance by 
Israeli intelligence” Palestinians “organized large-scale, adamant protest activity” during the 
period of the Military Administration. While Cohen’s corrective to the perception of Palestinians as 
passive is important, the reality was still one in which political activity and organization was to a 
great extent repressed and marginalized. 
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least 2000 Palestinians transferred to Gaza in 1950 (White 2012, 74; see also Morris 1994).46 
Considered a potential, if not immediate, hostile threat from within, Israeli containment 
policies regarding Palestinian Arab political organization were purposely divisive. As Ian 
Lustick (1980, 25) has pointed out, starting in 1948, the Military Administration imposed 
by Israel on the Palestinian Arab population had the crucial goal of curtailing and 
impeding the emergence of a cohesive and organized Arab community, especially in 
terms of political organization: 
 … the failure of Israel’s Arab minority to “organize itself” and the minimal 
significance, to date, of the communal segmentation of Israeli society for 
the operation and stability of the Israeli political system are due to the 
presence of a highly effective system of control which, since 1948, has 
operated over Israeli Arabs.  
As Lustick suggests, the Israeli political strategy regarding the Palestinian Arab 
population was implicitly aimed at curtailing the civil and political rights of Palestinians in 
Israel, despite the formal acknowledgement of their citizenship.47 Yet, these measures of 
                                                
46 One of the most tragic events for Palestinians to have resulted from the Military Administration 
was the Kafr Qasim Massacre in 1956. On the eve of the Israeli invasion of Sinai, the military head 
in the Kafr Qasim area changed the curfew time to 17h from 21h, the time the people of village 
had been previously informed. When the villagers were returning from the fields, unaware that the 
curfew time had been changed, the military shot and killed 48 Palestinians (see Robinson [2005] 
for a detailed account of these events).  
47 One result of this curtailment of Palestinian Arab political organization was their support of the 
joint Jewish-Arab Israeli Communist Party (ICP), also known by its Hebrew acronym, Maki and 
Arabic Maqi. The reason Maqi was able to garner so large Palestinian support had to do with its 
defense of Arab minority rights, including calls for the end to the appropriation of land, the return 
of refugees and support for the Palestinian state alongside Israel (Ghanem 2001, 66-67; also see 
Landau 1971, 81-92). Maqi eventually split due to ideological differences among its Arab members, 
and from it emerged Rakah, a fully Arab communist party that was headed by Emil Habibi, who 
was later to become a prized novelist. Not surprisingly, communist parties will play a central role 
in Palestinian Israeli politics well into the 1980s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see 
Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 184-185).   
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repressing and marginalizing political organization and activity had deeper aims. One of 
the most immediate and visible illustrations is the divided and fragmented Palestinian 
community in Israel that emerged from this period. In their definition of Palestinians as 
“Arabs of/in Israel,” an identification that emerged in this period and that continues to be 
used to this day amongst many Jewish Israelis, not only are all national or communal ties 
to the Palestinians in Mandate Palestine symbolically severed, any sense of the shared 
values and history amongst those Palestinians who remained in Israel are erased.48 In 
other words, the label “Arabs of Israel” not only denationalized, it fragmented from within. 
On the one hand, such a definition allowed for a process of historical erasure; portrayed 
simply as Arabs, there was no right to the land of Israel, or, for that matter, any 
connection to historic Palestine. To a degree this strategy of de-Palestinization is 
exemplified in the Palestinian educational system that is controlled by the state, and 
which disavows the teaching of Palestinian and Arab history, society, culture and politics. 
On the other hand, it permitted the Israeli state to take advantage of the different “ethno-
religious” groups within the Palestinian Israeli community (Muslim, Druze, Christian, 
Bedouin) as a way of dividing and inhibiting their political organization and socio-cultural 
unification.49 As Cohen (2010, 233) explains:  
                                                
48 Between 1948 and 1967 all travel and communication of Palestinians in Israel with either 
Mandate Palestine or other Arabs countries was impossible (not to mention other parts of Israel).  
49 This relationship to the Palestinian community cannot be likened to Euro-American models of 
multiculturalism that tend to “ethnicize” their minorities through liberal democratic principles. 
Although multiculturalism has a place in Israel, it is one focused on the multicultural dimensions 
of its Jewish population (see Shafir and Peled 2002). As a homeland for the Jewish people, the 
Palestinians are first and foremost a security threat that is inseparable from the Jewish-Zionist 
character of the state (see Al-Haj 2002).   
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[…] the state exacerbated distinctions and discord among different parts of 
Israel’s Arab population, played off one religious and ethnic community 
against another […] Indeed creating this new Israeli Arab identity was one 
of the state’s tacit goals. 
Following Cohen, then, it becomes clear that the aims of the Military Administration were 
not only to restrict movement and contain Palestinians in Israel, but further to divide and 
fragment the Palestinian community, to rupture any sense of collective identity that 
might have fostered political organization and activity. But these strategies were not 
simply that. At the root of the Military Administration was the Zionist aim of ensuring 
consolidation of Israel as a Jewish state. To this end, containment of the Palestinian 
population and its de-Palestinization were paramount.  
While the Military Administration was officially abolished in 1967, for various 
reasons there was not a complete turning of the page on these policies. First, the changes 
brought about under the leadership of Levi Eshkol at the end of 1966 were largely a 
transfer of these policies from a military administration to a civil administration (Jiryis 
1976, 63). In other words, policies were transferred from the military and secret police to 
the internal security services and local police. Second, many regulations of the Military 
Administration were only nominally adjusted, such that this “new policy” was more 
focused on maintaining a positive image of Israel than actual changes in discriminatory 
and repressive practices.50 For example, as Kretzmer (1990, 124) explains in regard to 
                                                
50 It is important to note that the “Defence (Emergency) Regulations” that were invoked in 1948 as 
part of Israeli domestic law remained in effect after the so-called dissolution of the Military 
Administration, and remain in effect to this day. In short, these regulations allow for the 
continuing application of such restrictions as those contained in Article 125 discussed above (see 
Kretzmer 1990, 141-142). 
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Article 125, the closure of Arab areas was not repealed, but instead replaced with the 
granting of general permits for Palestinian citizens to enter and leave these areas. At the 
end of 1966, control over these permits was given to local administrative heads (three 
military commanders, one for each Arab area) and a local advisory officer, who acted as 
liaison between the security services and the local civilian police (Jiryis 1976, 63). In sum, 
although these changes were cosmetic, they appealed to domestic and world opinion 
that was becoming increasingly concerned with the treatment of Palestinian citizens of 
Israel (Ibid., 64).  
If the Military Administration was officially abolished in 1967, the deep 
fragmentation incurred upon the Palestinian community had lasting repercussions. For 
nearly ten years following the end of the military administration, the “internal 
colonization” of the civil, political, and social organization of Palestinians was still being 
felt (see Zureik 1979, 166-187). As Pappé states, “Military rule scarred the Palestinians in 
Israel for life, as much as the Nakbah tormented the Palestinians as a whole” (Pappé 2011, 
46). In essence, while formally acknowledging the civil and political rights bestowed upon 
Palestinians in Israel by virtue of their citizenship, the practice of those rights were all but 
negated by a ubiquitous system of control that presented itself as a matter of security but 
functioned as an ethno-national project of colonialism. The identity dynamics noted 
earlier are but one dimension of this period and its lasting effects in what has become a 
regime of control and its contestation. Yet, this is but only part of the picture, which 
several observers have referred to as a spatio-temporal “Judaisation” of the state. 
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The Internal Frontier 
 
Unlike other settler movements in America, Africa and Australia, the land the Jewish 
people in Palestine wished to settle was decided a priori. Zion, or the land of Israel, is a 
central tenet of the Zionist movement, even if this land was referred to in mostly 
metaphysical and abstract terms in the earlier periods of the movement. As Kimmerling 
(1983, 9) notes: 
Zionism without Palestine was evidently doomed to failure as a nationalist 
movement, a movement which had imposed upon itself a task not imposed 
on any other nationalist movement – to build a membership from among 
the people who were dispersed throughout almost all parts of the world 
(and who, as became apparent later, differed not only in terms of country of 
origin, but also culturally and even ethnically). 
Premised on the idea of Palestine as a frontier, a “free land,” the Zionist movement of the 
late nineteenth century believed Palestine to be sparsely populated and full of potential 
wealth, “a land of milk and honey.” The reality, however, was quite the contrary. The 
arrival of early Jewish settlers between 1882 and 1915 found a land that was far more 
populated, far more settled, and far more developed agriculturally than had been 
anticipated. Land, therefore, and settlers’ ability to occupy and exploit the land, was a 
central issue from the very first establishment of the state as a Jewish space.51  
                                                
51 As Kamal Boullata (2008, 3) has explained with regard to the notion of space in Hebrew: “In its 
noun form, makom, [Hebrew] simply means ‘space’ or ‘area to be filled or occupied.’ By preceding 
it with the article ha, the word ha-makom literally means the ‘place.’ Coming from the trilateral 
root k-w-m, a word such a kiyyum could mean ‘existence’ as well as ‘settled area.’ Most 
importantly, unlike the Arabic word makaan that has no metaphysical connotations whatsoever, 
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 Confronting a native population, a people that already had ownership of most of 
the land, the leadership of the newly established state had the choice to either ignore 
them, as was done to the Aborigines in Australia (at least until 1967), or to treat them as 
part of the hostile environment.52 Following the latter, the basic strategy for Israel was 
therefore to spatially restrict ethnic minorities within the state through economic, 
political and territorial legislation (i.e. land policies), such that the rule and presence of 
the dominant ethnic group would remain unchallenged (Yiftachel 1998, 44). Indeed, as 
Yiftachel points out, in the case of Israel, there has been a territorial strategy to push 
newly arrived Jewish immigrants to these peripheral zones (see Tzafadia and Yacobi 2011, 
and this is not unique to Israel), in this case Palestinian villages, in order to create a break 
between them and also in order to limit their further expansion and development. The 
result is that the internal frontier zones of the state have become ethnically “mixed” but 
have also resulted in a large degree of segregation (Ibid., 45). The idea of the Zion (the 
land of Israel) as a frontier, a free land, did not exist in reality, thereby requiring a series of 
spatial policies surrounding the internal frontiers of the state through strategies of 
containment and restriction on the native Palestinian population (Yiftachel 1998, 46).53 As 
Kimmerling (1983, 14) notes: 
                                                                                                                                                  
HaMakom also refers to God. Believed to be omnipresent, ‘God is [thus] not only THE place, but 
place itself’” (Ibid.; original emphasis).    
52 While British colonization and Israeli colonization differ on this point, both shared the idea, as 
did many other colonial empires, that the land they were settling was a Terra Nullius (“no man’s 
land” or “empty land”), which in Australia shaped land legislation until 1992. See Yiftachel (1998, 
43-44). 
53 The issue of internal frontiers and peripheries is to be distinguished from borders and the 
keeping out of external outsiders. First, Israel has never properly defined its borders, thus leaving 
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From the beginnings of the Zionist movement, its leaders were aware (a) 
that the acquisition of substantial areas of land in Palestine was an 
essential basis for the development of a future Jewish society or state, (b) 
that the desired land was then in someone else’s hands, and (c) that it 
would be necessary to raise and allocate economic and political resources 
to obtain the land. 
The central premise here is that once the land was in Jewish hands it would acquire a 
national significance toward the fulfillment of a Jewish state. Further, these spatial 
policies of containment and segregation were embodied in the apparatus of the state. 
The internal frontiers of the newly established state were thus sites of territorial control 
and the creation of dominant and dominated, colonizer and colonized. 
The full extent of these spatial policies was revealed a number of years after 
abolishment of the Military Administration in the leaking of the Koenig Report in 1976. An 
internal and secret document written by Yisrael Koenig (Northern District Commissioner 
of the Ministry of the Interior at the time), the Koenig report outlined the program for 
“diluting existing Arab population concentrations” through existing practices of 
“discrimination [i.e., distinguishing] and containment.” The report was an attack on the 
government for not being forceful enough in the “Judaization of the Galilee”54 and 
advocated for an increased expropriation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements. In 
some respects the report was not so much a plan to be put into action, but a revelation of 
                                                                                                                                                  
open the question of what constitutes the space of the state itself (Dakwar 2007). Indeed, this is 
why today Israeli leaders continually refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “disputed 
territories.” Second, the frontiers and peripheries within Israel itself were areas designated for 
Development Towns, settler spaces for (non-Ashkenazi) Jewish immigrants (see Tzfadia and 
Yacobi 2011). 
54 As Lustick (1980, 333) notes, this phrase, although predominant in government documents, was 
often softened with terms such as “populate the Galilee” or “develop the Galilee.”  
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already existing policies and measures that had long been in place, albeit perhaps not as 
radical in their implementation as Koenig wished. Indeed, according to Lustick (1980), the 
report’s description of the demographic, political, and economic factors among the 
Palestinian Arab population and the means for controlling them strongly reflected the 
overall orientation of the Israeli government during Military Administration period of 
1948-1967. Although the government repudiated the policies detailed in the report, as 
Pappé (2011, 127) points out, it nonetheless implemented most of its recommendations, 
thus opening a period of spatial policies explicitly designed to “Judaize” the land. 
At the basis of the Military Administration, and in conjunction with the division and 
fragmentation of the Palestinian community, was the curtailing of movement. The goal 
was to ensure that Palestinians would not make claim to any further lands, nor that any 
land would be reclaimed by internally displaced persons (IDP), those who fled or were 
forced out of their villages but remained in the newly established state. As the Koenig 
Report stated, the goal must be to “expand and deepen Jewish settlement in areas where 
the contiguity of Arab populations is prominent,” “to dilut[e] existing Arab population 
concentrations,” and “limit ‘breaking of new ground’ by Arab settlements (Koenig in 
Kanaaneh 2002, 53).55 On the one hand, there was the rationale of limiting Arab access to 
the lands that Israel wished to keep for incoming Jewish immigrants. Framed as an 
                                                
55 The appropriation of Palestinian Arab land, or what might also be called, the “de-Arabizing” of 
the land, was the central task of the Jewish National Fund, an organization established before the 
creation of the Israeli state with the responsibility of purchasing land in Palestine for Jewish 
immigrants. Most of the land belonged to Palestinians that were pushed out or fled during the 
fighting of 1948, or land that “went fallow” due to the Orwellian-esque creation of “present 
absentees” (see Dieckhoff 2006, 88; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003, 172-173). 
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economic necessity, the aim of this rationale was to avoid high levels of unemployment 
for newly arrived Jewish immigrants that would have necessarily occurred without 
imposing limitations on Arab mobility. On the other hand was the deeper rationale 
behind the protection of land. As Shafir and Peled (2002, 112) argue, labor and land were 
the two principal motivations for the installation of a “Military Administration,” and 
security was nothing more than a ruse used to pursue these colonial objectives. Put 
simply, the effort to contain and control the movement of Palestinians in Israel in the 
name of security, even in those cases of labor, was basically a strategy focused on the 
expropriation of land:  
… the prevention of movement was used by the Israeli government to 
expropriate land without being interrupted by protest or by legal action. … 
For this purpose, the Emergency Regulations were used again to 
expropriate land without compensation or the right to protest. The land 
was used for new Jewish towns and community centres (no new Arab 
towns were built despite the high rate of natural population growth and the 
limitations on Palestinians who wished to reside in Jewish areas) in order to 
attract upwardly mobile people from Tel Aviv (Pappé 2011, 51; 127). 
Here so-called security questions surrounding movement and containment are deeply 
tied to the control of land and a policy of fragmentation through the disruption of a 
certain geographical continuity. At the source of the question of security was the desire to 
break Palestinian autonomy and establish a Jewish majority in those areas where 
Palestinians had already a dominant presence (especially the Galilee and the Naqab). One 
telling example is the creation of lookout settlements (Hebrew: mitzpim) in the Galilee in 
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the 1970s and 1980s by the Jewish Agency. Built on hilltops, these settlements allowed for 
the surveillance and fragmentation of the Palestinian Arab community: 
These sites were selected to create wedges between clusters of Arab 
villages and to physically observe Arab building and agricultural activity in 
the region. … the new settlement program would ‘save the state (i.e. 
Jewish) land from Arab invaders,’ thereby giving the new settlement 
process a status of extreme national importance, as it acted against threats 
to the Jewish collective (Yiftachel 1998, 58). 
The symbolic significance and control of land for the state of Israel is fundamental to 
understanding its relationship to Palestinian Arabs. For the Zionist movement in the early 
twentieth century, the land of Palestine was a frontier, or free land, an open space 
(Kimmerling 1983, 9). It is a relationship expressed most clearly in the Zionist motto, “a 
people without a land returning to a land without a people.” The importance of securing 
the land to the nationalist movement, of making the land of Israel a land of the Jewish 
people, underlies the formation of the Military Administration, but also the policies and 
regulations that continue to shape and determine the spatial policies of the state as an 
ethno-national entity. To this day it is nearly impossible for most Palestinian towns to 
expand beyond the borders that were assigned to them in 1948; Nazareth is a prime 
example where no more land is available, forcing many families to build on top of their 
existing homes as they grow (Rabinowitz 1997). Further, it is equally difficult for 
Palestinians to live in Jewish towns (see Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005).   
A case in point is the Supreme Court decision surrounding the Qa’dan case (2000). 
In 1995 Adel and Iman Qa’dan, with their three children, sought to purchase land to build 
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a home in Katzir. While Palestinians were already living within Katzir, the Qa’dan family 
was seeking to buy land in a newly developed region of Katzir, Western Hill, an exclusive 
and upscale project being planned and implemented by the Jewish Agency. All potential 
residents had to go through a committee-based evaluation before their purchase was 
accepted. The Qa’dan’s request was flatly refused on the basis of their being Arab, or, in 
other words, being non-Jews. The regulations regarding the sale of land in Ketzir 
stipulated that it was officially prohibited for non-Jews to buy land in Ketzir (a policy of 
the Jewish Agency).56  At this point the Qa’dan’s contacted the Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel (ACRI) who stepped in and filed a petition on behalf of the couple, claiming that 
such a decision violated the Law of Human Dignity and Freedom.57 The case eventually 
ended up in the Supreme Court where chief justice, Aharon Barak, after initially 
encouraging that the case be settled out of court, ruled that it is unlawful to discriminate 
against Palestinian Israeli citizens in the allocation of land. As Baruch Kimmerling and 
Joel S. Migdal (2003, 207) note, the initial reaction to this decision among journalists, 
academics and others was phrased as “revolutionary”, an opening toward a “post-
Zionist” Israeli society. Basing his decision on the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown vs. 
                                                
56 The defendants in the case were the Cooperative Association of Katzir, the Jewish Agency and 
Israel Land Association (Shafir and Peled 2002; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Rabinowitz and Abu-
Baker 2005). Another poignant example of how policy prohibitions inhibit Palestinian settlement 
in Jewish communities is examined in the ethnography of Upper Nazareth by Dan Rabinowitz 
(1997). 
57 Israel has no constitution but instead a set of what are called “Basic Laws.” The Law of Human 
Dignity and Freedom is one of these laws and it stipulates that when the allocation of state 
resources (such as land) are at issue, equality must be ensured, that individuals can not be 
excluded or given preferential treatment. Yet these same basic laws also stipulate that Israel is a 
Jewish and Democratic state.  
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Board of Education, chief justice Barak made it clear that differential treatment based on 
nationality or religion is unjust (Shafir and Peled 2002, 132). Looking closer at this 
decision, however, reveals a deep and troubling dilemma. Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 
(2005, 141) clearly spell out: 
On the one hand, [the Supreme Court] could not condone such an obvious 
violation of a basic right. On the other hand, the justices realized that a 
ruling in favor of Qa’dan and against Katzir, the Jewish Agency, and the 
Israel Land Administration would have far-reaching historic and political 
consequences. 
What are these “historic and political consequences”? In short, the undermining of Israel 
as a Jewish state; that is, Israel as an ethno-national state. The dilemma facing chief 
justice Barak was, if the state could not give preference to Jews in matters of state 
resources (in this case land), what future did it have as a Jewish state? The weight of this 
dilemma is revealed in the final statement of the court. While chief justice Barak’s ruling 
stipulated that discrimination against Palestinian citizens was unjust, and recommended 
that the Jewish Agency and the Cooperative Association of Katzir tender a plot of land for 
the Qa’dan family, how precisely the family was to acquire property rights, build a home 
and take residence were left unaddressed.58 It is important to underline that this decision 
was a recommendation, not a decree. Which is to say, there was no order or obligation 
that the Qa’dan’s be leased or sold a plot of land, only that the Katzir Cooperative 
                                                
58 Shortly after the court ruling the Qa’dan family re-submitted their application to the Katzir 
Cooperative Association. They were invited for an interview but finally rejected by the Association 
on the grounds that they were not “suitable residents.” The family appealed this decision and in 
2009 were finally able to sign a contract lease, though as of spring 2009 they had still not moved 
(see Jabareen 2010, 78). 
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Association and the Jewish Agency reconsider their decision. This left any final decision as 
to the sale of land to the Katzir Cooperative Association and the Jewish Agency. 
 While the struggle over land has been central to the relationship between the state 
and the Palestinians in Israel, nowhere is this more palpable then in the case of those 
Palestinians that were displaced in the early years of the establishment of the state, but 
who remained within its borders, namely internally displaced persons or present 
absentees. Unlike refugees who fall under the care of international bodies, it is the host 
state that is responsible for internal refugees. In the case of Israel, this “care” has 
amounted to a brutal and extensive expropriation of their land.  
 
The Present Absentee 
 
Symbolizing Palestinian Arabs citizens’ precarious status in Israel are 
hundreds of villages whose existence remains unrecognized. For them, no 
official map bears witness to their presence, and the development policies 
of the state conspire to make their absence a fact on the ground. The 
residents of the “unrecognized villages” form the weakest link in a chain of 
surviving indigenous communities within Israel’s 1948-49 borders and 
constitute one of the last frontiers for Israel’s population transfer of 
Palestinians from the lands occupied before 1967. Other Palestinians 
uprooted from their homes during the war but who remained within Israel’s 
borders bear the paradoxical title “present absentees.” The term denotes 
the familiar estrangement of internally displaced and dispossessed citizens 
still living out of place, so close yet so far from their confiscated homes and 
lands (Schechla 2001, 20).  
The post-Zionist history of Israel that emerged in the late 1980s explicitly points to how 
the state made a significant effort to reduce and minimize the number of Palestinians that 
64 
 
remained within its borders (Morris 1988, 1994; Pappé 1994; Masalha 1992, 1993; Segev 
2000).59 For those who were displaced but not pushed out of the borders of the state, they 
were to soon find themselves in a precarious situation, their status unclear and their 
presence being deemed a hindrance. During the period of 1948-1951, the principal aim of 
the state was to counter the unregulated movement of Palestinian Arabs, especially those 
who had fled their towns and villages or who had returned from exile. As Shira Robinson 
(2005) notes, this unregulated movement was in many ways a threat to the sovereignty of 
the Jewish state. As many of these people did not have the proper papers, i.e. those 
distributed in 1948, there was a subsequent loss of residency, but also a loss of rights: 
those without official papers became Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Forced out of 
their homes and villages but remaining in Israel, the hope of returning to their homes and 
land was impossible, the Israeli government and military having deemed most of these 
villages closed security zones, with most since being settled as Jewish towns. In fact, for 
many IDPs it was not until the 1980s that many were finally able to obtain citizenship, 
though only upon proving beyond a doubt their registration within the towns they were 
forced out from (Davis 2003, 89).60 Nevertheless, to this day, “present absentees” (Hebrew: 
nifkadim nokhahim) are still not permitted to return to their land and homes.61 
                                                
59 The post-Zionist history emerged with the release of government documents that shed light on 
the policies and practices of the Israeli government since 1948, but also before. Consisting of 
Jewish historians, the key figure in this history was undoubtedly Benny Morris whose work 
exposed the systematic policy of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1948 (1988). As the movement 
spread, questions about the definition of the state as Jewish and democratic were also critiqued 
(see Nimni 2003).  
60 Uri Davis explains that Palestinians falling under the category of “present absentees” were 
classified as “Class C” citizens in Israeli law (Absentee Property Law, 1950). As such, they had no 
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In 1950 there were an estimated 46 000 internally displaced persons out of 156,000 
Palestinians who remained in historic Palestine62 Although some Palestinian “present 
absentees” were granted citizenship under the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law, their 
classification, as well as that of their descendants, remains that of a “present absentee,” 
thus permanently forbidding them from returning to their villages. The Absentees’ 
Property Law (1950) that created this legal category of identification was effectively a set 
of measures by which to ensure that the land of historic Palestine did not fall back into 
the hands of these internal refugees. On the one hand, the absentee laws barred 
Palestinians from returning to their lands and then transferred ownership of absentee 
property to the state (Jiryis 1976). Under these laws, all abandoned property went to the 
Israeli government, specifically the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which was to later be 
managed by Israeli Land Administration (ILA). Today 93% of the land in Israel is owned by 
                                                                                                                                                  
right to any properties, such as land, houses, corporations, shares, bank accounts, etc. According 
to Davis, at least 25% of the 2003 population of Palestinians in Israel (250,000) is classified as 
“present absentees.” See Davis (2003, 89). I will of course return to a fuller discussion of the 
present absentee below.  
61 The most notable cases are Iqrit and Kufr Bir’im – both of which were declared “security 
zones” – two villages in the Galilee whose residents, now present absentees, have been 
repeatedly permitted to return by the Israeli Supreme Court but have been blocked by the 
government and military. I have been to both villages in 2009 and in the case of Iqrit there has 
been an effort by former village members to maintain their presence, including sit-ins and the 
maintenance of the Greek Catholic Church. As for Kufr Bir’im, in 1953 the land was decreed 
abandoned, confiscated and declared state lands, and today is a park administered by the 
government. The refusal to allow residents to return to their villages despite Supreme Court 
rulings, as stated by former prime minister Golda Meir, was to “avoid setting a precedent” (see 
White 2012, 31-32). The term “present absentees” is only ever used in Arabic [7adareen 3’aebeen] 
in legal texts or legal contexts. 
62 As Amal Jamal has recently noted, there are various figures for how many Palestinians ended up 
IDPs, which, depending on the source, ranges from 31 000 to 50 000 (Jamal 2011, 111-112). The 
figure of 46 000 is taken from UNRWA. Nur Masalha estimates that as of 2009 roughly a third of all 
Palestinians in Israel are present absentees (Masalha 2009).  
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the state and the JNF, land which, by the mandate of the JNF and the ILA, is to held “in 
perpetuity by the Jewish people” (Masalha 2005, 35).63 On the other hand, the outcome of 
this legal framework was such that the social status of IDPs was effectively annulled; that 
is, it superseded the historical and cultural connection of Palestinians with their land.  
At the heart of the creation of the category of “present absentee” is a peculiar 
temporality and a clear distinction between space and place. The category of “present 
absentee” was created to regulate and contain IDPs inside the state by assigning them to 
a specific legal framework that would ultimately undermine their social status and hence 
their historical and cultural attachment to the land. To begin, under subjection (iii) of the 
Absentees’ Property Law of 1950, an “absentee” refers to those Palestinians or residents 
of Palestine who had left their “ordinary place of residence” and were “in any part of 
Palestine outside the area of Israel” after 29 November 1947, or in any “place outside 
Palestine” before 1 September 1948. In sum, an absentee is any Palestinian who left their 
ordinary place of residence for anywhere outside the area of Israel between the 29 
November 1947 (the UN partition date) and 1 September 1948. Designated as an 
absentee, the additional qualifier “present” specified those who remained within the 
territory of Israel. For those Palestinians wishing to counter their inclusion within the 
category of “present absentee” and to have their ownership recognized, the requirement 
was to demonstrate their presence in their place of residence. The trouble, as we will see, 
is that as “absentees” their “presence” in these places was illegal as the ownership of 
                                                
63 Today, if Palestinians make up just over 20% of the population in Israel, they control only 2% of 
the land. 
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their property and land had already been handed over to the Custodian of Absentee 
Property, and thus was now the official property of the state.64 
There are two fundamental paradoxes in the category of “present absentee.” First, 
as Jamal (2011, 114-115) points out, the designation of absentees as those outside of the 
area of Israel after 29 November 1947 is problematic insofar as Israel did not yet exist, the 
state only have been declared a state on 15 May 1948.65 In chronological terms there is a 
retrospective aspect to the law, an assertion of the state’s jurisdiction prior to its 
establishment, the effect of which was to “legalize measures that had already been 
taken” (Ibid., 114). The second paradox has to do with the relation between space and 
place. As Jamal (Ibid., 115) explains: 
The law differentiates between “ordinary place of residence” as a particular 
place and Palestine as a more general spatial area. By leaving their 
concrete place of ordinary residence, Palestinians were not entitled to their 
property anymore, even if they remained within the areas of Palestine that 
became the “area of Israel.” The political space of Palestine that became 
Israel was not respected as a source of legal standing and territorial 
identity. Instead, place, in its concrete material sense, was treated as the 
only factor legitimating the entitlement for property. 
To put it differently, through the Absentees’ Property Law the space of Palestine that was 
colonized (’48 Palestine) was effectively denied any existence prior to the establishment 
of the state of Israel, thus requiring that any claims to land and property be contingent 
                                                
64 The risk of “present absentees” re-establishing themselves on their land and property was 
precluded by the state by forbidding them to live or work in their former villages. As Hillel Cohen 
(2002, n.p.) explains: “Even after the transfer of the lands to Jewish settlement, the Israeli 
authorities laid down that ‘under no circumstances must land be leased to Arabs formerly from 
that village, or originally from there’.” Jews or Arabs receiving land in the abandoned villages had 
to commit themselves not to employ refugees whose origins were in that village. 
65 The date 29 November 1947 was the date of the United Nations partition plan.  
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upon residency in a concrete place, an “ordinary place of residence.”66 This maneuver of 
erasing a Palestinian space and separating it from place is made possible through the 
containment of Palestinians and through the conflation of identity and place. By being 
outside of a concrete place, which is to say, their proper place, the absent Palestinian was 
stripped of his or her rights, thus making the historical and temporal relationship to 
property and land null and void. Through the Absentees’ Property Law, presence in a 
designated place during a certain time was considered a necessary condition for 
justifying a granting of citizenship. To be out of place is necessarily to be out of time, in 
every sense of the expression. As present absentees had no basis to claim their property 
and land, the state was able to legally justify the systematic expropriation of land.67 This 
logic not only criminalized the absentee, it also allowed Israel to “reduce the number of 
Palestinians as much as possible” (Jamal 2011, 115). In this way, the creation of the 
category of the “present absentee” was a radical spatio-temporal displacement of 
Palestinians in Israel, despite the fact that their original displacement was the result of a 
deliberate state policy.  
 The problem of IDPs or present absentees has re-emerged over the last two 
decades after a near silence following the end of the Military Administration and the 
                                                
66 Significantly, Jamal (2011) points out, this legal framework was in stark contrast to that which 
applied to Jews, who were granted full rights and property on the basis of their Jewish identity 
from anywhere in the world.  
67 Many of these villages have since become “unrecognized villages” under a series of legal 
measures undertaken by the Israeli state with the Building and Construction Law in 1965 and the 
Markowitz Commission in 1986. These measures have cut off these villages from electricity, water 
and other services, made their existing infrastructure illegal, with demolitions, and have 
transferred their populations (see Schechla 2001, 23-26). It must be noted that these measures 
continue today, especially among the Bedouin communities in the Naqab (Negev).  
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occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. While the struggle for many present 
absentees to return to their villages was never resolved, the principle reason for their re-
emergence within political discourse was tied both to their “sense of alienation which 
[they] felt in their new homes” and to the fact that new legal and political avenues have 
emerged since the 1990s to pursue their rights. Jamal (2011, 108) notes: 
…the Palestinian present absentees have adopted new legal and political 
strategies based on the new opportunity structures that opened with the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, changes within the Israeli legal and 
political systems, and the globalization of human rights discourse…. 
Fearing being left out of the peace process on account of how their condition was being 
framed by the Israeli legal system discussed above, the IDP community established their 
own strategies, re-emerging in the form of new a social movement (Ibid.).68 The most 
marked aspect of the return of the refugee question was the focus of annual Nakba events 
on those villages that were erased and whose residents that came to be known as 
“present absentees.”69  The significance of Nakba Day cannot be understated. As Nur 
Masalha (2009, 8) puts it:  
                                                
68 Most significantly, this included the creation of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of 
the Internally Displaced in Israel (ADRID) in 1995 when it was becoming clear that Palestinian 
internal refugees in Israel were being sidelined in the peace process (Wakim 2001; Peleg and 
Waxman 2011, 67; for a brief background of ADRID see Masalha 2005, 41-43; Sabbagh-Khoury 2011, 
43-44). 
69 While a different village is chosen each year, one of the notable examples is Saffuriyya, a village 
that was completely destroyed and cleansed in 1948, and whose habitants who remained in the 
state settled on the edges of Nazareth in the overcrowded Safafri quarter, only a few kilometres 
from Saffuriyya and whose name means people from Saffuriyya. Both Sharif Waked, an artist that 
is discussed in the dissertation, and the renowned filmmaker Elia Sulieman are present absentees 
from Safafri/Saffuriyya. 
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The Nakba Day connects the relatively isolated Palestinian communities 
inside and outside historic Palestine. Collective memory helps consolidate 
national bonds, mutual solidarity and shared history and memories. 
Nakba [The Catastrophe] refers to the day that Palestinians were dispossessed from their 
lands and homes, a day (15 May) that coincides with the establishment of the state of 
Israel. It took on an unprecedented status in the early 1990s as the visibility of the present 
absentees increased. These events became focused around those dispossessed and 
“unrecognized” villages, with former individuals and families from joining and leading the 
marches. These annual marches underline how the Nakba is not a past historical event, a 
finished historical event to be commemorated year to year, but a “present unfinished act” 
(Massad 2008). As Jamal (2011, 101) writes: “The memory of loss is repeated during the 
marches as a collective statement against the insult of the past and the role that the state 
plays in keeping it fresh”.70  
The predicament of the present absentee and their increasing visibility throughout 
the 1990s must be understood within the more broad “politicization” of Palestinians in 
Israel in the 1990s and 2000s. Throughout the 1990s the success of the Labor government, 
from Rabin and Peres (1992-1996) to Barak (1999-2001), depended considerably on their 
securing the support of Palestinian parties and vote. In exchange, however, the 
                                                
70In 2011 the Israeli government sought to counter this act of memory by passing what is called 
the Nakba Law (Amendment 40 of the Budget Principles Law). This law threatens to imposse 
harsh fines on any government-funded organization that contributes to the commemoration or 
teaching of the Nakba: “an expense which, in essence […] marks Israel Independence Day or the 
day of the establishment of the state as a day of mourning” (see 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/2011/05/15/“the-nakba-law”-and-its-implications/ ). In 2012 the High 
Court of Justice rejected an appeal made by ACRI and Adalah for rejecting this law on the basis 
that it violates the exercise of free speech (see 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/5_1_12.html ).  
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Palestinian parties received no access to the centers of power (such as ministries), instead 
being forced to show their support from the outside.71 The disappointment and sense of 
betrayal felt by Palestinians in Israel was reinforced in 1999 when Ehud Barak promoted 
his candidacy to Palestinians on the promise of a “state for all,” echoing a long-standing 
desire in the Palestinian community of “a state of all its citizens.”72 While Barak won the 
election, receiving nearly 95% of the Palestinian vote, his promise of “a state for all” was 
quickly shelved for fear of being a politically volatile position given his desire to build a 
broad coalition together with left, right, and religious parties (Al-Haj 2004, 115).  
The second event that has had a detrimental effect on the advances of the 
Palestinians in Israel was the failure of the Oslo Accords and Camp David, the end result of 
which culminated in the second Intifada in 2000. I will not dwell on the failings of the Oslo 
Accords or Camp David, but it is important to point out that they did play a critical part in 
the uprisings within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When the leaders convened for the 
Camp David meetings in July 2000, three issues remain unresolved. First was the question 
of the territorial contiguity and integrity of a Palestinian state; the second was the 
problem of Jerusalem; and the third the question of the fate of the Palestinian refugees. 
                                                
71 In 1992 the Rabin government depended on the votes of “Arab” delegates from the Democratic 
Front and the Arab Democratic Party to maintain Labor’s Knesset majority. Neither of these Arab 
parties was included in the governing coalition, nor did they get any ministerial posts. What they 
did receive, with the additional support for the Oslo agreements in the Knesset, was better 
treatment in terms of access to social services. See Al-Haj (2004, 115) and Shafir and Peled (2002, 
131). 
72 Laurence Louër (2007) explains this in terms of Barak using the “political language” of the 
“citizenship pact.” As she explains, “[t]his was a conscious return [by Barak] to the theme of 
citizenship, initially developed by Azmi Bishara”, (2003, 121-122). For more on the political 
thought of Azmi Bishara see Fraser and Shabat (2003). 
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Within months, on 28 September, Ariel Sharon, under heavy police escort, decided to visit 
the al-Aqsa mosque, knowing it would be considered a provocation.73 As one of the three 
holiest sites of Islam, there was wide spread rage among Palestinians, both in the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and in Israel. Within twenty-four hours, thousands of Palestinians in 
Israel held mass counterdemonstrations in which Israeli police killed five Palestinian 
citizens. At the same time, there was an outbreak of violence and clashes with the Israeli 
Defense Forces in the Occupied Territories. In response to the deaths of five Palestinian 
citizens and in solidarity with their brethren in the territories, on 30 September the 
Supreme Follow-up Committee of Israeli Arabs called for a general strike across the 
Palestinian towns of Israel. In the end, thirteen Palestinian citizens were killed, as well as 
one Jewish Israeli citizen. 
In November 2000 the Orr Commission was set up to investigate the October 2000 
events and the killing of Palestinian citizens.74 The report, which appeared in September 
2003, is in many ways a statement on the identity and citizenship status of the Palestinian 
minority (see Peled 2005). As Rabinowtiz and Abu-Baker (2005, 158-161) argue, the fifty-
page introduction to the report goes further than any other state document in 
acknowledging the predicaments of Palestinians of Israel and their struggles for equality, 
going so far as to suggest that, as an indigenous minority, the Palestinians in Israel have a 
right to claim certain collective rights. While the report does not go into any detail as to 
the reach and definition of these collective rights, the very acknowledgment that such 
                                                
73 Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005, 101) point out that Sharon’s visit was also motivated by an 
internal power struggle within his own Likud party, and in particular Netanyahu. 
74 Named after the Supreme Court justice who headed the committee, Theodor Orr. 
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rights exist for the Palestinian minority opens the question as to whether Israel is 
something more than a state for Jews (Ibid., 161). In other words, it brings into question 
the problem of Palestinian citizenship within a Jewish and democratic state. 
Unfortunately, the conclusions of the Orr report fall well short of the tone taken in 
the introduction. As Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005, 162) note: 
On the whole, however, the conclusion [of the Orr report] is a faint shadow 
of the sweeping and refreshing impetus apparent in the introduction. It is as 
if, before composing the conclusion, the commission reread its own 
introduction, panicked at its implications, and decided to shrink the scope 
of is recommendations to a level more acceptable to mainstream Israel. 
For all its efforts to assert itself, to move from a “politics of protest” to a politics of 
“power-sharing,” the second generation of Palestinians in Israel that had supported the 
Labour government from Rabin to Barak found itself back in the political conditions that 
preceded the 1970s, and simultaneously suffering from fatigue. 
There is little doubt that the period from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s brought 
significant and often positive changes to the Palestinian community in Israel. From 
economic opportunities and increased birth rates to access to higher levels of education 
and social services, this period was in many ways a “golden era.” But it also brought with 
it the realization that little had changed, that Palestinians remained second-class citizens 
in a Jewish state. For all these gains, levels of employment and income, health care, social 
services, remained lower than the Jewish Israeli population. Moreover, through a series of 
legislative moves with the Knesset, political participation had become difficult for those 
who opposed the “ethnocratic” nature of the Israeli state, an idea that I will address in 
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greater detail below. Thus, when demonstrations erupted in October 2000, what emerged 
was a new generation, one that was young, educated and highly disillusioned. 
Importantly, according to Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005), all but one of the 
Palestinians killed in October 2000 were under thirty, with two in their late teens. This was 
the first political stand of the new generation, what they call the Stand-Tall generation.75 
This generation was born roughly around the time of Land Day in 1976 and “came of age” 
with the previous generations’ failed efforts at civil equality and the rise of the Palestinian 
national movement during the first intifada in 1988 (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, 113). 
Having been raised during this period, the third generation took confidence and pride 
from the achievements of the Palestinian national movement, particularly the PLO, which 
it then turned on the previous generation to highlight its misguided attempts to see the 
Palestinian people accepted as full and equal members of Israeli society (Ibid.). This new 
generation also saw the identity politics that the previous generation attempted to 
mobilize as futile, an endless effort that would never result in a desirable outcome. In 
other words, in their eyes, any effort to conceptualize a double or dual Palestinian-Israeli 
identity is a foregone failure given that genuine equality and inclusion are impossible 
from the start. This “impatient skepticism” has led the third generation to radically 
rethink identity, and with it, its understanding of Israeli citizenship. It is a generation that 
is reasserting its presence in a social space in which they were previously neither visible 
nor heard. It is in this sense that the fear behind Michaeli’s proposed law to silence the 
                                                
75 As Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker (2005) point out, the place of this new generation is yet to be 
determined.  
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noise emanating from the Mosques in Israel is surely the noise that is reconfiguring this 
spatio-temporal order; the noise of democracy. 
 
“We are all present absentees” 
 
The generation that took part and organized the Land Day protests in 1976 had broken 
the silence and confronted the fears of their parents’ generation who had endured nearly 
twenty years under a Military Administration. For the first time, Palestinians came 
together as a community and demanded from the Israeli government their full and equal 
civil rights, which, by the 1990s was phrased as “a state for all its citizens.” If there was a 
sense of renewed possibility among this generation, by the 1990s, with the exclusion of 
the Palestinians in Israel from the Oslo process and their continued discrimination and 
exclusion within Israel, this generation had become “worn out.” 
 The “stand tall generation” that emerged after 2000 has taken a different 
approach to political struggle. While continuing their struggle within the political arena, 
either through the Knesset and political parties or through NGOs, it is a generation that 
has also sought to rethink the terms of their identity, skeptical of how far identity claims 
can go in attaining equality. It is therefore not surprising that the internal refugee or 
present absentee question was to re-emerge at this time. The present absentee was the 
embodiment of the condition of Palestinians in Israel as a whole, a people that have been 
displaced and become strangers at home (Arabic: al-ghurba). As Masalha (2009, 5) states: 
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The internally displaced found themselves in a unique situation. Despite 
their historic, geographic, cultural and national ties with the Palestinian 
people, they were “refugees” in their own homeland and their special 
situation was shared with the Palestinian minority in Israel. Sharing 
common memories of their “towns and villages of origin,” they formed a 
distinct group (in a distinctly weak position) among the Palestinian citizens 
of Israel: “a minority within a minority” – with its adverse consequences of 
“double marginalization”. 
As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5, when my friend Adi bluntly stated, “we are 
all present absentees” what he was doing was re-appropriating this colonial category for 
all Palestinians in Israel. As Leela Gandhi (2011, 32) has noted: “There is, of course, a rich 
tradition within numerous oppressed cultures for the positive re-appropriation of 
pejoratives”. At work in this re-appropriation, I will argue, is a figure of political 
subjectivity, an impossible identification that is not simply a resistance to state regimes of 
identification but more significantly a disruption of these regimes of identification and 
their spatio-temporal ordering. It is an “impossible identification” insofar as those 
aligning themselves with it are not “present absentees,” thus overturning its colonialist 
underpinnings. Moreover, it is the expression of a radical equality that has been twisted; it 
is the noise of democracy. 
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Michael Halak: Suspension 
 
The last time I saw Michael before leaving was when he had asked me to come to his 
studio at Pyramida, a gallery space with a number of artist studios in the Wadi el Saleib 
area of Haifa. He wanted me to come to see some new pieces he had just finished, works 
he thought I’d find interesting for my research. Up until this point I had always been given 
a lift by friends to his studio, usually someone on their way either to Akka or Nazareth. 
This time, however, I decided to walk. I knew the Wadi el Salib well, having heard about it 
in the news over the previous months and from many early weekend mornings with 
friends at the flea market. Among Jewish Israelis, the Wadi el Salib is known for the riots 
in 1959 between Jewish Moroccan immigrants and the Haifa police, since becoming a 
“site of Israeli memory” reflecting the ethnic discrimination against Mizrahim Jews (see 
Weiss 2011). For Palestinians, however, lost in this history is their presence in the Wadi el 
Salib before 1948, what was once a flourishing community and the center of life in Haifa.76 
Before leaving Michael’s studio that day I went to a window that overlooked what had 
once been the center of the Wadi. Since 2007, many of the properties in the area, the 
majority of which are refugee owned and therefore protected by Israeli and international 
law, are being sold to private investors.77 The fragmentation of Wadi, both historically and 
                                                
76 The Wadi el Salib area was the subject of the artist Ahlam Shibli’s 1999 photographic series, 
Wadi Saleib in 9 Volumes. In this series Shibli returns to the Wadi el Salib and photographs 
Palestinians re-inhabiting the abandoned homes. I will discuss her work, and this series, in a later 
chapter. 
77 These properties are protected under the Absentee Property Laws and are to be held by the 
Israel Land Administration until the refugee question is resolved. Israel claims that a second law 
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in the public memory, is nicely captured in Michael’s playful painting of photographic 
snapshots of the area (Figure 11). 
 When I got to Michael’s studio he was hanging one of his new paintings on the wall 
for me to see, a painting I had already seen the week before on his Facebook page. In the 
middle of the canvas was an Israeli Blue-ID card held by two pieces of masking tape on to 
what appears to be a section of a brown carton shipping box, a sticker directly below the 
ID card saying “FRAGILE: HANDLE WITH CARE” (Figure 12).78 Michael was visibly proud of 
this work and it garnered many positive comments in the week since he put it up on 
Facebook. “So what do you think?” Michael asked. “I like it, very much, but I can’t help 
but feel there’s a lot going on here,” I answered. Michael smiled in affirmation. “On the 
one hand,” I continued, “it is deceptively simply but, on the other, the composition 
suggests far more.” Michael paused, looking at the painting: “You’re right, what do you 
see?” “Let me think more about it and I’ll let you know,” I replied. Michael then showed 
me a sketch of a glass vase with three apples suspended inside sitting inside a shoebox. 
Before I had a chance to say anything he told me, “wait,” and quickly disappeared to an 
adjacent room, what appeared to be a supply room. After a few minutes he returned with 
a shoebox in hand, the outside of which was in a bright orange: “This is the box, what do 
you think?” he asked (Figure 13). I looked at the sketch and then back at the box and said: 
“well, I see the apples are suspended in air, with the orange of the box framing, almost 
                                                                                                                                                  
passed in the 1960s does not forbid the sale of refugee property in urban settings. Adalah is 
presently contesting this claim. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hm1fTLwKuWQ  
78 The Blue-ID (Teudat Zehut) is an identity card that every Israeli citizen, as well as those with 
legal resident status, over 16 is required to carry.    
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enclosing them, as if to signal a warning or danger. Is this what you had in mind?” Michael 
appreciated my interpretation, “I always want to hear what other people see, it helps me 
see new things.” 
Over the following few weeks I carried an image of Michael’s painting of the Blue-
ID around on my phone, showing friends to see their reactions. For the most part the 
response was positive, though not amazed, that is, until I told them it was a painting: 
“Really? Wow!” They would then look again, more intently, their indifference turning to 
appreciation. However, not everyone was impressed, my friend Bilal rather bluntly asking: 
“Why didn’t he just take a photograph?” I suppose that showing people such a painting 
on a phone was not the best way to appreciate it. Those who were impressed with the 
painting chuckled about the “Fragile” sticker below the Blue-ID, recounting stories of how 
they had lost theirs or how they didn’t have it on them when they were stopped by the 
police. Other friends got into more detailed discussions about the way the older ID cards 
used to say Jewish or Arab, which the state, after much criticism changed. They further 
pointed out how the new ones continue to distinguish who is Jewish and who is Arab, 
albeit less obviously by way of a line of asterisks or the format of the date of birth, which 
includes the Hebrew date of birth for Jewish citizens. As my friend Khulood poignantly 
said, “these [ID cards] are just another way they [Israel] make sure they keep us [Arabs] 
separate.” 
 As Michael and I got to know each other over the year, our conversations often 
tended to cross a variety of topics, but one subject we always returned to, without much 
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prompting, was the issue of identity. A particular conversation was especially 
perspicacious. Sitting in a friend’s apartment in Haifa during one of our first long talks, 
Michael told me he was from Fassouta, an Arab Christian village near the border of 
Lebanon. As we continued talking about his village, Michael abruptly declared, “I’m not 
Palestinian or 100% Arab.” At first his denial of being Palestinian greatly confused me 
considering his work had a nuanced but strong political message regarding the state of 
Palestinians in Israel. Maybe he was being flippant with me, trying to be a bit provocative 
for the anthropologist. At the time our conversation quickly moved on to another topic, 
and I didn’t have a chance to confront Michael about this statement. But it stayed with me 
and I was not willing to let such a claim go, and some time later I asked him: “Do you 
remember telling me one time that you weren’t Palestinian or Arab? What did you mean 
by this? Michael clarified: “My grandfather from my dad’s side is American, my other 
grandparents have Lebanese roots and I’m Catholic. In Jewish eyes I’m Arab and 
Palestinian, as are all the ‘48 Arabs in Israel, and they treat us so.” I suppose I had 
assumed, wrongly it turns out, that the issues of identity in Michael’s work were about a 
Palestinian identity. But was I entirely wrong? What did Michael mean by “and they treat 
us so”?  
Thinking about this statement I was reminded of something Michael told me that 
day sitting in a friend’s apartment in Haifa, about a recent event at the University of Haifa 
where he taught in the art department: “Last semester something funny happened. I was 
teaching a course, basic introduction to art techniques. One day I found out that almost 
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half of the 20 students, the 9 out of the 10 Jewish students, were dropping the second 
part of the course,” Michael said. “Why?” I asked. He continued: “When I asked why they 
were dropping the course, they said because they cannot be taught by an Arab; they 
couldn’t continue and would wait until a Jewish professor gives the course to do the 
second half.” I was stunned: “Because you’re an Arab!?! But how did they not know you 
were Arab? When they signed up for the course, or at least when they first came to the 
course, couldn’t they tell?” I inquired. “Michael is a common Jewish name, and my last 
name, it’s not so easy to tell; and it was impossible to tell from my Hebrew. It was only 
when I spoke to a few of the Arab students in Arabic one day that they found out, and 
that’s when they decided they couldn’t continue. I pointed out that this was a basic art 
techniques class and that my being Arab made no difference, but it didn’t matter.” As we 
talked it became clear that the reaction of Michael’s students to drop the second part of 
the course, decided on the basis of his proclaimed identity in Jewish eyes as an Arab, is 
what undoubtedly what Michael meant when he said to me later, “and they treat us so.” It 
was not entirely surprising that identity was a troubling issue for Michael, and many of his 
self-portraits express this sense of unease and discomfort. While on numerous occasions 
he hinted to me of the importance of his self-portraits, he said very little more about them. 
Each of his self-portraits would appear to express an anxiety of sorts, but as I got to know 
Michael, I started to see something different, something about not belonging to the 
traditional categories of identification that were being imposed. The first indication I got 
of this, even though I wasn’t aware of it at the time, was when I first met him.  
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My friend Nardeen, also an artist and close friend of his for many years, insisted I 
should meet Michael and even offered to introduce me. Still at Pyramida, he was in a 
different studio space that was smaller and more confined. As I walked through the door I 
noticed unfinished portraits leaning against the far wall, but it was when I turned around 
that I saw the works Michael wanted to show me. On the wall was a series of paintings, 
the most striking of which was one with three green apples over-towering a single cherry 
front and center (Figure 14). I moved forward to see it more closely. On one of the apples 
was a sticker, “48,” an obvious reference to the establishment of the state of Israel. But I 
was curious, what was a cherry doing here? I turned to Michael, “A cherry? They aren’t 
even native here,” I said. “Neither are the green apples,” he replied, “they came with the 
creation of Israel, imported from Europe.” “So,” I continued, “nothing is native in this 
painting?” “Nothing,” he replied. “And the cherry? If the apples are to represent Israelis 
coming from Europe, is the cherry supposed to be you?” With a sly smile on his face, 
Michael said, “it is.” But,” I asked, “how are you not native to here?” This was the first time 
I had met Michael and I assumed he was Palestinian and that therefore the “you” was a 
collective subject referring to Palestinians in Israel, to portray himself by way of an 
imported cherry seemed to me to be odd, but I didn’t then understand his own uneasy 
relationship with his identity, not for a few more months at least. I remember expressing 
my puzzlement regarding the cherry, or at least its apparent incoherence. As it was our 
first time meeting, and as Michael was quite shy to begin with, there wasn’t much 
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explanation, but he did make a remark that took me many months to understand: “I’m 
not native here either.”  
Michael was never short of contradictions. The last day I saw him he pulled out 
one final painting for me to see, a landscape. On a grey and slightly tattered wall hangs a 
small piece of paper that has been torn out of a spiral bound notebook. Having been 
folded in four, perhaps to put in one’s pocket or to maybe to pass along to someone else 
without revealing its contents, a secret note, it is now opened and its message exposed 
(Figure 15).  
As I stared at the painting I didn’t know what this list was supposed to tell me. The 
objects were typical symbols – a shepherd, sheep, olive trees, a blue sky, no clouds – 
symbols Palestinians might invoke to talk about what they lost in 1948. An image formed 
in my mind, was the point to remember this now lost place? Yes, there was the question of 
the numbers, which didn’t seem in any way random: 1, 10, 20. Confused, I turned to 
Michael and asked: “What is this list and the corresponding numbers supposed to 
designate?” Without any hesitation, Michael replied: “1 is for the day, 10 is for the month, 
20, plus a 0 for the blue sky and a 0 for no clouds, a year.” 1 October 2000, the October 
Ignition when 13 Palestinians in Israel were killed by Israeli police in demonstrations and 
strikes in support of the Second Intifada. If Michael claims not to be Palestinian, artistic 
gestures such as this landscape suggest otherwise. But then he was never without 
contradiction. 
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Some days after seeing Michael for the last time I sent him a short message about 
the painting of the Blue-ID he showed me that day: “One thing that I keep thinking about 
is that it’s not clear whom this identity card belongs to since we can’t see inside of it to 
know for sure. It’s as if its fragility is what is unknown. Arab, Jew, Christian?” A few hours 
later I got an even shorter response from him: “!”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Michael Halak, Wadi el Salib, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 12: Michael Halak, Fragile, 2011 
  
 
 
Figure 13: Michael Halak, Untitled, 2011 
 
  
 
 
Figure 14: Michael Halak, Untitled, 2009 
  
 
 
Figure 15: Michael Halak, Landscape, 2011 
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Chapter 3: Anthropology, Contemporary Art and the Politics of 
Place 
 
Introduction: Contemporary Art and Anthropology 
 
In their now seminal text The Traffic in Culture, George E. Marcus and Fred Myers’ (1995, 1) 
begin with the bold claim that anthropology and contemporary art share a common 
object of culture: “In contemporary cultural life, art has come to occupy a space long 
associated with anthropology, becoming one of the main sites for tracking, representing, 
and performing the effects of difference in contemporary life”. Both contemporary art 
and anthropology are thus involved in “positing or evoking difference” (Ibid., 20) and, 
moreover, of “transforming difference into discourse, for making it meaningful for 
thought and action” (Ibid., 34-35). To be sure, the affinity between these two practices, as 
“discursive arenas for comprehending or evaluating cultural activity” (Ibid., 5-6), is rooted 
in their common critical stance toward modernity (Ibid., 6). In other words, both are 
cultural practices that, in being discursively separate from culture, have culture as their 
object. Their central point is that, modern anthropology and modern art have long been 
engaged in the game of representing and producing cultural difference.79 In a similar vein, 
the idea of contemporary art and anthropology sharing a common object is also 
maintained by Arnd Schneider (1996,185) who claims, “artistic expression is as legitimate 
                                                
79 Although they note that the influence of art discourses on anthropological thinking about 
culture is a history that has yet to be written, they do offer an outline (Marcus and Myers 1995, 11). 
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and valid in representing other cultures as academically legitimized and institutionalized 
forms of anthropological writing, film and photography” (see also Schneider and Wright 
2006; 2010; MacClancy 1997). 
 For Marcus and Myers (1995, 11), discussions of cultural difference in the West 
have long been developed in the art world, and, moreover, “art continues to be the space 
in which difference, identity, and cultural value are being produced and contested”. What 
they signal is that the traffic between anthropology and art, the condition of their present 
affinity, has a strong historical precedent (see Rampley 2000), with modern art figuring in 
many anthropological concerns about cultural difference (e.g. primitivism, cubism, 
surrealism) and anthropology providing many of the ideas within these same movements 
(e.g. Frazer’s Golden Bough). Indeed, as Schneider (1996: 200-201) contends,  
… differences between artists and anthropologists are matters of historical, 
social and cultural choice and disciplinary confinement, rather than being 
founded on differences in substance of the cognitive processes knowledge 
acquisition and production.  
Such affinities might appear to open up numerous probing questions and collaborations, 
a crossing of boundaries and borders with distinct opportunities for challenging both 
practices, as Arnd Schneider and Christopher Wright have provocatively explored (2006; 
2010; see also Marcus 2010; Strohm 2012).80 As Morphy and Perkins (2006, 470) note: 
If done in collaboration, such visual or artistic methodologies can, as with 
ethnographic film, play an important role, since expressive representations 
                                                
80 For Schneider (1993) in particular, the relationship between art and anthropology dates at least 
from the 1960s in the uses of fieldwork by such artists as Jean Rouch, Susan Hiller, Joseph Kosuth, 
etc. 
87 
 
are natural formats for the dissemination of anthropological research on 
cultural practices that are themselves artistic or expressive forms in the 
communities where they are produced. 
Setting aside the promising avenues opened up in this affinity of practices, the 
relationship between contemporary art and anthropology Marcus and Myers (1995) are 
asserting demands closer inspection. To be more specific, what exactly is this “shared 
object of culture”? Further, what does it mean that art and anthropology occupy the same 
site as culture?  
While anthropologists have long been aware of the difficulties of defining the 
concept of culture (see Brightman 1995; White 2006a), focusing on Marcus and Myers’ use 
of the concept, as well as its reiteration by others working in the anthropology of art 
(Schneider 2006; McClancy 1997; Morphy and Perkins 2006; Schneider and Wright 2006, 
2010), but also following more recent thinking about culture across anthropology, culture 
is here broadly conceived as “a site of difference and contestation.” Culture does not so 
much designate “a domain of sharing and commonality” as it does a “ground and stake of 
a rich field of cultural-political practices” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 5; see Appadurai 
and Breckenridge 1988, 6-7; Marcus and Myers 1995, 11). For Gupta and Ferguson (1997b) 
there is a distinct emphasis on the spatiality of culture and its transformation from a 
bounded place to a “site of difference and contestation.” Thus, when Marcus and Myers 
(1995) note that art and anthropology occupy a common space, it is arguably this “site” of 
culture that they have in common, and of which they both are part. To be sure, at the 
beginning of their introduction they point out that one of the distinguishing factors of a 
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critical anthropology of art, setting it apart from previous scholarship both in 
anthropology and more broadly, is a recognition that “anthropology is implicated with 
the very subject matter that it wants to make the object of its study: art worlds” (Ibid., 1).  
Of particular interest to me here is how this spatial understanding of culture 
functions within Marcus and Myers’ program for conceiving the relationship between art 
and anthropology. Conceived as a site of difference and contestation, they argue, 
anthropology and art both occupy a space in which difference is both ground and stake, 
something given and disputed. In order to further unpack this idea, I want to focus on the 
spatial metaphors of “site” and “space” in so far as they point to an underlying spatial 
logic within Marcus and Myers’ argument. Beyond elaborating the relationship between 
anthropology and art, I am also interested in what these spatial metaphors can reveal 
about the conceptualization of politics in the anthropology of art, a discussion I will take 
up in more detail in the following chapter.81 Within the writings on the relationship 
between space and place within anthropology (e.g.,Gupta and Ferguson 1997a), the 
processes by which place is space made meaningful, especially as a practice of politics, is 
a central consideration. It is this relationship that I read back into Marcus and Myers’ 
understanding the affinity between art and anthropology. 
Starting from these spatial metaphors, the current chapter explores the affinity 
between anthropology and contemporary art by situating it within wider anthropological 
                                                
81 To be fair, it is not as though politics is absent in the anthropology of art. Indeed, there is often 
an indication of politics in the claim that art is most often tied to the assertion of identity claims, a 
point I will discuss at length at the end of this chapter and in the following one. That said, it is 
nonetheless disconcerting that in Morphy and Perkins’ (2006) reader in the anthropology of art, 
politics is absent from the subject index. 
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discussions of space and place. Specifically, I contend that both anthropology and art are 
practices of place making, that is, of making space meaningful.  In other words, by 
“transforming difference into discourse” (Marcus and Myers 1995, 34-35), both are 
engaged in place making and thus can be considered cultural practices with political 
implications. The recent historical conjuncture at which anthropology recognizes its close 
relationship to contemporary art is a period marked by their mutual concern with the 
politics of space and place. From the boundaries of fieldwork and culture in anthropology 
to the site, location and public/community as political interventions in contemporary art, 
it is a period in which both practices are responding to the effects of globalization and 
how these spatial concerns have left the givenness of place, “the natural property of a 
spatially localized people” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 3), unstable and problematic. On 
the one hand, anthropology finds itself struggling with the question of place and its 
relation to the spatial dimensions of globalization in terms of power and global capital 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997a; Escobar 2001). On the other, for many contemporary art 
historians, theorists and artists, especially those working in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
idea of culture as a site of difference becomes a dominant theme (Foster 1996; 
Papastergiadis 2010). As art historian Anne Ring Petersen (2012, 198) has described, the 
issue of cultural identity or difference as an object of art practices appeared in the 1980s, 
at a time when the exclusion of artists of non-Western origin came under attack, leading 
to both the critique of institutional attitudes and the adoption of multicultural policies 
within art institutions and curatorial practices.82 Thus, for contemporary art, the mid-80s 
                                                
82 It is widely considered among art historians that the preeminent historical moment of this 
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and early 90s is a period in which the social and political relevance of art is critiqued and 
extended beyond the frames of the gallery and museum through such practices as site-
specificity and installation art (Kwon 2002). It is also at this time that the appropriation of 
so-called “anthropological” methods (i.e., ethnographic fieldwork) by many artists 
reaches a high point in the effort to underline the constitutive role of place and the 
everyday within contemporary art practice (Papastergiadis 2010, 15; Foster 1996).83  
With these issues in mind, the first section of this chapter examines the claim that 
culture is the shared object of anthropology and contemporary art. Specifically, I look at 
the spatial moorings underlying the idea of culture as a “site” of difference and 
contestation. I argue that this spatial conception of culture leads to an understanding of 
anthropology and art as practices of place making. In the second part I take up the 
problem of place in anthropology, providing an overview of the criticisms of place as 
projecting a bounded, fixed and exclusionary conception of culture versus the mobility, 
circulation and hybridity of contemporary life. In the third section I explore the recent 
“return of place” in anthropological research and how these are efforts to mediate the 
                                                                                                                                                  
arrival was the 1989 exhibition in Paris, “Magiciens de la terre”: “For the first time ever, art from 
non-Western countries was set in an historical framework” (Konijn 1992, 29). For art critic Rasheed 
Araeen (2000), the exhibition largely set the agenda for the inclusion of other artists (i.e., non-
Western) in the contemporary art scene thereafter. Going further, art historian Julian Stallabrass 
(2004) argues however that the exploration of diversity, difference, and hybridity dates from the 
end of the Second World War and the establishment of New York as the centre of the art world.  
83 In a somewhat more acerbic assessment of this turn to anthropology, for art critic Hal Foster the 
“ethnographic turn” within contemporary art in the late 1980s was effectively premised on the 
valorization of cultural alterity (read: difference) as the new exploited proletariat; that is, “the 
cultural and/or ethnic other in whose name the artist often struggles (Foster 1995, 302). It is 
significant that Foster’s essay (albeit an abridged version), “The Artist as Ethnographer” appears 
in Marcus and Myers’ (1995) The Traffic in Culture, conveniently adding a critical art historical 
legitimacy to their central claim. For an important critique of Foster’s essay, see Rampley (2001).  
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tension between the deterritorialization of culture and the attachments of culture to 
place; that is, how place making, in particular, is a strategy for contesting the power 
relations of a spatially interconnected world. In the final part of the chapter, I look to 
anthropology and art as practices of place making and ask whether the continued 
adherence to culture as the site of identity/difference has not led to an over-emphasis on 
the question of identity politics. Turning to my fieldwork, I contend that this adherence to 
identity politics has its limits and must be rethought the object of further analysis and 
criticism. Thus, I ask, is there a way to rethink place making without identity? Put 
differently, is it possible to conceive of the affinity between anthropology and art as 
cultural practices that are not unavoidably bound to assertions of identity and difference? 
An attempt to answer this question will be the task of the next chapter. 
 
Culture and Contemporary Life 
 
As Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992, 13) have pointed out in their reading of 
Anthropology as Cultural Critique (Marcus and Fischer 1986), the notion of cultural critique 
put forward in that work depends on a “spatialized understanding of cultural difference 
that needs to be problematized”. The notion of cultural critique that it attempts to 
reclaim for anthropology, in short, rests on an “already existing world of many different, 
distinct ‘cultures,’” which are so positioned as to gain critical insight into each (see 
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Marcus and Fischer 1986, 117). The problem, Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 14) note, is the 
following: 
The fundamental conception of cultural critique as a relation between 
“different societies” ends up, perhaps against the authors’ intentions, 
spatializing cultural difference in familiar ways, as ethnography becomes … 
a link between an unproblematized “home” and “abroad.” The 
anthropological relation is not simply with people who are different, but 
with a “different society,” “a different culture,” and this, inevitably, a 
relation between “here” and “there”. 
The presupposition of the project of cultural critique is that differences are starting points, 
thus implicitly sustaining a vision of pre-given cultures occupying separate places. What 
Gupta and Ferguson problematize is the ahistorical assumption underlying this project 
and how it effectively effaces the historical construction of differences (Ibid., 16). The 
point, they argue, is to understand how “differences are produced and maintained in a 
field of power relations in a world always already spatially interconnected” (Ibid., 17). As 
they argue, “enforced difference becomes part and parcel of a global system of 
domination” (Ibid.). Indeed, such a conception of cultural difference carries the risk of 
“nativizing” the other through a bounding and fixing of the “Other” in place (see 
Appadurai 1988b). This process, which will be explored further below, detracts from the 
significance of difference as a historical product and process that “differentiates the 
world as it connects it” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 16).84  
                                                
84 Matti Bunzl (2004) has recently made a similar argument for a historical appreciation of cultural 
difference, though his criticisms go much further than Gupta and Ferguson. As he states: “While 
articulated as criticisms of Malinowskian fieldwork, such positions [e.g. Gupta and Ferguson 
(1997b) and Clifford (1997)] reaffirm foundational aspects of the paradigm they deplore, 
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If my aim is to engage the spatial approach to culture and the problems therein, I 
should clarify that my concern is not to suggest that Marcus and Myers’ conceptualization 
of cultural difference holds to the idea that the people anthropologists study are 
sedentary or inescapably rooted to particular places; rather, it is to underline their 
recognition of the unmooring of culture and place. This point comes through most clearly 
in the emphasis they put upon “contemporary life.” Significantly, contemporary life for 
Marcus and Myers is the critical juncture at which art and anthropology come together 
and occupy a shared space. For Marcus and Myers it is arguably the peculiarity of 
contemporary life that makes the present affinity between art and anthropology 
noteworthy. Indeed, it is not as if art and anthropology haven’t crossed before, one need 
only recall the historical conjunctions between anthropology and art noted in Clifford’s 
(1988) Predicament of Culture and Marcus and Fischer’s (1986) accounts of the avant-
garde in Anthropology as Cultural Critique for a historical account of previous crossings 
and collaborations. What is contemporary life? And how does their understanding of 
contemporary life lead to a spatial consideration of culture? Moreover, how does it allow 
them to “conceptualize cultural difference without invoking the orthodox idea of ‘culture’ 
[i.e., place-bound]” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 19). 
Unlike engagements between art and anthropology in the early twentieth century, 
the vagaries of contemporary life present an entirely unprecedented set of circumstances 
and conditions; for anthropology it is a globalizing world “where new metaphors of 
                                                                                                                                                  
sustaining the ethnographic hierarchy of Self and Other at the very moment they attempt to 
transcend it” (Bunzl 2004, 436). 
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mobility (diaspora, displacement, traveling, deterritorialization, border crossing, 
hybridity, nomadology) are privileged in explanations of culture and identity” (Escobar 
2001, 146). In conceptual and theoretical terms, these changes have pushed 
anthropologists away from the fixity, givenness or naturalness of place toward a wider 
view of the spatial relations of power beyond the boundaries of the local. In 
contemporary life, culture and place have become uncoupled, with culture 
deterritorialized, the consequence of which Marcus and Myers (1995) described earlier as 
being the “interpenetration of cultures.” For the ever mobile contemporary artist, 
increasingly attentive to the experiences of being in a particular place, globalization has 
been similarly understood in terms of the deterritorialization of culture and general 
rootlessness, and likewise has incurred the awareness that the experience of culture no 
longer happens in isolation of wider global relations (Papastergiadis 2010, 17; 8). With 
culture, once attached to a particular place and location, now uprooted and embroiled in 
the flows of the global, tropes of placelessness or “non-lieux” (Augé 1992) have become 
the essential features of contemporary life. If place exists, it is something made in the 
process of giving meaning to space (Cresswell 2004; Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003); in 
other words, it is the localized effect of global power relations (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). 
There is, however, a peculiar tension between space and place in contemporary 
life. As has been pointed out by a number of anthropologists, the paradox of 
contemporary life is that the increase in mobility and transnationality, an unprecedented 
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acceleration in deterritorialization (Appadurai 1988b; Harvey 1990),85 has not curtailed the 
desire for the attachment to a particular place in the world (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 10; 
Olwig 1997, 17; Bauman 2000; Escobar 2001, 140; White 2002). Similarly, as Papastergiadis 
(2010, 8) notes with respect to contemporary art, “[artistic] practices are increasingly 
defined by the dual desire for mobility and attachment to place”. Contemporary artists, 
by exploring practices that are sited, conceived or presented in or for a particular place, 
seek to draw attention to the everyday and its particularities with a critical view of its 
process of production. As art theorist Miwon Kwon (2002, 8) argues, with a slight twist, 
one of the aims of contemporary art is to “counter both the nostalgic desire for a retrieval 
of rooted, place-bound identities on the one hand, and the antinostalgic embrace of a 
nomadic fluidity of subjectivity, identity, and spatiality on the other”.86  
It is here that we begin to discern a tension between space and place, a tension 
that, I will argue, underlies object of culture in art and anthropology. Despite culture 
being decoupled from place, there is a recognition that it still retains a localized 
dimension or site. As suggested in the above discussion of contemporary life, in which 
place and the local are the effects of global relations of power, the assumption that 
culture be tied to a particular place, even through historical elision, is unsustainable. Yet, 
this is not to suggest that we should abandon place, or that space and place are not 
                                                
85 Appadurai (1988a, 16) defines the “problem of place” in anthropology as “the problem of 
culturally defined places to which ethnographies refer”. I will elaborate this point below. 
86 Kwon (1997, 109) also states that in the context of site-specific art: “[D]espite the proliferation of 
discursive sites and ‘fictional’ selves, the phantom of a site as an actual place remains, and our 
psychic, habitual attachments to places regularly return as they continue to inform our sense of 
identity”. 
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related. People do continue to assert their attachment and belonging to a particular 
place; it is precisely this making of place that merits our attention, especially the 
relationship between space and the continued desire for an attachment to place 
understood as “the process whereby a space achieves a distinctive identity as a place” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 4; original emphasis). As Hastrup and Olwig have similarly 
stated, the point is not to take “local cultures for granted… but to explore the siting of 
culture as a dynamic process of self-understanding” (1997, 3). Most importantly, however, 
following Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 11), “the urgent task is to politicize this 
uncontestable observation.” To understand this process whereby space becomes place is, 
in other words, to understand how the bond between culture and place is established 
historically as part of a spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations (see also Harvey 
1993, 21). This being the case, I want to extend Marcus and Myers’ claim that culture is the 
shared object of contemporary art and anthropology, by adding to it the process by which 
culture becomes attached to place. The affinity between at and anthropology, in other 
words, is that both are practices of place making. To be sure, it is as practices of place 
making that both processes are deeply political.  
If, however, the isomorphism of culture and place are to be avoided, as has been 
argued in anthropology and contemporary art theory, a reconsideration of place must be 
undertaken. 
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The Problem of Place 
 
I would like to begin this discussion of the problem of place in anthropology in a slightly 
roundabout manner, by briefly rehearsing what is undoubtedly a commonplace for most 
anthropologists: the unraveling of the culture concept since the 1980s.87 For many, the 
“writing culture” debate spurred a radical critique in anthropology, a rethinking of its 
practices and the retooling of its ways of knowing.88 It started more or less with the 
central contention that alongside participant observation, ethnography was also a matter 
of writing and therefore must be considered more closely (Clifford 1986). The point, in 
other words, was how a critical attention to writing or the making of texts would reveal 
more closely the dynamics of power with fieldwork practice. I will not here review the 
often widely divergent ensemble of texts that make up Writing Culture; instead I want to 
focus on how this attention to writing opened an avenue for the critique of the culture 
concept that immediately followed.  
                                                
87 The following discussion of the problem of place in anthropology will be centered on a body of 
literature from between the 1980s and early 2000s. This period is significant insofar as it is the 
height of the theoretical debate surrounding space and place in anthropology (specifically U.S. 
anthropology). This is not to suggest that the debate has gone silent, but it is surely less 
prominent.  
88 In this context I am referring to George E. Marcus and James Clifford’s (1986) Writing Culture. 
Also see Marcus and Cushman (1982) and Geertz (1988). It should be noted, however, that this 
critique, emerging at the time of the neo-liberalization of the American academy, was a 
culmination, or better, consolidation and pacification of earlier critiques, e.g. Hymes (1972); Asad 
(1973); see also White (2012). As Gupta and Ferguson (1997b, 24) rightly suggest, the radicalism of 
these earlier critiques more or less failed on account of their implicit adherence to “conventional 
conception of the relation of anthropologist to ‘the field’”. I will return to the issue of the field and 
fieldwork below. 
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 The disclosure that the reality anthropologists often depicted in their writing was 
partial and far from transparent led to a more probing examination into how the 
ethnographic text itself was being constructed.89 Borrowing the tools of literary criticism 
popular at the time, the debate on writing focused on the rhetorical techniques invoked 
in the representation of other cultures, such as the disappearance of the 
author/anthropologist once the mise-en-scène had been established (Clifford 1986). This 
critique of writing dispelled the illusion of textual transparency and ethnographic 
authority, and brought to the foreground what is now referred to as the “politics of 
representation” in anthropology (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; 
Clifford 1988). 90  In the years that followed the publication of Writing Culture other 
anthropologists continued to critically explore the rhetorical techniques within 
ethnographic writing, from various experimental approaches that borrowed from art and 
fiction (Marcus and Fischer 1986; Clifford 1988) to the phenomenon of fieldnotes (Sanjek 
1990), dialogical anthropology (Tedlock and Mannheim 1995), and other critical forms of 
knowledge production (Fabian 1991).91 One particular line of inquiry, and the one that 
interests me here, was directed at what was called “ethnographic holism”; the way in 
                                                
89 A similar point is made, much earlier, by Johannes Fabian in his Time and the Other. Here Fabian 
(1983, 74-76) discusses how “folk”, “, primitive” and “savage” were all categories in the making of 
the object of anthropology that were temporal operators or relations, devices for that served 
time-distancing effects (to this list should be added “culture” – see McGrane [1989]). 
90 The “politics of representation,” though rarely explicitly defined, refers to the dynamics of 
power relations within the process of representational practices, such as ethnography. The 
conflation of politics and power, common in English speaking social scientific discourse (Glick-
Schiller 1997, 1-2), will be problematized in the following chapter.  
91 For Johannes Fabian representation is not about the mirroring of the field or another culture in 
the ethnographic text (i.e., an indexical relationship), but a process of knowledge production that 
happens through conversation and confrontation, which is then re-presented in the ethnographic 
text (see Fabian 1991).  
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which the ethnographic text became a closed form built around the idea that culture itself 
was by its nature a whole. As Robert Thornton (1988, 285) described the problem: 
Unlike the zoologist who describes the mollusc before him, the 
ethnographer must imagine the “whole” that is society, and convey this 
imagination of wholeness to his reader, along with descriptions of places 
seen, speech heard, persons met. The description of wholes, however, is 
“description without place… a sight indifferent to the eye.” For this the 
ethnography needs a special kind of rhetorical technique.  
For Thornton, then, the representation of society or culture as a whole is, or at least was, 
a prerequisite of anthropology, even if such an undertaking was not empirically 
attainable. The image of wholeness, Thornton maintains, gives ethnography its apparent 
closure (Ibid., 286) and is thus one of the keys for understanding how ethnography 
“works.” The wholeness of a society or culture is an ethnographic trope, the ulterior 
image “against which description makes sense,” what holds the story of the 
anthropologist together. Not being directly accessible to anthropologist or informant, it is 
the work of imagination. Thornton goes to great pains to ensure the reader that these 
textual imaginations of social and cultural wholes are not reality: there is a difference 
between a cognitive construct and a social entity (Ibid., 293). To wit, they are wholes 
without place, reifications of autonomous and regulatory entities (Bourdieu 1977, 26-27). 
Undoubtedly, the idea that cultures are akin to texts, a notion promulgated by Geertz, 
fostered and encouraged this conception.92 
                                                
92 Thornton (1988, 291) suggests that there is a “mistaken analogy with the text whose parts – 
namely chapters, titles, subheadings, paragraphs, and so on – are truly constitutive of the textual 
whole”. It should also be noted that Geertz’s analogy is not that culture is a text, as is often 
wrongly claimed (e.g. Augé 1992, 49; Rees 2008, 11), but rather an ensemble of texts: “The culture 
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Here the idea of culture as a unified, internally coherent and spatially bound whole 
(the negation of intracultural diversity and variation) was revealed to be no more than a 
rhetorical device, an imagined reality conveyed by the ethnographic text, a fiction of the 
anthropological imagination. As Stephen Tyler (1986, 132) announced in his contribution 
to Writing Culture: 
We know that these textual transcendentals, these invocations of holism, of 
functionally integrated systems are literary tropes, the vehicles that carry 
imagination from the part to the whole, the concrete to the abstract, and 
knowing them for what they are, whether mechanismic or organismic, 
makes us suspect the rational order they promise. 
Yet, the wholeness of a society or culture as presented in ethnography goes further than 
these rhetorical strategies astutely outlined by Thornton, Tyler and others: the idea of 
wholeness is tacit to the practice of fieldwork, to the “field” itself as a bounded space and 
localizing strategy (Fardon 1990). In fact, the critical insight of the Writing Culture debate 
was the imbrication of culture and the field, how each depended on the other in a sort of 
recursive manner. Yet, for all of this, the idea of the field and fieldwork merited little to no 
attention in the writing culture debate, somehow falling outside of the purview of critical 
eyes. As Gupta and Ferguson (1997b, 2) query: 
But what of “the field” itself, the place where the distinctive work of 
“fieldwork” may be done, that taken-for-granted space in which an “Other” 
culture or society lies waiting to be observed and written? This mysterious 
space – not the “what” of anthropology but the “where” – has been left to 
common sense, beyond and below the threshold of reflexivity. 
                                                                                                                                                  
of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles…” (Geertz 1973, 452; see White 2012, 
76). Geertz’s influence on those involved in Writing Culture was considerable, albeit often mutually 
antagonistic.  
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As Gupta and Ferguson suggest, the ideas of the field and fieldwork have for too long 
been left unexamined, despite their centrality within anthropological practice. Instead, 
the idea of fieldwork has remained shrouded as a rite de passage, consequently garnering 
little if any critical attention, all the while strategically functioning as a disciplinary 
boundary. Rather than seeing these separately, they argue, it has become necessary to 
think how they are related, how the “field” of fieldwork and the “field” of anthropology, 
far from being neutral spaces, are “politically and epistemologically intertwined” (Ibid., 3). 
To put into question the “field” of fieldwork is therefore to draw into question the 
disciplinary field of anthropology and its identity. To put it differently, a critical 
interrogation of the field of fieldwork as an epistemological a priori and a methodological 
device, insofar as it is also what distinguishes and differentiates anthropology from other 
related disciplines, such as sociology, political science, history, etc., unavoidably brings 
into relief the borders of the field of anthropology. Indeed, if the field of fieldwork were to 
be undermined and potentially effaced, what would distinguish anthropology from these 
other disciplines?93 In turn, I argue that this intertwining of the field of fieldwork and the 
field of anthropology as a discipline, in which putting the former into question necessarily 
implicates the latter, is precisely where the focus on writing and the rhetoric of holism 
risks masking the deeper relationship between the “field” of fieldwork and the concept of 
                                                
93 As Gupta and Ferguson (1997b, 2) note, the difference between anthropology and similarly 
related social sciences is not the topics studies, e.g., “primitive” societies and cultures, as much as 
it is “the distinctive method anthropologists employ, namely fieldwork based on participant 
observation”. As we will see in the next section, it is the appropriation of fieldwork in 
contemporary art practice that initially led to discussions of the affinity between anthropology 
and art, first in the 1960s and 1970s and again in the 1980s. 
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culture. In other words, it is in the “field” (as both a concept and location) that the 
conjuncture or isomorphism of culture and place emerges. 
 By evoking the “field” of fieldwork as its badge and boundary, anthropology, qua 
scientific discipline, is obligated to unambiguously define the location of this field, its 
margins and limits. In so doing, however, it must therefore also define its object as 
identical with said field. This problem has been cogently presented by Appadurai (1988b) 
in his essay, “Putting Hierarchy in its Place,” in which he argues that, as a location for the 
anthropological project, the field as place has often come to be synonymous with the 
people that inhabit it, those “Other” cultures and societies, what he elsewhere refers to as 
the production of locality; (see also Appadurai 1996a). Fieldwork, at least traditionally, is 
such a production, a process of bounding culture to a particular place, whereby the 
“there” of the field implies that “different cultures are separate places” (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997b, 35). The anthropological production of place, as Appadurai (1988b, 37) 
explains, is, in effect, an incarceration, a process in which the native and cultural Other is 
simultaneously confined spatially and ideologically, located in a geographical place and 
by “what they know, feel, and believe”. As Appadurai quips, even if the native were to 
move to another place, “it is usually flight, escape, to another equally confining place” 
(Ibid.) – we might here think of the immigrant to the West who often is imprisoned by their 
culture, whether or not they so choose.94 
                                                
94 It is arguably always the Other who must learn to struggle between the modern world and their 
traditions, as if these were easily discernable and separable worlds. A whole literature on 
transculturation, hybridity, métissage, etc. is built around this presumption and is often the lot 
assigned the postcolonial. As I will discuss later, over much of the twentieth-century it was also 
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 But is place simply the imagined space of the anthropological project, an 
unfortunate imprisoning of the Other out of methodological and epistemological 
necessity? To be sure, if this were the extent of the problem with place, no more than an 
anthropological problem, it would easily be put aside, aspersions defused and culture 
liberated from place. This would look to be what Appadurai suggests in his critique of the 
anthropological conflation of field and place (1988b, 38-39; see also Rosaldo 1989, 45). 
But, as Margaret Rodman contends, anthropologists do not hold the patent on place-
making (1992, 641; see also Malkki 1992); anthropological thought is but a reflection, part 
and parcel of modernity, of colonialism, of nationalism. The idea of place as signifying the 
natural attachment and rootedness of a people to a particular geographic location or 
area, a primordial belonging is, according to Augé, the “concrete and symbolic 
construction of space” that emerges from the demands of negotiating collective identity 
(Augé 1992, 51). Indeed, pace Appadurai and Thornton, Augé appears to suggest that the 
anthropological emplacement of culture does not fully ensue out of methodological or 
epistemological necessity, but rather in the “convergence of the indigenous population’s 
semi-fantasy with the ethnologist’s illusion” (Augé 1992, 47). Hence, if the problem is not 
wholly anthropological, leaving behind the isomorphism of culture and place (and 
identity) is not so easily achieved.95  
                                                                                                                                                  
the Other that had culture, a point alluded to by Appadurai (1988b, 37) when he notes that the 
“anthropologist rarely thinks of himself as a native of some place.” 
95 By the late 1980s there was a spate of ethnographic and other studies on how nations and their 
corresponding cultures were historically constructed, with often racist and exclusionary 
overtones (cf. Bhabha 1990; Handler 1989; White 2006b). These works were building on such 
historical studies as The Invention of Tradition by Ranger and Hobsbawm (1983) and Benedict 
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 In retrospect it is clear that the challenges to the notion of the field as a metaphor 
of place in anthropological thinking would not have occurred were it not for the 
appreciation that culture had become dispersed and unfixed from any particular 
geographical location. When Lila Abu-Lughod asked, for instance, that anthropologists 
“write against culture,” proposing the Foucauldian notion of discourse instead, she was 
underscoring the localizing tactics implicit in the concept, how boundedness, both 
spatially and ideologically, negates “movement, travel, geographic interaction… as well 
as history itself” (Abu-Lughod 1991, 146). As she notes: 
Anthropologists are increasingly concerned with national and transnational 
connections of people, cultural forms, media, techniques, and commodities. 
They study the articulation of world and international politics with the 
situations of people living in particular communities. All these projects, 
which involve a shift in gaze to include phenomena of connection, expose 
the inadequacies of the culture concept and the elusiveness of the entities 
designated by the term cultures (Ibid.,  149). 
For Abu-Lughod then, it is against the backdrop of contemporary life that the attachment 
of culture to place, a defined and immutable geographic site or location bounded in 
space and time, is rendered a problematic and potentially violent concept for 
anthropological practice. As she states, we live in a world of national and transnational 
connections, of multiple and global connections, and it is the anthropologist that must 
                                                                                                                                                  
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). By the mid-1980s it had become manifestly clear that 
nation, culture and community had lost their unassailable status as given facts, becoming 
generally understood as constructed or made, albeit no less real. The effect was not only the 
unmooring or detachment of culture from place within anthropology, but also more generally the 
realization of the radical constructedness of both.  
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catch up to this new reality, of which culture is inadequate. In a more critical tone, Anna 
Tsing (2000, 338) writes: 
Culture, specificity, and place making have conventionally been the domain 
of the discipline of anthropology, particularly as practiced in the United 
States. Because these kinds of issues are so often missing from discussions 
of the global, the stakes are particularly high in seeing their incorporation 
into global questions in anthropology. Yet, it is not these issues that first 
chaperoned globalism into U.S. anthropology. Instead, the charisma of the 
global was introduced to forward a disciplinary transition away from an 
overzealous nonreflective localism.  
For many anthropologists the world of circulation and connections of people and cultural 
forms is not a harbinger for the loss of culture as a concept, but more narrowly its 
detachment from place, that rigid and fixed geographical space inculcated in the method 
and epistemology of anthropology itself. Indeed, to paraphrase Marcus and Myers (1995, 
31), it is because cultures are deterritorialized, circulate and are thoroughly embedded in 
world-system institutions that there has been a disruption of the category of the field. Yet, 
with this “charisma of the global” and new concepts of spatiality and metaphors of 
circulation, mobility and movement, not to mention the fashioning of multi-sited 
ethnography to accommodate this newly anointed reality (Marcus 1995), “place has 
dropped out of sight” (Escobar 2001).96   
 The dropping out of sight of place was an inevitable dimension of the triumph of 
postmodern discourse in anthropology at the end of the 1990s and the over-valorization 
of fluid, mobile and hybrid identities. Yet, this logic of the “postmodern” in 
                                                
96 Obviously place did not entirely drop out of sight, as I have so far suggested. Escobar’s point, I 
would contend, is that place had become relegated to a secondary concern with respect to issues 
of space and spatiality. This point will be developed below. 
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anthropological thinking in the 1990s is also the very logic of capitalism and neo-
liberalism.97 As Hardt and Negri (2000, 150) point out: 
Many of the concepts dear to postmodernists and postcolonialists find a 
perfect correspondence in the current ideology of corporate capital and the 
world market. The ideology of the world market has always been the anti-
foundationalist and anti-essentialist discourse par excellence. Circulation, 
mobility, diversity, and mixture are its very conditions of possibility. Trade 
brings differences together and the more the merrier! Differences (of 
commodities, populations, cultures, and so forth) seem to multiply 
infinitely in the world market, which attacks nothing more violently than 
fixed boundaries: it overwhelms any binary division with its infinite 
multiplicities. 
The celebration of cultural difference, especially once it entered the mobility of the global 
and contemporary world to mix, hybridize and circulate was a reinforcement of identity in 
the name of the state and the market.98 Ironically, parallel to this demand for cultural 
difference is the disappearance of place in anthropology. Place has come to designate the 
fixed boundary, the binary of inside and outside, the anathema of the spatial logics of 
mobility and circulation of identities and differences, and their commodification and 
consumption. Place, in other words, was, and still is to a great extent, the bad side of 
identity politics for many anthropologists insofar as it fails to allow for mixing and 
circulation, the cornerstones of contemporary life and, coincidentally, but unfortunately 
for some, neoliberalism. Even when understood as something made and constructed (i.e., 
                                                
97 As art historian Julian Stallabrass (2004, 78) has put it, postmodernism, far from being 
exposition of a utopia/dystopia became a “flat description of an existing reality”.  
98 As Tsing (2000, 337) states: “In part, the acceptability of circulation rhetoric among liberal and 
leftist social scientists derives from a self-conscious rejection of the Marxist emphasis on capitalist 
production and its consequent deemphasis on market exchange and consumption. … A focus on 
circulation shows us the movement of people, things, ideas, or institutions, but it does not show 
us how this movement depends on defining tracks and grounds or scales and units of agency”.  
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as “place-making”), a degree of suspicion continues to surround place. This is not to say 
that assertions of place-based identifications are benign and without problem. Yet, 
despite its dangerous reputation, how might the assertion of place and place-making also 
be understood as a critical gesture which destabilizes the hegemonies of cultural 
difference? 
 
The Return of Place 
 
As the discussion of the disentanglement of culture and place proceeded throughout the 
early 1990s, with emphasis assuredly on the mobility and hybridity of global cultural 
products and symbols, a less audible cohort of anthropologists, geographers and 
philosophers vigorously sought to affirm the importance of place in the globalized world 
(cf. Feld and Basso 1996; Harvey 1993; Malkki 1992; Massey 1994; Olwig and Hastrup 1997). 
Reflecting on the fate of place in the contemporary world, the philosopher Edward Casey 
(1996, 18), in his opening contribution to Feld and Basso’s Senses of Place, asserts, “To live 
is to live locally, and to know is first of all to know the places one is in”.99 Such a 
generalized appreciation of place, with clear delineated ontological grounds,100 focuses 
                                                
99 Importantly, Casey (1996) writes against most anthropological debates surrounding the 
relationship of space and place when he asserts that place is primary, universal, general and 
space is in fact derived from place. This claim goes against the anthropological idea that people 
transform a preexisting, empty and absolute space into place (Ibid., 230; see also Low and 
Lawrence-Zuñiga 2003, 17). 
100 One of the most recognizable ontological arguments for place comes from Heidegger and his 
discussion of dwelling, a spiritual unity between humanity and its environment (1971). In 
Heidegger’s account, rootedness is an experience of authenticity and the construction of place 
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on how people continue to make sense of their local worlds and the experience of the 
everyday: it is an effort to reclaim place from its perception as a vulgarization of identity. 
As Rodman writes in response to Appadurai, “it is time to recognize that place, like voices, 
are local and multiple” (Rodman 1992, 643). The thrust is not to reassert a return to place 
as the primordial attachment to a geographic location with nationalist and exclusionary 
undertones, but instead to appreciate how people “make place” and the continuing 
significance it holds. That is, how cultural difference is not merely a global phenomenon 
but a locally enabled process of belonging in the contemporary global world. As Escobar 
(2001, 47; original emphasis) argues: 
People continue to construct some sort of boundaries around their places, 
however permeable, and to be grounded in local socio-cultural practices, 
no matter how changing and hybridized those grounds and practices might 
turn out to be. To capture the place specificity of the production of place 
and culture thus becomes the other side of the necessary 
reconceptualization of culture deterritorialized and transnationally 
produced. 
The point for Escobar is not to revive “pure place against global space,” place as the other 
of space, but rather to understand their relationship, how place is to “a significant extent 
produced by spatial logics” (Ibid., 147). In other words, the objective is not to ignore the 
deterritorialization of culture, its disjuncture from place, but to examine how these 
spatial logics are “countermeasured” in local situations of place-making. In Escobar’s 
particular case it is a matter of how black and indigenous communities in the Pacific 
region of Colombia have become central players in the making of the Pacific as place 
                                                                                                                                                  
the recovering of these roots. His malaise comes from the encroachment of the modern world 
(technology, rationalism, mass production, etc.). 
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through “a process of ethnicization of identity in close connection with ecological and 
alternative development strategies” (Escobar 2001, 160). Comparably, for Olwig (1997, 33), 
in her ethnographic study of Nevis, an island in the West Indies, it is how a community 
that has become highly mobile in a globalized world, has, at the same time, continued to 
produce a place or cultural site of belonging and attachment. For Palestinian refugees in 
the West Bank, George Bisharat (1997, 217) claims, the social identities that were part of 
the spontaneous attachment to place that preceded exile in 1948 are being transformed 
by a younger generation who do not share this experience as “attempts to reconcretize 
their connection to the land”. These are just a few examples from within anthropology 
that attempt to return to give a central role to the question of place in the contemporary 
world, without discrediting or ignoring recent writings and considerations of spatiality 
and the global. Indeed, echoing Foucault (1986), space is not neutral but a grid of 
hierarchical power relations. Nor, I would argue, are these accounts putting forward an 
idea of culture as a “place-bound” (versus place-based) identity, thereby “disguising and 
suppressing inequalities and oppressions that are internal to place” (Dirlik 2000, 166). On 
the contrary, what each of these studies highlights is that the process of place making is 
deeply political.  
The problem is that the erasure of place in anthropological thinking, Escobar (2001, 
155) asserts, has produced an asymmetry between the global and the local (as degrees of 
scale), where the “global is associated with space, capital, history and agency, while the 
local, conversely, is linked to place, labor and tradition – as well as with women, 
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minorities, the poor and, one might add, local cultures”. From a temporal perspective, the 
global is the compression of time and space (Harvey 1990), while the local is allochronic, a 
place in the past (Fabian 1983).101 There are two reasons for this conception of the 
relationship between space and place. First, space is given a hierarchical priority due to 
its all-pervasiveness. The point here is that space is positioned as dominant and prior to 
place, an all-pervasive factor in place-making itself, even if place is conceived as a 
mitigation of such spatial logics. Second, and underlying the first, space is often 
considered as more or less neutral when compared to place. In other words, given the 
ubiquity of space, its all-pervasiveness, space is largely considered to be more or less 
ontologically neutral: cultures and identities emerge from the space of the global and 
power relations that are unequal, but rarely is this space itself historicized or culturalized. 
The question, Escobar asks (2001, 156), is how to conceptualize place and the local 
without them being derivative of space.  
 This question is a key concern of Escobar’s (2001) work in the Pacific region of 
Colombia. His analysis is centered on the significance of territory as a political strategy of 
localization, where place is conceived as a critique of power and the spatial logics of 
capitalism. As one of the most important rainforests in the world, and richest in terms of 
biodiversity, capital investment in the Pacific region of Colombia has undoubtedly been 
historically significant in constructing this region as a place; yet, Escobar argues, it cannot 
                                                
101 Fabian (1983, 32) defines allochronism as the denial of coevalness in anthropology, what he 
describes as “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a 
Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse” (Ibid., 31; original 
emphasis). 
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fully explain it. The efforts of these communities were coupled with the discourse of 
“biodiversity” that links local and global networks as sites for cultural, political and 
ecological action.102 The strategies of subaltern communities and social movements of 
localization, which include both place-based strategies that emphasize and mobilize the 
attachment to territory and culture, and “glocal” strategies in which communities and 
social movements participate in biodiversity networks, point to how place becomes the 
location of cultural politics. Thus, instead of viewing politics in terms of the supralevels of 
capital, and thus derivative of the spatial, Escobar maintains that politics is located in 
place (Ibid., 156): “To construct place as project, [is] to turn place-based imaginaries into 
a radical critique of power” (Ibid., 157).103 
In formulating place making as a practice of resistance, Escobar addresses Gupta 
and Ferguson’s appeal for politicizing this process. Specifically, in politicizing the 
“uncontestable observation” of place being space made meaningful, Escobar’s research 
on place making as a form of strategic resistance to spatial relations of power directly 
addresses the questions: “… how are spatial meanings established? Who has the power 
to make places of spaces? Who contests this? What is at stake?” (Gupta and Ferguson, 
1992, 11). In so doing he also points to how culture is to retain its critical function, its 
potential as an emancipatory resource. From a temporal point of view, it is a creation that 
has no specific temporal logic; manifesting itself as a heterotopia, a form of resistance 
                                                
102 For a general defense of such identity-based movements of resistance, see Clifford (2000). For 
account of social movements and the politics of place, see Nash (2004, 177-186). 
103 In making this argument, Escobar (2001, 156) cites Lefebvre’s notion of place as a “form of lived 
and grounded space and the reappropriation of which must be part of any radical political agenda 
against capitalism and spaceless and timeless globalization”.  
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and freedom, it is a culture that is a heterochronic, a breaking with given modes of time 
(Foucault 1986).104 By attaching itself to place, in other words, culture is not asserted as a 
primordial identity, but instead is a critical resource in the resistance to spatio-temporal 
deterritorialization. It is the difference between culture as place-based against culture as 
place-bound.   
 
Conclusions 
 
So far I have only made passing reference to the questions of culture and place in 
contemporary art, mostly in notes adjoined to my discussions of these issues in 
anthropology. This was neither accidental nor without reason. At first glance, many 
theorists and historians of contemporary art would generally appear to be in accord with 
the many positions in anthropology, which is to say, the originary separateness of 
cultures and the dominance of space versus place (e.g. Papastergiadis 2010). Yet, 
examining more closely the critical writings on site-specific art, a dominant movement in 
contemporary art over the last 40 years, paints a different picture. In fact it is in site 
specificity that the problem of place emerges and is transformed.  
 Site specificity, or site-specific art, emerged for the most part in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s as reaction against the “uncontaminated and pure idealist space” of 
Modernism (Kwon 1997, 86). It sought to displace these immutable ideals through the 
                                                
104 There has been a tendency to read Foucault’s heterotopias as “counterplaces.” This reading is 
not incorrect, but it does cover over his point that these heterotopias are also sites of social order, 
power and control, e.g., asylums, prisons, etc. See Foucault (1986). 
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critical examination of the gallery and museum space, specifically through those spaces 
uncontained by the gallery or museum, such as the banality of the everyday and the 
materiality of the landscape.105 It also sought to redress the relationship of art with the 
spectator by demanding their presence and thus “rendering one conscious of one’s body 
within this ambience” (Meyer 2000, 26). The effect was that the “site” or location was to 
become part of the experience of the work itself. As Richard Serra famously stated, “[t]o 
remove the work is to destroy the work” (quoted in Kwon 2004, 12).106 The aim of site-
specific art was to engage the “aural, spatial, visual, and environmental planes of 
perception and interpretation” (Suderburg 2000, 2) in order to engage directly the realm 
of the social, a reality often ignored by dominant modernist art discourse in its opposition 
of life and art (Kwon 1997, 91).107 For the first generation of site-specific artists, the site 
                                                
105 The “everyday” is where contemporary art practices begin to make their first forays into 
anthropology and other social sciences, specifically by bringing into relief the relationship of 
culture and place. While the everyday did not enter widely into contemporary art discourse until 
the early 1990s, already in 1975 artist and theorist Joseph Kosuth, seeking more experimental 
modes of artistic practice, talks about how methods of anthropology, in allowing for cultural 
fluency, give access to the everyday, the banal and the quotidian, showing the common ground of 
experience and, more politically, giving voice to those silenced (Kosuth 1991). As Kosuth 
underlines, however, unlike anthropology, art is engaged and thus seeks to transform the world: 
art is praxis, a commitment to engage the everyday to transform it. Interestingly, Kosuth 
acknowledges his indebtedness to the more “engaged” (i.e. political) and alternative Marxist 
tradition in anthropology represented by Stanley Diamond and Bob Scholte, both of whose work 
he was exposed to during his studies at the New School for Social Research, New York (Kosuth 
1991, 117-124). 
106 The context of Serra’s comment is the removal of his 120-feet steel sculpture, Tilted Arc, which 
was “commissioned and designed” for the Federal Plaza in New York. It was complete in 1981 and 
removed 1989 due to numerous complaints from the people in the area of it being an eyesore, 
among other reasons. Serra’s response is widely cited by both art theorists and historians as 
quintessential of the idea of site-specificity that emerged in the 60s, but was critiqued heavily 
throughout the 70s and 80s. 
107 As art critic Douglas Crimp (1993, 17) states: “The idealism of modernist art, in which the art 
object in and of itself was seen to have a fixed and transhistorical meaning, determined by the 
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was an actual location, something grounded and tangible, as Serra’s quote testifies. 
However, throughout the 1970s the relationship between site-specificity and location 
slowly unraveled, leaving the art object without any immediate relationship to a fixed 
location. There was a “dematerialization” of art object, a de-emphasis on uniqueness, 
permanence, decorative attractiveness (Lippard 1997) and a subsequent move toward 
the notion of the site as a discursive realm. In other words, the “site” in site specificity is 
detached from place and becomes a discursive site, a site concerned with social issues 
such as race, gender, class, cultural difference, etc., while at the same time functioning as 
an avenue to resist the institutional and market forces of commodification of the art 
object. James Meyer (2000: 24-25) refers to this as a shift to a “functional” notion of site 
specificity versus a “literal” notion:  
The literal site … is in situ; it is an actual location, a singular place. … In 
contrast the functional site may or may not incorporate a physical place. It 
certainly does not privilege this place. Instead it is a process, an operation 
occurring between sites, a mapping of institutional and textual filiations 
and the bodies that move between them (the artist’s above all) … On the 
contrary, the functional work refuses the intransigence of literal site 
specificity. It is a temporary thing, a movement, a chain of meanings and 
imbricated histories: a place marked and swiftly abandoned.  
The dematerialization of the art object within site-specific art now relies on an 
reconfiguration of site or place as discourse, its sitings/placings and installations 
structured in moving through space, a nomadic narrative with the artist ever more mobile, 
a sort of ethnographer moving between biennales re-siting (re-installing) his or her art 
                                                                                                                                                  
object’s placelessness, it’s belonging in no particular place. … Site specificity opposed that 
idealism – and unveiled the material system it obscured – by its refusal of circulatory mobility, its 
belongingness to a specific site”.  
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object. As Kwon (1997, 95) observes, “[c]onsequently, although the site of action or 
intervention (physical) and the site effects/reception (discursive) are conceived to be 
continuous, they are nonetheless pulled apart. Put differently, there is no longer an 
indexical relationship between the grounded physical place and discursive narrative, 
their breach marking the renewed criticality of art practices in resisting institutional and 
market forces of commodification (Ibid., 95). At the same time, these artists often work in 
collaboration with the audience in the conceptualization and production of their works, 
allowing them to bridge life and art, to “penetrate the socio-political organization of 
contemporary life with greater impact and meaning” (Ibid., 95), the other impetus of site-
specificity. Thus, from one point of view, contemporary site-specific art revels in the 
nomadic artist, curator and other art workers: it is the celebration of the transnational 
and diasporic cultural worker. Here the nomadic artist has usurped the nomadic art 
object of modernism. Yet, from another point of view, such a conception of the artist as 
nomad affirms the logic of global capital. As Kwon (Ibid., 96) asks: 
While site-specific art once defied commodification by insisting on 
immobility, it now seems to espouse fluid mobility nomadism for the same 
purpose. But curiously, the nomadic principle also defines capital and 
power in our time. Is the unhinging of site specificity, then, a form of 
resistance to the ideological establishment of art or a capitulation to the 
logic of capitalist expansion? 
Kwon’s question brings us to the heart of the problem of this chapter, noted earlier, 
namely the tension between space and place. There is an ambivalence regarding the 
relationship of space and place in site specific art practice and theory: while 
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acknowledging the continued importance of place in site-specific practices and the 
liberties proffered by the notion of space, a number of artists and theorists remain highly 
suspicious of both, the former for its potential nostalgic retrieval, the latter for its illusions 
of freedom (Ibid., 109). Kwon especially is adamant about the dangers of reiterating a 
notion of place that would recall the worst forms of violence and exclusion, yet seems 
equally critical of the celebration of the artist as nomad, both in terms of its capitulation 
to capitalist logics and for its reinstatement of the autonomy of the work of art and the 
status of authorship, each the explicit objects of attack in the inception of site specificity 
in the late 60s and early 70s. Yet, the trouble with Kwon’s account is that the notion of 
place remains uncritical. Although willing to acknowledge that site has become unhinged 
from place, her analysis is unable to propose a more critical model for the notion of place, 
of how it too has become destabilized in the wake of globalization. 
 Such a critical approach to place is explored in a recent study of site-specific art by 
art theorist Judith Rugg (2010) who offers an alternative model of site-specific practices 
and their relation to place. Rugg argues that the temporary nature of site-specific works, 
their ephemeral and time dependent nature, as they move across different contexts or 
sites, become sites of contestation. As she states: 
As sites of contestation, site-specific art can offer an incongruence and 
antagonism to this fabricated space [i.e., spatial order] and show its 
inherent instabilities, rent by processes of estrangement, alienation and 
loss. … The potential of contemporary site-specific art to disrupt the 
certainties governing the consumption of space manufactured by its 
regulating discourses reveal the power relations and exclusions within 
hegemonic terms of constructed utopias. … In the fissures between various 
forms of spatial ordering, relationships between art and space can 
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introduce ambivalence where the hidden, suppressed, forgotten and the 
surrogate are made visible (Ibid., 177-178). 
With clear echoes of Escobar (2001), Rugg proposes that those sites produced in site-
specific art are critical places for the contestation of the spatial hierarchies of 
contemporary life. To be sure, the sites of site-specific art, in troubling sedimented 
configurations of public space, are forms of contestation. There are two points to be 
made at this juncture. First, in a moment of clear nostalgia, Rugg seems to lament that 
spatial hierarchies have left place, as source of identity, “a site of anguish and disquiet.” 
Through forced displacement, she notes, the experience of place for many people has 
been upset and destabililized. The implication is that site-specific art practices, by making 
these spaces meaningful, are efforts to contest this experience. 
The second, though less conspicuous, point is Rugg’s (2010) framing of the 
disruptive acts of site-specific art as “taking place.” For example: 
The artist’s intention to appear as if transposed from the street outside 
(namely as a homeless person), collapsed various paradoxes of a view of 
the homeless that have become imbibed within cities. A private and 
intimate activity (sleep) taking place within the public and exposed space of 
was ‘normalized’ through paradigmatic assumptions of a fixed category of 
being (homelessness) (Ibid., 165; my emphasis). 
This seemingly innocuous notion of art “taking place” is pivotal, I argue, insofar as it 
points to how and where art is contesting and disrupting dominant spatial configurations. 
It underlines how the contestation to which Rugg refers (as well as others such as Kwon 
2002 and Kaye 2000) with regards to site-specific art is place based, not place bound. In 
other words, it points to how art is engaged in place making.  
118 
 
Rugg (2010) and Escobar’s (2001) plea for place-based acts of contestation are 
undoubtedly appealing, but more importantly they make it possible to elaborate Marcus 
and Myers’ (1995) conception of the affinity between anthropology and art. Specifically, I 
would argue that what anthropology and art share is a concern for how culture becomes 
associated with particular places, that is, how processes by which difference is made 
meaningful are place-based acts of contestation. When Marcus and Myers talk about the 
transformation of difference into discourse, it is precisely this process of place making 
that is at work.108 In other words, anthropology and art are those sites of place making in 
which culture, difference and identity are made meaningful for thought and action. From 
this angle their conception of culture is historically situated by being located and sited, 
giving further depth and clarity to the notion of culture as the shared object of these two 
practices. 
I want to raise an objection, however, to an underlying conceit with this 
conception of the affinity between anthropology and art, and to which I have alluded to 
above: If we take culture to be a site of difference and contestation, a site which both 
anthropology and art occupy, are we not also assuming that identity and art (not to 
                                                
108 Myers’ (1995) contribution to the volume is important in this regard as he discusses the 
production of culture in Aboriginal acrylic painting and the right to place that is at work in these 
cultural acts: “The painters presume their own cultural discourse: they expect that those who see 
the paintings will recognize in them the assertion and demonstration of the ontological link 
between the painter, his/her Dreaming, the design, and the place represented. […] Clearly, the 
available meanings to Aborigines for this activity are many. To summarize briefly, they include 
painting as a source of income, painting as a source of cultural respect, painting as a meaningful 
activity defined by its relationship to indigenous values (in the context of self-determination), and 
also painting as an assertion of personal ad sociopolitical identity expressed in rights to place” 
(Ibid., 66; see also Myers 2002). 
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mention anthropology) are intimately bound up with one another? In so far as culture is a 
site of difference and contestation, a matter of place making, it is inevitably a site of 
identity politics. Yet, as will be recalled from above, cultural difference/identity is 
precisely that which is celebrated and sought by the spatial logics of capital and global 
spatiality (though not limited to these, as my previous chapter demonstrated in the case 
of Palestinians in Israel living under a colonial state). In other words, is there a way to 
imagine the politics of place without identity and difference? In short, is Harvey right in 
his conclusion that place remains torn between being a force of resistance against global 
capitalism and an exclusionary identity politics (Harvey 1993)? Taking my cue from these 
critical assessments of place and their limitations, in the following chapter I will consider 
an alternative conception of the relationship between culture and place that retains 
politics as its central concern but avoids the reiteration of identity that plagues most 
thinking about this relationship. 
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Nardeen Srouji: Deferral 
 
Sitting one afternoon in Sudfeh restaurant in Nazareth with Nardeen, an artist, and Mary, 
the owner of the restaurant,109 talking about Palestinian art, the subject of discussion 
turned to the difficulties of being a Palestinian artist in Israel: “Look, if you want to be an 
artist here,” Mary answered, “you must accept that there’s not support, nothing from the 
state, nothing from the community. The problem is we [Palestinians] don’t appreciate art, 
at least not for what it is. If you want to get support from the community, if you want 
them to come see and buy art, you can’t try to convince them about it being an 
investment. You need to show them how seeing and buying art is about social status.” 
This seemed to me a cynical comment, but perhaps not entirely unjustified. Over and over 
again I heard stories from artists and curators how the Palestinian community in Israel 
had no interest in buying art, too often the excuse of Islam and issues of figurative 
representation being dragged out to provide an underlying explanation. But what Mary 
and Nardeen were telling me was different; this wasn’t about religious taboos but social 
distinction à la Bourdieu (1979). As our discussion continued, Mary explained how in 
recent years, mainly since the 1990s and the availability of satellite television, this 
perception has slowly started to shift as more and more people are learning about the 
popularity and “star” quality of Western artists. To make sure I didn’t get the wrong idea, 
that this shift was far from being in any way widespread, she repeated her point that it’s 
                                                
109 Sudfeh is a well-known restaurant in Nazareth with an adjacent gallery space for young and 
upcoming Palestinian artists. The owner, Mary, has long been involved in the arts scene in 
Nazareth, from being an art collector to supporting local artists through the gallery.  
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impossible to sell the Palestinian public art as art or as an investment. One needs to 
approach art as a sign of class. When I talked about this again with Nardeen months later 
she agreed with my recounting of the discussion but cautioned me to not be too critical of 
Palestinian society: “It’s not just that, people here are not buying art because we are 
trying to survive; it [art] is not something we can always value living as we do in this 
place.”   
Not long after I saw exactly what Mary was trying to explain about art as sign of 
social distinction. A few days later Nardeen invited me to join her and her family for a 
performance of music from Abdel Halim Hafez in Nazareth. When we arrived at the 
concert hall the lobby was full of people shaking hands, taking photos, and all dressed 
very well for the evening. This all seemed normal, even predictable, but when the show 
started I was surprised to see people continuing to talk and many on their phones, almost 
entirely oblivious of the concert taking place in front of them. At the end everyone 
clapped in appreciation, got up and continued back to the lobby to continue socializing. 
When we later returned to the home of Nardeen’s family, I expressed my bewilderment: 
“No one really seemed to be listening to the music, or even seem all that interested. They 
seemed to be more focused on meeting and talking.” My bemusement got a chuckle from 
everyone. “That’s the way it is, people go to these things to be seen, to let everyone see 
they are cultured,” replied Nardeen’s father. As Nardeen warned some months later, 
while this attitude does exist, “we’re talking about Nazareth here.” Given this perception 
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of art, how would someone who wants to be an artist be perceived, and what if they are a 
woman? 
Earlier that day, prior to the concert, Nardeen had invited me to meet her parents 
at their home. As we made our way through the windy streets of Nazareth, I asked 
Nardeen how her parents felt about her becoming an artist: “They weren’t too happy 
when I first told them, but they also know I’m stubborn and will do what I want anyway.” 
“What about your extended family, and even the society here?” I inquired. Nardeen didn’t 
hesitate: “They don’t accept a woman being independent, and especially being an artist, 
which is fine for a man. They expect a woman to do the proper thing: get married, have 
children and take care of the family. Although by this time we had arrived at her family’s 
home, I was still curious how her parents felt and how they were finally convinced to let 
her go to art school and be an artist. As we sat down with her mother and father, all of us 
introducing ourselves and finally me telling them about my research, I saw an opportunity 
to go directly to the source for my question. Turning to her father, I indelicately asked, my 
full intention being to put him in an awkward position: “How did you feel when Nardeen 
told you she wanted to go to art school and be an artist?” “Yes, I was fine with it, sure,” he 
replied matter of factly. Nardeen’s mother instantly started to shake her head in 
disapproval and retorted, “No, you weren’t so fine with it!” “Well, okay, I worried,” her 
father admitted, “I worried about how she was going to have money and make a living.” 
“Did you not worry about what your neighbors and family and the society might think 
too?” I asked, trying to provoke a bit more. This time her mother replied: “Of course it was 
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unheard of for a woman to want to be an artist, there’s people who talk, everyone talks, 
but this was what Nardeen wanted so we supported her.” Not to be left out, her father 
added, “We very much support her, we even have one of her paintings in our living room.” 
Nardeen would always tell me how liberal her family was compared to most families in 
Nazareth, how she would have never had such opportunities or such support were it not 
for her family.  
Soon after Nardeen and I met she had told me about an installation she had 
wanted to do a few years ago: a small girl’s room whose walls were covered in the word 
“shame” [Arabic: 3aib]: “You don’t understand, people love to talk here, especially about 
women who don’t do the proper thing – keep quiet, find a man, get married, have 
children. Every time I see my aunts, they always ask me when I’m getting married. In their 
eyes, because I’m not, and because I’m an artist, they are worried for me: ‘why is Nardeen 
not married, what is she doing with her life…’” There’s no doubt that in the late 1990s, 
when she chose to go to art school and become an artist, the idea of a young woman from 
Nazareth taking this kind of path was viewed as unconventional. If the idea of going to art 
school was relatively unheard of for many Palestinians in Israel, let alone a woman, 
Nardeen wasn’t dissuaded, but as I learned, this meant also being critical of her own 
society.  
One of the first works Nardeen showed to me was a lithograph series she created 
in 2004 entitled “Sabr” [Patience] (Figure 16), a series of 7 lithograph prints. When we 
talked about the work, about the clear symbolism running throughout the series, she told 
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me it was a time of personal difficulty when she created it and that: “I just made it, 
without thinking about what it meant – it [the process] was more intuitive.” What she did 
tell me is that it is a series about the coming of age of a young woman, of leaving the 
innocence of her youth behind. But looking at the prints in the series, I couldn’t help but 
notice the faceless figures either in the forefront or background of half of the prints. “Who 
are these figures?” I asked. Smiling, she said, “they are the society, the people watching.” 
“But it’s not clear whether they are looking inward toward you in the image or toward us, 
the spectators?” I replied. “Both,” Nardeen answered. “I see,” I said. At that point it also 
struck me that the figures also look like cacti, the kind you see all around the landscape, 
and once used to demarcate borders between village properties, and which today 
Palestinians will often point to as a sign of a former Palestinian village since erased. I 
asked Nardeen if this play between faceless figures and cacti was intentional, to which 
she replied, “Think about what the words are for cactus and patience in Arabic.” Although 
I was aware the words for patience and cactus were the same, I hadn’t made the 
connection in her work until Nardeen pointed it out, and with it the Palestinian proverb: 
sabr as-sabbr (“the patience of the cactus”).110 While what happened within the center of 
these images, most notably a person throwing herself down a well – undoubtedly a strong 
                                                
110 The cactus is one of three key symbols within Palestinian culture, the other two being the 
orange and the olive tree. According to Boullata, the cactus is also the key symbol within the 
transition of Palestinian icon painting to the birth of a national art in the 1930s (see Boullata 2009: 
186). Losing some its symbolic capital following the creation of Israel, the cactus again became a 
major symbol within Palestinian painting again in the 1980s and 1990s through the work of Walid 
Abu Shaqra and ‘Asim Abu Shaqra. As was pointed out to me by friend Hatim Kanaaneh, the 
prickly cactus is not native to Palestine but was imported roughly 300 years ago from the 
Americas (see also King 2008). 
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reference to Jacob’s Well from the Bible – I was struck by the metaphor of these faceless 
figures as cacti and how it functioned as a symbol not only of patience but of 
perseverance, the perseverance of a woman coming of age in a society that kept her 
under constant surveillance. Having become close friends, time and again I watched 
Nardeen refuse to change her path and to tenaciously hold to her goals and what she 
wanted from life, all in the face of enormous pressures from family and society. Yet there 
was still the question of these faceless figures or cacti turning their gaze toward viewer. 
What did they want of us, the spectators?  
Reluctant to talk much about this particular aspect within her prints, “ah, that is 
for you to figure out!” I was fortunate enough that for roughly a month the series was on 
exhibit at Elika, a local café in Haifa with frequent exhibitions and film screenings from 
Palestinian artists. During this time I would often sit with friends and others and ask them 
what they thought of the black and white prints by Nardeen, did they notice the symbolic 
elements, did they get a sense that this was about a woman coming of age, what about 
the faceless figures in the foreground and there resemblance with cacti? Interestingly, 
most of the reactions I got had to do with the faceless figures or cacti running along the 
bottom of the borders of the prints and their ambiguous status: “It’s almost as if we [the 
spectators] are being stared at, like they are creating a boundary between us and what is 
happening inside,” said one person. “Well, as figures we don’t really know who they are 
looking at, but as cactus plants they are there to remind us about the patience we need 
with all the changes going on,” a friend mused. I was intrigued, “What changes?” “The 
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changes of the person in the painting, losing their childhood – do you see the swing and 
then the uprooted tree? These are the changes we as Palestinians have had to face for 
over 60 years, the loss of our land and our way of life. To be patient is to be steadfast 
[Arabic: summud]!” she replied. “But don’t you also see this as a critique of your own 
society?” I asked. “How so?” she replied. “These figures in the front watching her to make 
sure she behaves and does the right thing, isn’t she trying to tell us that they are 
oppressive?” I asked. “Sure, it is hard here as a woman, all the social pressure, and the 
cactus tell us we have to be patient, things are changing for women but it is slow.” I was 
still curious, “But as faceless figures, what about the fact that they are also looking at us 
as spectators?” My friend looked longingly again at the prints, “It’s hard to say, maybe we 
too are being watched, or maybe told to stay out of what is happening.” Regardless of the 
meaning of this outward gaze, it was inescapable that as spectators we were somehow 
involved. Later I was reminded of what Fatima, a schoolteacher from Arrabeh, told me 
about the cacti along the road as we walked between Arrabeh, Deir Hanna and Sakhnin as 
part of Land Day: “As fences between different villages, or between orchards, they were 
not the property of either village, but shared between them, so anyone could pick their 
fruit.”111   
Nardeen hasn’t continued in the visual arts, but instead in recent years has moved into 
theatre and cinema as a set and costume designer. The last time I met with her we 
                                                
111 This communal aspect of the cactus is a point also made by Abufarha (2008: 347), but in his 
account the sharing of the sabr is limited to the members of the village: “For the members of the 
community as a whole (normally residents of a village), picking the saber is acceptable. However, 
this shared ownership stops at the boundaries of the village, such that people from neighboring 
villages cannot come to pick from another village’s orchard.” 
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discussed this change: “It is very hard to make it in the art world here, and while I like it 
and I want to keep creating and with theatre and film I get to keep that part of creating.” 
“And what about being a woman in the theatre and film world?” I asked. “Listen,” she 
replied, “It is still a man’s world. You remember my series, ‘Patience’? Things don’t 
change here; my work was trying to be critical of how this patience is also a refusal to 
change, a sort of stubbornness.” As I thought about what Nardeen told me, it struck me 
that maybe those figures looking back at us, the spectators, are indeed symbols of 
patience and perseverance, but they are also signs of intransigence: Looking back 
outward, they are telling us to stay out and not to intervene.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 16: Nardeen Srouji, Sabr (Patience), 2004 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Nardeen Srouji, Sabr (Patience), 2004 
 
 
Figure 17: Nardeen Srouji, E7teqan (Congestion), 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Nardeen Srouji, Untitled, 2012 
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Chapter 4: Art and Politics; or, the Place of Art 
 
“Il y a de la politique quand il y a un lieu et des formes pour la rencontre entre 
deux processus hétérogènes.” (Rancière 1995, 53).112 
 
 
Introduction: Art and Identity 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Marcus and Myers (1995) assert that anthropology 
and art have come to occupy a shared space, namely, culture as a site of difference and 
contestation. This site is where anthropology and art track, represent, and perform the 
effects of difference, transforming into discourse what I elaborated as a practice of place 
making. Leaving anthropology aside for the moment, unerpinning to Marcus and Myers’ 
assertion is the idea that art is about the expression of identity. This is an idea widely 
shared in anthropology, where discussions of art, Western and non-Western, are 
predominately framed in terms of claims about the specificity of culture and the 
relationship between culture and art (see Lippard 1990; Phillips and Steiner 1999; 
Schneider 2006; Myers 1991, 2002). Significantly, the idea of art as an expression of 
identity has permitted anthropology, as well as other social sciences, to attach to art a 
political content. In other words, identity allows art to be understood as a form of cultural 
politics, or better, cultural activism (Ginsburg 1997). To be sure, this political conjuncture 
                                                
112 “Politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet” 
(Rancière 1999, 30). 
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of art and identity is not unfounded. In colonial and postcolonial situations, present and 
past, in which local identities have been marginalized and repressed, art has emerged as 
“a form of social action in uncertain discursive spaces” (Myers 1994, 693) and as a strategy 
for “self-representation and self-identification” (Phillips and Steiner 1999, 4). According to 
Jeremy MacClancy (1997, 2): 
Many peoples, bent on self-determination and unhappy with the way they 
are represented by others, wish to represent themselves to others and art is 
one of the most powerful media by which to do so. … Further, if the degree 
of structural difference between societies is being steadily eroded by the 
seemingly uncheckable advance of global capitalism, then art becomes, 
partially by default, a key means of proclaiming cultural difference. 
Given these claims, the politics of art would seem to be especially germane where claims 
over identities are at stake. As a manifestation of the agency of marginalized people, art is 
uniquely positioned as “a site of struggle, where identities are created, where subjects are 
interpellated, where hegemonies can be challenged” (Kondo 1997, 4). Thus, in contrast to 
the Kantian idea of aesthetics as “disinterested judgment of natural beauty and art 
separate from economic and moral concerns” (Mahon 2000, 478), in underlining its 
political message, anthropologists are seeking to reconnect art to everyday social life. Art, 
in other words, is not a mere supplement to social life, “but a major and integral part of 
the transaction which engenders political behaviour” (Edelman 1995, 2). 
 Is the conjuncture of art and identity, in reconnecting art with everyday social life 
and thereby allowing for an understanding of art as a practice of politics, to suggest that 
art is always already political insofar as it is inseparable from the social world of which it 
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is part? To what degree are art and politics inseparable? As Maureen Mahon (2000) rightly 
cautions, despite the imperative and necessity of reconnecting art to everyday social life, 
we must avoid collapsing art and politics. As she argues, anthropologists need to retain a 
sensitivity to the aesthetic, that is, “the creative and artistic choices, preoccupations, and 
goals that inform their work” (Ibid., 479).  
Following Wendy Brown (2005), I propose that the relationship between art and 
politics can generally be understood in anthropology from one of two positions.  First, 
insofar as everyday social life is organized by power relations (à la Foucault), art, being a 
part of this world, is therefore always political. Second, art is political to the degree that it 
is a practice for “negotiating the power and values of enduring collectivities” (2005, 75). 
The first view, in linking power and politics, renders all art political, whereas the second 
limits its scope to those conflicts between already existing groups and identities. 
Anthropologists, I contend, participate in both these lines of argumentation, even 
sometimes blending the two. By considering all art to be enmeshed in power relations, 
the first relationship renders everything political and thus there is little point in stating 
that art is political – if everything is political then nothing is political (Rancière 1999, 32; 
see Nancy 2002). The effect is a collapsing of art and politics, leading to what Mahon calls 
“art as ideology,” which results from assuming that politics and power relations are 
synonymous. In the second line of argumentation, by posing the relationship in terms of 
given identities, art loses all specificity, becoming merely a matter of contestation or the 
articulation of identity, in other words a politics of representation. More troubling, 
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however, is that both these lines of argumentation seem to have pre-determined the 
answer as to what makes art political, which, as I will discuss below, is a position that 
tends to render art secondary to politics.  
If we are to think the relationship between art and politics, it is clear that, on the 
one hand, if power relations are not a condition for the appearance of politics, is not to 
say power relations are not present. In the understanding put forth here, politics is not 
the exercise of power. On the other, so long as the politics of art remains bound to 
expressions of identity (which is not to say that identity related issues are not involved), 
the significance of art will be diluted. If art is merely (or even primarily) about identity, 
why would it be more “political” than other forms of identity making?113 To this end, I will 
propose in the following a shift in the discussion of the relationship of art and politics by 
suggesting that art is political when it becomes a place for the disruption and 
reconfiguration of norms, orders and identities. From this point of view, art is political to 
the extent that it is an interruption of the order of domination. 
As I asked at the end of the previous chapter, what happens when imposed 
identities are contested but no identity claims are asserted in response to this 
contestation? Is it possible to continue to think about place making without assertions of 
identity? Following this line of thinking, does art have to be about identity in order to be 
political? Coming back to the ethnographic context of this thesis, identity for the 
Palestinian minority in Israel is deeply bound up with spatial practices of ordering such 
                                                
113 Throughout the discussions regarding the significance of art in the expression of identity and 
cultural difference there is little consideration of why this is so. What makes art particular and, as 
MacClancy (1997, 2) states, “by default a key means of proclaiming cultural difference”?  
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that to engage in identity claims is risky because it can lead to incarceration.114 For artists 
this has not meant that their work is not political. On the contrary, this situation 
demanded going beyond given frameworks and expectations about the relationship 
between art and politics.  
 This chapter will explore a definition of the relationship between art and politics 
that resists both the idea that art is always political and that art is political because it 
expresses identity. I will offer an alternative theoretical framework to these two claims by 
looking to the critical philosophy of Jacques Rancière. Rancière’s theoretically innovative 
approach to the relationship between art and politics proposes that what makes art 
political is the distance it takes from established orders, its disruption or suspension of 
identities and their reconfiguration. His rethinking of the relationship between art and 
politics is different from much of the received wisdom in the fields of philosophy, art 
history and cultural studies (Tanke 2010), and is therefore worth considering in greater 
detail.  In this chapter I will look at the way that he renders the relationship between art 
and politics, but also the different reactions to his work.  While anthropologists and art 
theorists tend to express a certain discomfort with his theory, contemporary artists 
                                                
114 This is not to suggest that Palestinian identity is not an issue or is something denied. A number 
of the artists I worked with were adamant that however much their work was not about asserting 
a particular identity, this did not mean that there was not a Palestinianness to their work, but they 
refused to identify it. This will be examined more closely in the following chapter.  
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working in various post-colonial settings seem to be energized by the implications of his 
model.115  
 The first section of the chapter will explore Rancière’s re-writing of the idea of 
politics, a fundamental step in understanding his writings on art and aesthetics. The 
second part of the chapter will then examine his conception of aesthetics and art, with a 
focus on what makes art political. Finally, I will return to the questions I have set out in 
the introduction to the chapter in order to address various phenomena concerning art, 
politics and place.  
 
What is Politics? 
 
As Rancière asks in the foreword to his book La Mésentente, “qu’y a-t-il de spécifique à 
penser sous le nom de politique?” (1995, 15).116 Is it merely synonymous with the exercise 
of power, as is often assumed in much American social and political thought (see Glick-
Schiller 1997)? Put differently, can we say that where there is power there is politics? Or, is 
politics strictly a matter of governmental practices, which is to say, politics as policy and 
governance, laws, etc.? Given what is at stake with these different concepts and terms, 
conceptual clarity is paramount. Below I will put forward the idea, following the writings 
of Jacques Rancière, that politics is what emerges when the logic of the police meets the 
                                                
115 I have in mind here two specific events in which Jacques Rancière participated in the Arab 
world: Homeworks III: A Forum on Cultural Practices, Lebanon 2005; Art Practice and Research in 
North Africa and the Middle East, Morrocco 2012.  
116 “...what can be thought of specifically as politics?” (Rancière 1999, xiii) 
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logic of equality. It is the meeting of these two logics or worlds that politics, as the 
affirmation and verification of equality, takes place. Given the complexity of these 
propositions it is important to begin by spelling out briefly the assumptions and 
implications that they carry with them. To use Rancière’s (1995, 56) example:  
Une grève n’est pas politique quand elle demande des reformes plutôt que 
des améliorations ou s’en prend aux rapports d’autorité plutôt qu’à 
l’insuffisance des salaires. Elle l’est quand elle refigure les rapports qui 
déterminent le lieu du travail dans son rapport à la communauté. La 
ménage a pu devenir un lieu politique, non par le simple fait que s’y 
exercent des rapports de pouvoir mais parce qu’il s’est trouvé argumenté 
dans un litige sur la capacité des femmes à la communauté.117  
In this statement Rancière refutes the premise that politics is simply a matter of 
governance, policies and laws, those measures taken to be the building blocks of the 
existing social order. He also argues that when the social political order is contested, 
either through resistance or through an adjustment of its rules and laws, this also is not 
politics. Rather, Rancière argues, politics takes place when a dispute regarding a people’s 
capacities emerges in such a way that it disrupts the organization of the community in the 
name of the equality of anyone with everyone. In other words, politics is not the mere 
exercise of power, nor is it a matter of demanding reforms or better working conditions. 
Neither is it the contestation of representations, interests and values in so far as these 
elements say something about our identity. Politics, according to Rancière, is the 
                                                
117 “A strike is not political when it calls for reforms rather than a better deal or when it attacks the 
relationships of authority rather than the inadequacy of wages. It is political when it reconfigures 
the relationships that determine the workplace in its relation to the community. The domestic 
household has been turned into a political space not through the simple fact that power 
relationships are at work in it but because it was the subject of argument in a dispute over the 
capacity of women in the community” (Rancière 1999, 32-33). 
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disruption of the established social order and its reconfiguration in the appearing of the 
part of those without part (la part des sans-part). In the above example, for instance, the 
domestic space of the home becomes the place of politics insofar as it allows for the 
dispute (litige) over the capacities of women in the community. Here roles and positions 
assigned are displaced, thereby allowing for new capacities through the reconfiguration 
of the relations between the domestic space of the home and the more public space of 
the community. As a part of the community, women emerge as those without part in 
contesting their assigned roles of domestic workers, that is, a distribution that designates 
their capacities and limits the roles they can occupy. Thus, when Rancière (1981), in La 
nuit des Prolétaires, writes about the nineteenth-century working class who write poetry 
at night, wishing for a life of bourgeois comfort, the point is not that these workers were 
writing poetry but that they have surpassed the roles and functions to which they were 
assigned, the time-bound demands of labour, giving rise to the possibility of living other 
lives. 
To the degree that Rancière’s conception of politics, as a meeting of two logics, 
goes against what we usually call politics, some initial clarifications are in order. Let me 
turn, therefore, to his distinction between politics and the police (la police). In Mésentente: 
Politique et philosophie, Rancière (1995, 51; original emphasis) makes the following claim: 
On appelle généralement du nom de politique l’ensemble des processus 
par lesquels s’opèrent l’agrégation et le consentement des collectivités, 
l’organisation des pouvoirs, la distribution des places et fonctions et les 
systèmes de légitimation de cette distribution. Je propose de donner un 
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autre nom à cette distribution et au système de ces  légitimations. Je 
propose de l’appeler police.118 
In renaming what is typically thought of as politics as the police, it is important to keep in 
mind that Rancière is not using this term in a limited or pejorative sense, as in the image 
of pepper-spray wielding forces of law and order. On the contrary, appropriating the term 
from Michel Foucault’s writings on the mode of government in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (e.g. Foucault 2004; Rancière 1995, 51),119 the police for Rancière 
refers to an “ordre du visible et du dicible qui fait que telle activité est visible et que telle 
autre ne l’est pas, que telle parole est entendue comme du discours et telle autre comme 
du bruit” (Rancière 1995, 52).120 Taken broadly as a condition of possibility or a priori laws 
(albeit contingent), the police is considered by Rancière to be largely neutral and not 
therefore equivalent to strategies of control, repression, domination or even an order of 
powers. As a “dispositif social” (Ibid., 51), it is primarily a logic of inequality, a partitioning 
of the sensible that creates hierarchical relationships in society:  
                                                
118 “Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of 
collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the 
systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and 
legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police” (Rancière 1999, 28; original emphasis).  
119 As Samuel Chambers (2011, 306) explains: “In order to stress the broad nature of this concept of 
la police Rancière (uncharacteristically) emphasizes the link between his use of police and 
Foucault’s work. Foucault argues: first, to the extent that any police order determines hierarchical 
relationships between human beings, ‘the police includes everything’; second to the extent that it 
sets up a relationship between ‘men and things’ the police order also constitutes a material 
order”. 
120 “…it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and 
another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière 1999, 
29). Importantly, this order is not simply a discursive one, but a spatial configuration, a mapping 
of bodies into their proper places, roles and functions, a point that will be explored in more detail 
later. In his later writings, particularly on aesthetics, Rancière will refer to the police as a 
distribution of the sensible (le partage du sensible), the general laws that determine what can be 
seen, heard, thought, said, done – in general the capacities of bodies. 
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La police n’est pas une fonction sociale mais une constitution symbolique 
du social. L’essence de la police n’est pas la répression, pas même le 
contrôle sur le vivant. Son essence est un certain partage du sensible. On 
appellera partage du sensible la loi généralement implicite qui définit les 
formes de l’avoir-part en définissant d’abord les modes perceptifs dans 
lesquels ils s’inscrivent (Rancière 1998a, 240).121 
Reconfiguring our understanding of politics as the police, Rancière thereby retains the 
notion of politics for those acts of contestation or dissensus with the police order. That is, 
politics happens when bodies are shifted from their assigned place, making the invisible 
visible and the inaudible audible: “La politique? Elle fait voir ce qui n’avait pas lieu d’être 
vu, fait entendre un discours là où seul le bruit avait son lieu, fait entendre comme 
discours ce qui n’était pas entendu que comme bruit”  (Rancière 1995, 53).122 Here politics 
is a disruption of the police order (celle qui rompt), a disidentification with its spatial and 
temporal ordering of bodies.123  
                                                
121 “The police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the 
police lies neither in repression, nor even in the control over the living. Its essence lies in a certain 
way of dividing up the sensible. I call “distribution of the sensible” a generally implicit law that 
defines the forms of partaking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are 
inscribed” (Rancière 2010a, 36). 
122 “It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once 
there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as 
noise” (Rancière 1999, 30). 
123 Rancière is not the only one to use this notion of disidentification. Most notably, Judith Butler 
(1993) defines disidentification as a central component of identity formation, being part of a 
relation of identification and counter-identification and a form of misrecognition. Her question 
centers on the politicization of disidentification. Rancière’s definition, as I will clarify in this 
chapter, is more radical than Butler’s and does not contain any component of identity formation 
or subjectivity. Rather, politics is disidentification. A similar definition to Rancière is found in 
Munoz (1999, 97) who asserts that “disidentification is a “third term that resists the binary of 
identification and counter-identification”. Likewise, for Munoz disidentification is a process of 
politicization.  
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It would be a mistake to understand politics as simply opposed to the police order, 
as a completely separate and distinct logic that seeks its elimination.124 Politics, as the 
meeting of two logics, is the reconfiguration of the sensible in the name of equality; an 
action (or practical experimentation) that runs up against the police logic in the name of 
the equality of anyone with everyone. For Rancière (1995, 57):  
Aucune chose n’est en elle-même politique car la politique n’existe que par 
un principe qui ne lui pas propre, l’égalité. Le statut de ce « principe » doit 
être précisé. L’égalité n’est pas un donné que la politique mettre en 
application, une essence que la loi incarne ni un but qu’elle se propose 
d’atteindre. Elle n’est qu’une présupposition qui doit être discernée dans 
les pratiques qui la mettent en œuvre.125  
I want to unpack this understanding of the relationship of politics with equality as it is 
elaborated in the work of Rancière before turning to a more detailed discussion of politics 
as disruption and reconfiguration. To appreciate this aspect of politics it is first necessary 
to elaborate the notion of equality as the presupposition of politics. What is this equality 
being affirmed and presupposed?  
The most fully developed discussion of equality is to be found in Rancière’s (1991) 
re-counting of the story of the schoolteacher Joseph Jacotot in The Ignorant 
                                                
124 For Rancière, the police logic, or the social hierarchical state-based order, as fully closed and 
without supplement is impossible (see the discussion of hegemony from Laclau and Mouffe 1985). 
There is never a total closure of the police logic, but always an excess or supplement through 
which politics emerges. It is in this sense that the givens of the police order are polemical and 
permeable and thus the object of contestation.    
125 “Nothing is political in itself for the political only happens by means of a principle that does not 
belong to it: equality. The status of this ‘principle’ needs to be specified. Equality is not a given 
that politics then presses into service, an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself 
the task of attaining. It is a mere assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices 
implementing it” (Rancière 1999, 33).  
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Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. At the period of the Restoration in 
France, Jacotot was exiled to the Belgium during which time he undertook to teach 
French to Flemish speaking students, whose language he himself did not know. In the 
process of realizing that his pupils were capable of learning French by themselves, a 
process not unlike learning a mother tongue, he developed the idea of a universal 
education premised on the principle that all people are equally intelligent and that the 
problem in education is therefore not the transmission of knowledge, but to “reveal an 
intelligence to itself” (Ibid., 28). All Jacotot had with him was a bilingual copy of Fénelon’s 
Les Aventures de Télémaque, which he asked his students to read and write a paper on, in 
French. Surprised by the quality of the work of his students, Jacotot concluded that there 
is an equality of intelligences and that the obstacle for students is not a matter of “a lack 
of instruction, but the belief in the inferiority of their intelligence” (Ibid., 39).  
Taking his cue from Jacotot, the claim Rancière makes concerning equality is that 
it is a “point of departure, a supposition to maintain in every circumstance” (Ibid., 138); 
that is, the supposition of the equality of all speaking beings. In the discussion of the 
equality of intelligences, Rancière (Ibid., 27) notes that it is not the equality of 
manifestations of intelligence that is the issue (i.e., knowledge or skills), but rather the 
equality, or non-hierarchy, of intellectual capacity. In this sense, equality is not something 
that can be observed or measured, and neither can it be considered a goal or future state 
(see also Ibid., 46), but is rather, in political terms, a human quality or potential. Rancière 
makes the crucial point that equality must therefore be approached as it is practiced and 
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verified; that is, it has no value in itself but only in its effects or what he calls its “practical 
experimentations”. 
Importantly, the principle of the “equality of all speaking beings” does not make 
equality an ontological principle. Precisely because its value is tied to its verification and 
practice, in itself equality is empty and without content. This point is clarified by Rancière 
when he states: “Elle n’est pas une valeur que l’on invoque mais un universel qui doit être 
présupposé, vérifié et démontré en chaque cas” (1998a, 116).126 There are two points to 
clarify at this juncture. First, at a primary level, equality is a presupposition to the degree 
that it is the condition for understanding between two or more people. Put simply, in 
order for me to understand you, and vice-versa, we must both first assume our equality 
qua speaking beings (versus beings who produce only noise). In the terms of Rancière 
(1995, 37): 
Il y a de l’ordre dans la société parce que les uns commandent et les autres 
obéissent. Mais pour obéir à une ordre deux choses au moins sont requises : 
il faut comprendre l’ordre et il faut comprendre qu’il faut lui obéir. Et pour 
faire cela, il faut déjà être l’égal de celui qui vous commande.127 
Those who claim a hierarchical position within the sensible order and, further, attempt to 
naturalize this position, must first assume that those who are inferior, who are in fact told 
and taught that they are inferior (stupid, poor, strangers), must first understand what he 
                                                
126 “Equality is not a value to which on appeals; it is a universal that must be [presupposed], 
verified, and demonstrated in each case” (Rancière 1992, 60; translation modified). 
127 “There is order in society because some people command and others obey, but in order to obey 
an order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must 
understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person 
who is ordering you” (Rancière 1999, 16). 
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or she is saying. Yet, in order to be understood, those claiming a position of superiority 
must presume the equality of all speaking beings, thus contradicting the police order and 
exposing the contingency of any social hierarchy.  
The second point is that the meeting of the logic of the police order and the logic 
of equality is not an opposition of two separate and pure spheres. The logic of equality, 
whose value and content is tied to its verification and demonstration, emerges only in the 
contestation of the twisting and wringing by the police order, that is, the twisting of 
equality as inequality, as the above case of equal speaking beings attests. Thus, the 
meeting of these two logics does not constitute a third space or ground, an ontological 
foundation, and thus they are not wholly external to each other.128 As Rancière (2003, 6) 
emphatically states, “there is no place outside of the police”. As Samuel Chambers (2011, 
317; original emphasis) explains: 
[P]olitics and police meet within the police order itself. Politics goes on in the 
only place it can go on: within the social formation where it occurs, i.e., 
within the space of the police order. … [P]olitics is that which opposes the 
terms of the police order but does so within its terms.  
It is in this sense that equality is not an ontological principle, but rather a presupposition 
that must be demonstrated and verified in each case. If there is no politics without the 
presupposition of equality, this also therefore means that politics is the demonstration of 
equality. Indeed, without the supposition of equality, the force of action directed against 
                                                
128 Here I am referring to the idea of the “political difference” in which la politique is distinguished 
from le politique, or politics/the political (see Marchart [2007] for a historiography of this 
difference). Rancière’s conception of politics (la politique) does not follow this entrenched model 
of thinking, which posits le politique as a “pure” ground outside of politics (la politique), but 
instead is a thinking of politics as “impure” (see Chambers 2011). 
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the police order becomes quickly recuperated and defused. It is only in its oppositional 
logic (and paradoxical) to the police order (as an order of inequality) that politics happens, 
or takes place. To understand and appreciate how this verification takes place from 
within the police order, it is necessary to consider how the police order twists or wrings 
the equality it must always presuppose. 
Equality is the source of politics to the degree that in its verification and practice it 
exposes a “wrong” (tort) between the parts of society or community, a miscounting that 
establishes and sustains inequality and hierarchy. From the word tordre, which denotes a 
twisting and wringing, Rancière wants to infuse this notion with the idea that there is a 
twisting and wringing of a primordial equality on which inequality relies. For Rancière 
(1998a, 113; original emphasis): “Au lieu de dire que toute police dénie l’égalité, nous 
dirons que toute police fait tort à l’égalité”.129 The “wrong” that ties equality to politics, 
and which is the basis for the verification of equality, therefore, is not simply the 
contestation of competing views over interests (i.e., the wages of workers). Rather, it is a 
miscount that exposes a hierarchical distribution of roles, functions, identities and places 
that is not natural but radically contingent, an inequality that rests in equality.  
Politics names these wrongs and, by making them visible, disrupts the police order 
or distribution of the sensible, about who gets to speak and make demands. In other 
words, in giving appearance to these wrongs, politics introduces the part of those without 
part as a new part of the community, with new capacities that are not yet fixed, 
                                                
129 “Thus, instead of arguing that [police] denies equality, I shall say that [police] wrongs equality, 
and I shall take the political the place where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the 
handling of the wrong” (Rancière 1992, 58-59; original emphasis, translation modified). 
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determined or identified. It is therefore through the exposing of a wrong that politics finds 
its place within the police logic, and, through the verification and demonstration of 
equality, disrupts its logic. Having laid out Rancière’s conception of politics and its 
relation to the social order and to equality, I want to now turn to another important 
dimension, specifically, what it means to disrupt and reconfigure the sensible order of the 
police logic. This aspect of Rancière’s thought is central to his notion of politics and 
therefore merits further explication. 
 
The Political Subject and the Place of Politics 
 
Having “located” politics within the police logic and, at the same time, as a manifestation 
of equality not identical to this logic, how exactly does politics work? If politics is not a 
sphere separate from and uncontaminated by the sensible order, but wholly a part of that 
order, how is politics then also a disruption of that order?130 
 It might be tempting to connect the argument Rancière has provided for 
rethinking politics along the lines of a politics of recognition.131 While there are clearly 
                                                
130 The common English translation of le partage du sensible is division or distribution of the 
sensible. For Rancière the sensible has a double connotation, meaning both that which can be 
sensed (i.e., the senses) and that which makes sense or is meaningful: “Le sensible, c’est du sens 
distribué : du sens mis en rapport avec le sens, du visible qui est articulé en dicible, qui est 
interprété, évalué, etc.”   [“[t]he sensible is distributed meaning, meaning brought into relation 
with one of the senses, the visible articulated as the sayable, interpreted, evaluated, etc.”] 
(Rancière 2009a, 159; my translation). 
131 The politics of recognition, or ethics of recognition, emerged as a debate in social and political 
philosophy in the early 1990s with Charles Taylor’s (1992) Multiculturalism and the “Politics of 
Recognition” and was developed by the proponents of critical theory influenced by the Frankfurt 
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some affinities, closer investigation reveals fundamental differences between the two 
that make the comparison unsustainable and call attention to how politics “takes place” 
for Rancière. If Rancière’s principal concern is the denial of recognition of those 
dominated, in an essay on this very issue Jean-Philippe Deranty (2003) asks, to what 
degree does this effort dovetail with the recent writings on the struggle for recognition?132 
I will not rehearse all the arguments put forward by Deranty, which cover a range of 
philosophical issues and debates. Instead, I wish simply to outline his central claim, 
namely that recognition is a struggle for the formation of a full identity, be it personal, 
social or cultural. As such, for the proponents of recognition, such as Axel Honneth, the 
core argument is about the contribution of these unrecognized identities to the social 
order, the community from which they are being excluded (Ibid., 151).  
Deranty points out that the model of recognition as put forth by Honneth, which is 
premised on the Habermasian model of communicative rationality, is problematic 
because it assumes as given pre-existing subjects and identities as participants in this 
struggle. As Deranty (Ibid., 147) states: 
The very contested object of political conflict is precisely the existence of a 
situation of speech and the identity of the valid participants in that 
situation. The fight of the dominated individuals consists in appearing as 
worthy speakers and in making the situation of speech visible. 
                                                                                                                                                  
School, such as Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib, among others. 
The foundation of this discussion is Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity and recognition. For a 
critical discussion of these issues see Fabian (1999). 
132 Deranty’s principal interlocutor here is Axel Honneth, generally considered to be the doyen of 
the Frankfurt School, following Jürgen Habermas. His writings have largely centered on the moral 
grounds of the struggle for recognition within contemporary deliberative democracies, especially 
in the context of debates around multiculturalism. See Honneth (1996). 
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The point Deranty is making is not that there are no identities at play in politics, 
but rather that it is precisely these identities that are at issue. In other words, those 
subjects engaged in politics do not do so on account of their identity, as an affirmation of 
difference, but instead because of how these identities are always already bound up with 
the police logic. Again, the thrust of politics is the verification of equality that has been 
twisted and wrung by the police order through the distribution of roles, functions, 
identities and places: politics works explicitly against such identities by disrupting those 
configurations of who can speak based on the hierarchical ordering of the social. As 
Deranty (Ibid., 151-152) notes:  
Ultimately, this recognition only achieves the conservation of a social order 
that is structurally based on inequality. By focusing on the subjects’ identity 
and by defining identities in strict social intersubjective terms, the ethics of 
recognition turn out to be a kind of sociologism that is unable to provide 
the theoretical basis for a radical critique of the social system. 
The givenness of identity as difference within the model of recognition, thus framed as an 
intersubjective moment, cannot account for politics as the disruption of this order, which 
Rancière claims is the hallmark of politics.133 If Rancière is to add anything to the debate 
on recognition, it is precisely in demonstrating how the “promise of identity” is precisely 
the wile by which the police logic maintains a hierarchy and a social structure of 
inequality. As a disruption of the police logic through equality, politics is the suspension 
of the social order and its assigning of identities through a process of disidentification 
                                                
133 Here it is useful to distinguish between intersubjectivity as an ethical or moral principle and 
intersubjectivity as an epistemological claim (see Fabian 1991). The latter would follow more 
closely with Rancière’s arguments as it suggests a condition of possibility of communication and 
knowledge rather than a stance to be taken with regard to other (given) subjects.  
146 
 
(désidentification). It is only in the appearance of bodies and capacities not identified in 
the police order through which politics takes place as a process of political subjectivation: 
the emergence of a subject of politics that has “…aucune forme de « culture », d’ethos 
collectif qui prendrait voix” (Rancière 1995, 61). 134  As Rancière explains: “Un sujet 
politique ce n’est pas un groupe qui ‘prend conscience’ de lui-même, se donne une voix, 
impose son poids dans la société” (1995, 65).135 Thus, in taking the givenness of identities 
as its starting point, whether personal, social or cultural, the ethics of recognition 
reproduces the consensual order of the police, its hierarchies and exclusions, and, in so 
doing, is always in danger of becoming a form of depolitcization. The ethics of recognition, 
put bluntly, opposes politics by claiming that there is no part of those without part: only 
those already implicated in the logics of identity as existing subjects are countable. But 
who is this subject of politics if it is not to be given within existing regimes of 
identification?  
Politics, writes Rancière (1995, 59), is a mode of subjectivation. That is, politics, in 
breaking with the police order is a process in which a political subject emerges through a 
series of acts not identifiable within the given sensible order. As the verification of 
equality, politics is a process of subjectivation in which there is a disruption of the police 
logic and its regimes of identification. It is a process that disrupts the sensible order by 
putting forth the voice and name of a political subject: an “impossible identification” 
                                                
134 “…political subjectification, as I have tried to show elsewhere, is in no way a form of ‘culture’, 
of some collective ethos capable of finding a voice” (Rancière 1999, 36). 
135 “A political subject is not a group that ‘becomes aware’ of itself, finds its voice, imposes its 
weight on society” (Rancière 1999, 40). 
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(Rancière 1998a, 213) not only because it falls outside of the purview of the sensible order, 
but also because it refuses any specific identification based on proper identities – 
personal, social or cultural. In summary, politics occurs as dissensus, as disruption and 
disidentification, through the manifestation of bodies and capacities not contained by the 
police order: 
C’est un croisement d’identités reposant sur un croisement de noms : des 
noms qui lient le nom d’un groupe ou d’une classe au nom de ce qui est 
hors-compte, qui lient un être à un non-être ou à être-à-venir. Ce réseau a 
une propriété remarquable : il comporte toujours une identification 
impossible, un identification qui ne peut être incarnée par ceux ou celles 
qui l’énoncent. « Nous sommes les damnés de la terre » est le type de 
phrase qu’aucun damné de la terre ne prononcera jamais (1998a, 119-
120).136 
This process of subjectivation evidently needs to be distinguished from those accounts 
that define this process as one in which the subject is constituted through the 
internalization of dominant scientific discourses or norms of behaviour (e.g., early 
Foucault).137 For Rancière, the process of political subjectivation is an integral part of 
                                                
136 “It is a crossing of identities relying on a crossing of names: names that link the name of a group 
or a class to the name of no group or no class, a being to a nonbeing or a not-yet-being. This 
network has a noticeable property: it always involves an impossible identification, an 
identification that cannot be embodied by he or she who utters it. ‘We are the wretched of the 
earth’ is the kind of sentence that no wretched of the world would ever utter” (Rancière 1992, 61).  
137 This conception of subjectivation is most visible in the early writings of Foucault (1976). In his 
later writings, particularly on the ethics of the self and the aesthetics of existence, there is an 
adjustment of this model toward a conception in which the subject is both constituted and 
constitutes itself. Yet, for Rancière, Foucault is not interested in a theory of subjectivation: “[N]ulle 
part, il ne considère une sphère spécifique d’actes que l’on pourrait nommer actes de 
subjectivation politique. Je ne pense pas qu’il se soit jamais intéressé à définir une théorie de la 
subjectivation politique au sens où je l’entends, celui d’une reconfiguration polémique des 
données communes. Ce qui l’intéresse, ce n’est pas le commun polémique, c’est le gouvernement 
de soi et des autres” (Rancière 2008a, 32) For an approximation of this point in English, see 
Rancière (2010b, 93). 
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politics and without which there is no subject of which to speak. It is the creation of a 
“class” that belongs to no on one in particular, and thus potentially to everyone. To clarify, 
there are two moments in the process of subjectivation. As noted, there is a moment of 
dis-identification with the assigned identities, roles and functions of the police logic (or 
sensible order) through a disruption of the naturalness of that order: “Une subjectivation 
politique redécoupe le champ d’expérience qui donnait à chacun son identité avec sa 
part” (Rancière 1995, 65).138 This first moment is largely negative and critical in tone 
insofar as it is a rejection of the given order. The second moment is the emergence of a 
political subject or subjectivities from the excess of those parts already identified by the 
community. These political subjectivities belong to no one in particular. They are 
subjectivities that are not determined or claimed by any person or group, but enable 
individuals and groups to exceed policed identities.  Rancière (1995, 60) refers to these 
political subjectivities as “a multiple”: 
La subjectivation politique produit un multiple qui n’était pas donné dans 
la constitution policière de la communauté, un multiple dont le compte se 
pose comme contradictoire avec la logique policière.139         
The multiple produced in political subjectivation is without identity in the proper sense, 
that is, it is of an order wholly other, a “discours de l’autre” (Rancière 1998a, 212) in 
                                                
138 “Political subjectification redefines the field of experience that gave to each their identity with 
their lot” (Rancière 1999, 40). 
139 “Political subjectification produces a multiple that was not given in the police constitution of 
the community, a multiple whose count poses itself a contradictory in terms of police logic” 
(Rancière 1999, 36). 
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relation to the police order;140 that which the latter attempts to deny and depoliticize: 
“C’est la formulation d’un un qui n’est pas un soi mais la relation d’un soi à un autre” 
(Ibid., 118).141 The subject of political subjectivation is not, however, created ex nihilo, says 
Rancière, but rather through the disidentification with the givenness of roles in the police 
logic. The multiple, for instance, the people (i.e., the demos), appears in the 
reconfiguration of the sensible, “l’arrachement à la naturalité d’une place” (Rancière 1995, 
60).142 He gives the following examples of such political subjects: 
« Femme » en politique est le sujet d’expérience – le sujet dénaturé, dé-
feminisé – qui mesure l’écart entre une part reconnue – celle de la 
complémentarité sexuelle – et une absence du part. « Ouvrier » ou mieux 
« prolétaire » est de même le sujet qui mesure l’écart entre la part du travail 
comme fonction social et l’absence de part de ceux qui l’exécutent dans le 
définition du commun de la communauté (1995, 60).143  
  
These examples are vivid historical instances of the part of those without part, particular 
instances of bodies and capacities that disrupted given police logics. Moreover, the 
                                                
140 “a discourse of the other”(Rancière 1998b, 29). 
141 “It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation of a self to an other” (Rancière 
1992, 60). 
142 “...removal from the naturalness of a place…” (Rancière 1999, 36). 
143 “In politics ‘woman’ is the subject of experience – the denatured, defeminized subject – that 
measures the gap between an acknowledged part (that of sexual complementarity) and a having 
no part. ‘Worker’ or better still ‘proletarian’ is similarly the subject that measures the gap between 
the part of work as social function and the having no part of those who carry it out within the 
definition of the common of the community” (Rancière 1999, 36). Another important example of 
political subjectivity Rancière frequently refers to is: “Nous sommes tous des juifs allemands”, the 
slogan of May 1968: “[I]ls mettaient en pleine clarté l’écart de la subjectivation politique, définie 
dans le nœud d’une énonciation logique et d’une manifestation esthétique, avec toute 
identification” (1995, 90). “[W]hen demonstrators in the Paris of 1968 declared… ‘We are all 
German Jews,’ they exposed for all to see the gap between political subjectification – defined in 
the nexus of a logical utterance and an aesthetic manifestation – and any kind of identification” 
(Rancière 1999, 59).  
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appearance and announcement of these “impossible identifications” are the emergence 
of political subjects, modes of political subjectivation that refigure the partage du sensible, 
working against the logic of the police and its claims that there is no part of those without 
part: “La politique est l’art des déductions tordue et des identités croisées” (Rancière 
1995, 188).144  
As we have seen, the logic of the police is an ordering of bodies, identities, 
functions, roles, capacities, a sensible order that determines what can be seen, heard, 
thought, said, done. It is an order that claims to be without supplement. In its attempt to 
render absent and invisible, to disavow the part without part, or the supplement, to 
neutralize politics itself, the logic of the police is the order of consensus, an accounting of 
community based on “des groupes effectifs définis par les différences dans la naissance, 
les fonctions, les places et les intérêts qui constituent le corps social, à l’exclusion de tout 
supplément” (Rancière 1998a, 239).145 It is on this ‘accounting’ of the community in which: 
“La police est un partage du sensible dont le principe est l’absence de vide et de 
supplément” (Ibid., 240).146 The police, in other words, is the elimination of politics, or 
dissensus. Thus, it is in exposing the miscount of community, its incompleteness, that the 
part of those without part opposes the consensus of the sensible order. But how do these 
demonstrations of a miscount take place? How does the part of those without part 
emerge? Where does the process of political subjectivation take place? 
                                                
144 “Politics is the art of warped deductions and mixed identities” (Rancière 1999, 139). 
145 “…actual groups defined by differences in birth, and by the different functions, places and 
interests that make up the social body to the exclusion of every supplement” (Rancière 2010a, 36) 
146 “The essence of the police lies in a partition of the sensible that is characterized by the absence 
of void and of supplement…” (Rancière 2010a, 36). 
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Throughout my discussion of Rancière’s conception of politics I have hinted, both 
through my own words and those of Rancière, that politics is something that takes place: 
“Il y a de la politique quand il y a un lieu et des formes pour la rencontre entre deux 
processus hétérogènes” (Rancière 1995, 53). 147  Thus far in my analysis I have not 
described the lieu, the place of this encounter (un lieu de rencontre). To begin, Rancière is 
disinclined to define the proper place of politics, as he does not want to necessarily 
attach it to any material conditions – i.e., politics can only happen in such and such place, 
etc. Yet, despite this reticence he continually refers to the place of politics, to politics as a 
taking place. Indeed, there is a significant but underappreciated spatial dimension to 
Rancière’s thinking of politics that is crucial for understanding his conception of politics, 
as we will see in the next section on the politics of aesthetics. In a talk entitled, “The 
Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics” Rancière (2003, 6-7) responds to inquiries 
regarding the spatial metaphors in his work: 
[…T]he issue of space has to be thought of in terms of distribution 
[partage]: distribution of places, boundaries of what is in or out, central or 
peripheral, visible or invisible. It is related to what I call the distribution of 
the sensible [partage du sensible]. By this I mean the way in which the 
abstract and arbitrary forms of symbolization of hierarchy are embodied as 
perceptive givens, in which a social destination is anticipated by the 
evidence of a perceptive universe, of a way of being, saying and seeing. This 
distribution is a certain framing of time and space. 
Throughout his conception of politics Rancière refers to the police or partage du sensible 
as a matter of knowing your place: the worker, women, immigrants are all obliged and 
                                                
147 “Politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet” 
(Rancière 1999, 30). 
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expected to know their place in terms of the functions, roles and identities ascribed to 
them. Politics, as we saw, is when the worker refuses to know his or her place. It is in the 
refusal to follow “their place” that the process of disidentification occurs. As Rancière 
(2000, 13-14) says, la politique:  
C’est un découpage des temps et des espaces, du visible et de l’invisible, de 
la parole et du bruit qui définit à la fois le lieu et l’enjeu de la politique 
comme forme d’expérience. La politique porte sur ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on 
peut en dire, sur qui à la compétence pour voir et la qualité pour dire, sur 
les propriétés des espaces et les possibles du temps.148    
In this short passage is the idea that politics is the fissure or disruption of those 
possibilities of time (e.g., the time of labour) and properties of spaces (e.g., the factory) 
assigned and configured within sensible order of the police logic. Further, it tells us that 
this fissure or disruption defines the place (lieu) and stakes (enjeu) of politics as a form of 
experience. While there is a clear aesthetic quality to this configuration of sensibility, a 
“système des formes a priori déterminent ce qui se donne à ressentir” (2000, 13).149 
 The spatial qualities of Rancière’s rethinking gives politics an aesthetic dimension, 
or what he refers to as the aesthetics of politics. The police order is an aesthetic 
configuration in the sense that it is a particular configuration or distribution of the 
                                                
148 “It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noice 
that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience. 
Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to 
see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” 
(Rancière 2004a, 14).  
149 “…the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to sense experience” (Rancière 
2004a, 13). Here Rancière (2000, 13) makes reference to Kant’s idea of aesthetics, later revisited by 
Foucault, as the structural system organizing sensible experience. Not a pre-Kantian notion, as is 
often wrongly assumed, it is the transcendental aesthetic, or what Kant (1855) refers to as the 
principles of a priori sensibility, as found in his Critique of Pure Reason (A21, B36). 
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sensible, of what can be seen, thought, heard, said, done. It is a distribution with a 
distinctive spatial quality, an ordering of bodies in particular places according to 
particular roles and capacities. Thus, when workers rupture their assigned temporal and 
spatial roles, it is through the reconfiguration of temporal and spatial capacities – using 
their nights when they should be sleeping to write poetry. It is in this sense that politics 
takes place. 
 
The Politics of Aesthetics 
 
For Rancière, not surprisingly, art is one of the areas where politics takes place. Indeed, 
one of the key functions of art is to manifest a place (un lieu) where it reconfigures the 
relationships between bodies, spaces and time. I now wish to consider the consistencies 
between Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and what can be called, for lack of better 
terminology, the politics of contemporary art. In assuming a consistency between his 
conceptualization of politics and the characterization of the politics of contemporary art, 
my task will be to identify a politics of art by way of moving from the aesthetics of politics 
to the politics of aesthetics. While equality plays a central role in the politics of aesthetics, 
the workings of the politics of art is not entirely identical to workings of politics outlined 
above, even if both give site to politics as disruption, disidentification and reconfiguration. 
 So far we have seen how Rancière’s conception of politics has an aesthetic 
dimension in the notion of the partage du sensible. This aesthetic dimension of politics, 
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following Kant, is premised on the idea that politics refers to what can be seen, heard, 
thought, said, done. Time and space are political to the degree that they define forms of 
subjectivity and modes of political participation, of who can be seen and heard. Politics 
begins, therefore, with the disruption of these times and spaces. This aesthetic dimension 
of politics is manifest in Rancière’s (2005, 14) study of resistance among nineteenth-
century workers in France: 
I showed that at the core of the emancipation of the workers was an 
aesthetic revolution. And the core of that revolution was the issue of time. 
The Platonic statement, affirming that workers had no time to do two 
things at the same time, had to be taken as a definition of the worker in 
terms of a distribution of the sensible: the worker is he who has no time to 
do anything but his own work. Consequently, the heart of the ‘revolution’ 
was the partition of time. In order to reframe the space-time of their 
‘occupation,’ the workers had to invalidate the most common partition of 
time: the partition according to which workers would work during the day 
and sleep during the night. It was the conquest of the night for doing 
something else than sleeping. That basic overturning involved a whole 
reconfiguration of the partition of experience. It involved a process of dis-
identification, another relation to speech, visibility and so on. 
Clearly Rancière’s concept of aesthetics, as a configuration of space-time, goes against 
the more commonplace notion of aesthetics being a matter of the philosophy of art and 
the beautiful, which then gets caught up in justifying or undermining the separation of art 
from the necessities of life (i.e., the everyday).150 For Rancière, conversely, aesthetics 
designates a particular relationship between art and life, a paradoxical form that asserts 
                                                
150 For Rancière, modernism and postmodernism are two sides of the same coin. Modernism 
constructs narratives around the autonomy of art, while postmodernism seeks to undo these 
narratives. The trouble, as we will see, is that both misunderstand the paradox at the heart of 
aesthetics, which posits that: “… l’art est de l‘art pour autant qu’il est aussi de non-art, autre 
chose que de l’art” (Rancière, 2004b, 53). “…art is art insofar as it is also non-art, or is something 
other than art” (Rancière 2009b, 36). 
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both the autonomy of art and its intermingling with the everyday – art and non-art: 
“L’esthétique, elle, est la pensée du désordre nouveau” (Rancière 2004b, 23).151  For 
Rancière, as we will see, it is this disorder that is the foundation of the political capacities 
of art.  
 To understand Rancière’s conception of aesthetics (2000, 16), which is but one of 
what he refers to as the three regimes of art, it is necessary to first examine each of these 
regimes, or partages du sensible, namely, the ethical, representative and aesthetic. With 
these three regimes, he explains: 
On a là trois formes de partage du sensible structurant la manière dont des 
arts peuvent être perçus et pensées comme arts et comme formes 
d’inscription du sens de la communauté. Ces formes définissent la manière 
dont des œuvres ou performances « font de la politique », quel que soient 
par ailleurs les intentions qui y président, les modes d’insertion sociaux des 
artistes ou la façon dont les formes artistiques réfléchissent les structures 
ou les mouvements sociaux.152 
Following Foucault’s archaeological method, Rancière establishes these three regimes or 
epistèmes of art as the transcendental conditions that determine what is visible in art, as 
well as what counts as art itself. To read these three regimes as rigid and separate 
historical periodizations would, however, be wrong: 
                                                
151 “Aesthetics is the thought of a new disorder” (Rancière 2009b, 13). 
152 “Here we have three forms of distributing the sensible that structure the manner in which the 
arts can be perceived and thought of as forms of art and as forms that inscribe a sense of 
community: the surface of ‘depicted’ signs, the split reality of the theater, the rhythm of a dancing 
chorus. These forms define the way in which works of art or performances are ‘involved in 
politics,’ whatever may otherwise be the guiding intentions, artists’ social modes of integration, 
or the manner in which artistic forms reflect social structures or movements” (Rancière 2004a, 14).  
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I would say that my approach is a bit similar to Foucault’s. It retains the 
principle from the Kantian transcendental that replaces the dogmatism of 
truth with the search for the conditions of possibility. … I differ from 
Foucault insofar as his archaeology seems to me to follow a schema of 
historical necessity according to which, beyond a certain chasm, something 
is no longer thinkable. … I thus try at one and the same time to historicize 
the transcendental and to de-historicize these systems of conditions of 
possibility (Rancière 2004c, 50). 
Each regime, in other words, has a historical period in which it is dominant, but that does 
not preclude the possibility of these regimes coinciding; there is not a strict chronological 
relation between these regimes – they are metahistorical categories (Deranty 2010, 119). 
So what are these three regimes? The first one is what Rancière, in reference to Plato, 
calls the ethical regime of art. This regime plays the least important role in Rancière’s 
argument so I will only describe it briefly. The ethical regime is founded on the idea that 
artistic representation is judged by its truthfulness to an ideal model. Whether a tree or 
the character of heroes in a story, the accuracy of representation and its truthfulness to 
the idea has a moral or ethical imperative insofar as it impacts of ethos of the community: 
… par la manière dont les images du poème donnent au enfants et aux 
spectateurs citoyens un certaine éducation et s’inscrivent dans le partage 
des occupations de la cité. C’est en ce sens que je parle de régime éthique 
des images. Il s’agit dans ce régime de savoir en quoi la manière d’être des 
images concerne l’ethos, la manière d’être des individus et des collectivités 
(Rancière 2000, 28; original emphasis).153 
                                                
153 “…by the way in which the poem’s images provide the spectator, both children and adult 
citizens, with a certain education and fit in with the distribution of the city’s occupations. It is in 
this sense that I speak of an ethical regime of images. In this regime, it is a matter of knowing in 
what way images’ mode of being affects the ethos, the mode of being of individuals and 
communities” (Rancière 2004a, 21; original emphasis).     
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Here art is not so much art as we understand it today; there is no art as such, but arts or 
modes of making. Put differently, there is no separation of art and politics. If the ethical 
regime would seem to be prior to the other two regimes, this is not to suggest that it is not 
still at work, as is evidenced in the question of how films or literature impart a moral 
message for their audiences or for example what goes under the banner of “engaged” or 
“political” art.  
The second regime is the domain of representative art and is a break with the 
ethical regime. In the representative regime, derived from Aristotle’s Poetics, the aim is to 
separate art from the moral community. Its principal mode is mimesis, that is, the manner 
of representing actions framed as a logical consequence of words and deeds: 
Le principe mimétique n’est pas en son fond un principe normatif disant 
que l’art doit faire des copies ressemblant à leurs modèles. Il est d’abord un 
principe pragmatique qui isole, dans le domaine général des arts (des 
manières de faire), certains art particuliers qui exécutent des choses 
spécifiques, à savoir des imitations. Ces imitations sont soustraites à la fois 
à la vérification ordinaire des produits des arts par leur usage et à la 
législation de la vérité sur les discours et les images (Rancière 2000, 28-
29).154 
The representative regime, unlike the ethical regime, does not demand a truthfulness 
between image and idea in the name of morality and the ethos of the community, but 
instead presents a narrative between the two in which a specific and certain order is to be 
                                                
154 “The mimetic principle is not at its core a normative principle stating that art must make copies 
resembling their models. It is first of all a pragmatic principle that isolates, within the general 
domain of arts (ways of doing and making), certain particular forms of art that produce specific 
entities called imitations. These imitations are extricated, at once and the same time, from the 
ordinary control of artistic products by their use and from the legislative reign of truth over 
discourses and images” (Rancière 2004a, 21). 
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maintained between the sensible object and its meaning. It is judged not by the same 
standards as non-representational practices, such as the products of labour, but rather in 
its capacity to imitate a codified set of conventions and norms. Premised on the logic of 
action, of cause and effect, the point here is for the story to represent an order or 
hierarchy of society. It is, in other words, “la hiérarchie des genres selon la dignité de leurs 
sujets” (2000, 31).155 In short, a given subject has a specific mode of representation. Such 
examples include paintings of mythological, religious and historical events (e.g., French 
classicisme, belles lettres, beaux arts). 
 The third regime of art, or the aesthetic regime is radical rupture of the 
representative regime to the degree that it undoes the causation and hierarchy within 
representation (Rancière 2008b). There is no longer the question of the appropriateness 
of the artwork to its subject, since the conventions and norms that guide and determine 
the representative regime are suspended and disrupted. Unlike the ethical regime and the 
representative regime, therefore, the aesthetic regime undoes any determination 
between poiesis (the manner of making) and aisthesis (the effect it produces). While still 
intimately linked, their relationship is indeterminate and must be worked out case by 
case: 
Le régime esthétique des arts est celui qui proprement identifie l’art au 
singulier et délie cet art de toute règle spécifique, de toute hiérarchie des 
sujets, des genres et des arts. Mais il le fait en faisant voler en éclats la 
barrière mimétique qui distinguait les manières de faire et séparait ses 
règles de l’ordre des occupations sociales. Il affirme l’absolue singularité de 
                                                
155 “…the hierarchy of genres according to the dignity of their subject matter” (Rancière 2004a, 22)  
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l’art et détruit en même temps tout critère pragmatique de cette singularité 
(Rancière 2000, 32-33).156 
Taking art as its object, whereby the arts become art, the aesthetic regime asserts that 
there are no pre-existing rules for presenting the world and its objects, subjects and 
situations; nor are there any pre-existing rules for distinguishing art from the world. In the 
aesthetic regime any object can potentially become a work of art, from the everyday to 
the commodity, and, further, any activity can potentially give rise to a work of art (e.g., 
Beuys’ statement that everyone is an artist). The aesthetic regime is thus the rupture of 
sense and sense, a suspension of “a form of sensory experience and an interpretation 
which makes sense of it” (Rancière 2009d, 275). It is art that opens a new relationship 
between poiesis and aisthesis that is without rule or norm, that allows for an equality 
between the world and its objects, subjects and situations by suspending any 
determinate relationship between appearance and reality, form and material, activity 
and passivity, understanding and sensitivity. Moreover, it is in this equality that art within 
the aesthetic regime offers a promise of emancipation, a new way of life (Rancière 2004b).   
 As I discussed above, equality is central to Rancière’s conception of politics. Not 
surprisingly, this notion is also central to Rancière’s conception of an aesthetic regime of 
art. Here he puts forth a two-fold idea of equality within the aesthetic regime. On the one 
hand, there is an equality of subjects, objects, situations that can be taken up within the 
                                                
156 “The aesthetic regime of the arts is the regime that strictly identifies art in the singular and 
frees it from any specific rule, from any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres. Yet it 
does so by destroying the mimetic barrier that distinguished ways of doing and making affiliated 
with art from other ways of doing and making, a barrier that separated its rules from the order of 
social occupations. The aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art and, at the same 
time, destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity (Rancière 2004a, 23). 
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artwork, which is to say, anything can become the subject of art; on the other, and as a 
consequence, there is a “free play” between sensibility and cognition. To the degree that 
anything and everything can become the subject, object or situation of art, their 
organization and presentation within the work itself is not necessarily hierarchical or 
predetermined. In breaking from the representative regime, the aesthetic regime 
suspends any and all determinate relationships between cause and effect, and form and 
content; with the rules for determining what can be represented fallen away, under the 
aesthetic regime there is an indifference or equality in subjects, objects and situations 
(Rancière 2004b). From Marcel Duchamp’s Fontaine to Santiago Sierra’s controversial 
performance/installations and Rirkrit Tiravanija’s participatory installations for sharing 
and cooking meals, anything (and anyone) can become the subject of art within the 
aesthetic regime.157  The result, which leads to the second instance of equality, is that the 
presentation of such subjects, objects and situations are also non-hierarchical; that is, 
within the work itself there is no prescription for how they are to be arranged on account 
that there was no hierarchy in their appropriation. Here the juxtaposition of 
heterogeneous elements, for instance as in collage, is an instance of such a non-
hierarchical presentation in which any predetermined meaning is necessarily suspended 
                                                
157 Santiago Sierra is a Spanish artist whose work to date has involved hiring workers (sex workers, 
etc.) to perform tasks within the gallery museum space. Taken by many critics to be exploitive, his 
work raises important questions about the nature of labour on contemporary capital society. 
Rirkrit Tiravanija is an Argentinean artist living in New York City and whose work revolves around 
creating installations where he and audience members cook and eat together in space of the 
museum. His work builds on the ideas elaborated by Nicholas Bourriaud in his Esthétique 
relationelle (1998). I will return to Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics below.  
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(Rancière 2004b).158 One of the consequences for Rancière, then, is that art that seeks to 
determine in advance how it ought to be interpreted, whether through the presentation 
of a moral fable of representative art or through didactic presentations of where art 
“teaches” the spectator, forecloses politics (Ibid., 65).159 According to Rancière, only art 
that holds open its own indeterminacy, its heterogeneity, this equality of objects, subjects 
and situations, can manifest an emancipatory politics: the pure identification of art with 
life is the end of art, while the pure autonomy of aesthetics is no politics.  
This two-fold dimension of aesthetic equality is clearly critical for understanding 
the relationship between politics and art put forward by Rancière, and more significantly, 
why not all art is political. Further, it is also the basis for how art maintains its promise of 
a new life while asserting its autonomy. To fully appreciate this politics of art is to 
understand how the aesthetic regime of art is a founded on the tension between art and 
                                                
158 Rancière (2004b, 67-68): “Le collage peut se réaliser comme pure rencontre des hétérogènes, 
attestant en bloc de l’incompatibilité de deux mondes. … Mais la politique du collage trouve son 
point d’équilibre là où elle peut combiner les deux rapports et jouer sur la ligne d’indiscernabilité 
entre la force de lisibilité du sens et la force d’étrangeté de non-sens”. “Collage can be realized as 
the pure encounter between heterogeneous elements attesting en bloc to the incompatibility of 
two worlds. … But the politics of collage has a balancing point in that it can combine the two 
relations and play on the line of indiscernibility between the force of sense’s legibility and the 
force of non-sense’s strangeness” (Rancière 2009b, 47). 
159 As Rancière (2004b, 65) states: “L’art critique, dans sa formule le plus générale, se propose de 
donner conscience des mécanismes de la domination pour changer le spectateur en acteur 
conscient de la transformation du monde. On connaît bien le dilemme qui pèse sur ce projet. … 
Les exploités ont rarement eu besoin qu’on leur explique les lois de l’exploitation. Car ce n’est pas 
l’incompréhension de l’état de choses existant qui nourrit la soumission chez les dominés, mais le 
manque de confiance en leur propre capacité de la transformer.” “In its most general expression, 
critical art is a type of art that sets out to build awareness of the mechanisms of domination to 
turn the spectator into a conscious agent of world transformation. The quandary that plagues the 
project is well known. … The exploited rarely require an explanation of the laws of exploitation. 
The dominated do not remain in subordination because they misunderstand the existing state of 
affairs but because they lack confidence in their capacity to transform it” (Rancière 2009b, 45). 
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non-art, between the autonomy of art and its attachment to everyday social life, which is 
to say, its disorder.  
Originating roughly at the end of the eighteenth-century, the aesthetic regime of 
art as defined by Rancière carries within it a fundamental paradox, or disorder, when it 
comes to its emancipatory claims. It claims to be both emancipatory by promising a new 
way of life to the community, yet at the same time it asserts its autonomy from life, that is, 
its separateness from society and politics. Indeed, the promise of a new life offered by the 
aesthetic regime is conditional upon its autonomy: 
La politique de l’art dans le régime esthétique de l’art, ou plutôt sa 
métapolitique, est déterminée par ce paradoxe fondateur : dans ce régime, 
l’art est de l’art pour autant qu’il est aussi du non-art, autre choses que de 
l’art. ... Il y a une contradiction originaire et sans cesse à l’œuvre. La 
solitude de l’œuvre porte une promesse d’émancipation. Mais 
l’accomplissement de la promesse,  c’est la suppression de l’art comme 
réalité séparée, sa transformation en une forme de vie  (Rancière 2004b, 
53).160 
Art is art only insofar as it promises to impact life; yet, at the same time, art claims to be 
separate from life. For art to fulfill its emancipatory promise, in other words, it must cease 
to be art and become part of everyday social life, or politics itself. But, at the same time, 
to be art it must also remain separate or autonomous from everyday social life. Pace 
modernism and postmodernism, the former embracing the autonomy of art and the latter 
the end of aesthetic autonomy, for Rancière this paradox between the autonomy and 
                                                
160 “The politics of art in the aesthetic regime of art, or rather its metapolitics, is determined by its 
founding paradox: art is art insofar as it is also non-art, or is something other than art. … There is 
a contradiction that is originary and unceasingly at work. The work’s solitude carries a promise of 
emancipation. But the fulfillment of that promise amounts to the elimination of art as a separate 
reality, its transformation into a form of life” (Rancière 2009b, 36). 
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heteronomy of art is the very definition of aesthetics. And, rather than attempt to resolve 
this paradox, Rancière embraces it as the “grounds” for a politics of art; aesthetics is the 
name of the relationship between art and non-art, between art and life.  
 At one time, a politics of art is contingent upon its refusal of and distance (écart) 
from everyday social life, from the partage du sensible. As a suspension of bodies and 
capacities (and their relations), as well as cause and effect, form and content, it creates a 
gap between sense and meaning by neutralizing any and all predetermined forms of 
everyday life. It thereby opens a heterotopia, a space of otherness or in-betweeness, what 
Rancière refers to as a discours de l’autre or entre-deux. In these spaces where accepted 
and given meanings are suspended and neutralized, everyday social life is presented with 
a counterworld. Very often it is a counterworld founded on equality: an equality of 
subjects, objects, situations whose presentation promise a new life while asserting their 
autonomy from life.  
Thus, the equality within the aesthetic regime of art, evidently, is not identical to 
the equality verified in politics discussed earlier. This is not to say they are not 
comparable and even similar at times, only that they offer different ideas in terms of 
politics. To begin, art is not political in the same way that a strike or demonstration is 
political. Rather, art is political to the degree that it maintains the tension in the paradox 
between its autonomy and heteronomy. Put differently, the distance art maintains from 
everyday life is the condition of its reconfiguration of that life. Thus, while both art and 
politics are disruptions, ruptures, disidentifications and reconfigurations of the sensible 
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order, the politics of art, in presenting a counterworld, is what Rancière calls a 
metapolitics (2004b). This counterworld, in other words, is the metapolitics of a sensory 
community. It is the bringing together of equality and bodies; modes of speaking, hearing, 
thinking, doing, being that present the possibility of new relationships with the sensible 
world. The politics of art, then, is a manner of doing politics. In his discussion of literature, 
Rancière (2004d, 10) puts it as follows: 
The syntagma “politics of literature” means that literature “does” politics 
as literature – there is a specific link between politics as a definite way of 
doing and literature as a definite practice of writing. 
Art, in this sense, is a sensible instantiation of equality: “Le libre jeu – ou la neutralisation 
– esthétique définit un mode d’expérience inédit, porteur d’une nouvelle forme 
d’universalité et d’égalité sensibles” (Rancière 2004b, 133).161 
 
The Taking Place of Art 
 
As I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, there is a commonly held belief among 
anthropologists, as well as many others in the humanities and social sciences, that art 
offers a voice to the marginalized and oppressed by which to contest their exclusion and 
misrepresentation, and assert their identity and/or difference. Yet, as I hope to have 
suggested, to reduce the politics of art to the assertion of identity would be to revert back 
to the “identity politics” of the police logic, an act which runs the risk of depoliticizing art 
                                                
161 “Aesthetic  free play – or neutralization – defines a novel mode of experience that bears within 
it a new form of ‘sensible’ universality and equality” (Rancière 2009b, 99). 
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in the process: It is to deny art its own politics by inscribing it within the narrative of an 
already constituted politics (Rancière 2004c).162 The counterworld that emerges within 
aesthetic art is the taking place of politics, the emergence of a polemical place distinct 
from the spatio-temporal world of the police logic. It is a fictional world founded on the 
equality of anyone and everything, and must be seen as a figurative and poetic 
configuration. It is here that place re-emerges without identity, outside of the police order 
or partage du sensible. 
The first half of this chapter demonstrates that the police logic or partage du 
sensible has clear and distinct spatial dimensions throughout Rancière’s writings.163 From 
La Mésentente, in which the police logic is understood as an ordering of bodies and 
capacities that assigns people to particular places and roles, functions and identities, 
throughout his writings on art, Rancière continues to refer to these spatial dimensions of 
the police logic or partage du sensible. Looking more closely, in identifying its wholeness 
                                                
162 Here Rancière (2004c, 60) is discussing the idea of “committed art”: “An artist can be 
committed, but what does it mean to say that his [sic] art is committed? Commitment is not a 
category of art”. 
163 The following is deeply indebted to the essay by Mustapha Dikeç (2005), “Space, Politics and 
the Political,” which encouraged me to re-read Rancière’s La Mésentente with particular attention 
to his shifting uses of “espace,” “lieu” and “place”. In the English translation of this book, 
Disagreement, the use of place (lieu) is largely absent from many passages. Compare, for example, 
this crucial passage: “Pour qu’un chose soit politique, il faut qu’il donne lieu à la rencontre de la 
logique policière et de la logique égalitaire, laquelle n’est jamais préconstituée” (Rancière 1995, 
56) with: “For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian 
logic that is never set up in advance” (Rancière 1999, 32). While this translation is not wrong, the 
frequency and significance of lieu, especially in these same pages (11 times on pages 56-57), 
arguably merits a more subtle consideration of its significance in Rancière’s conception of 
politics: in other words, “donne lieu” can also be read as ‘giving place to’. As I will show, there are 
clearer and less contentious instances where lieu/place is crucial to Rancière’s politics. As Dikeç 
(2005) notes, Rancière carefully distinguishes between espace, lieu and place throughout La 
Mésentente.  
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and closure, the police logic or partage du sensible seeks for each part to have its proper 
place (place). As Dikeç (2005, 181) puts it: 
The space of the police is space as emptiness, as stasis, a fixed and inert 
“container” geometrically divisible into discrete and mutually exclusive 
parts, the sum of which gives the count that is equal to the “whole” to be 
governed. It is, in spatial terms, the embodiment of geometrical reason, of 
administrative rationality, inviolable and sharply partitioned. It spatially 
articulates identities (logic of identification) and distributes them to their 
proper places (logic of the proper), and this displaces, through placement, 
the disruption of politics through an exhaustive ordering of space.  
This wholeness and closure may be composed of individuals, social groups with 
particular interests, or communities provided with recognition of their identities. It is a 
relatively tolerant whole so long as each individual, group and community is properly 
placed, that is, cognizant of their functions, roles, capacities. Politics, as I have argued in 
this chapter, is the disidentification with this temporal and spatial partition of bodies and 
capacities, but also its reconfiguration and the appearance of new capacities. For politics 
to emerge, there has to be a meeting of two logics, the police logic and the logic of 
equality. Yet we must not forget that, politics is not external to the police logic, and is not 
separate from the spatial distribution of proper places. Rather, this reconfiguration 
emerges within the spatial logic of the police order. According to Rancière (1995, 56): 
La politique agit sur la police. Elle agit dans des lieux et avec des mots qui 
leur sont communs, quitte à refigurer ces lieux et à changer le statut de ces 
mots. Ce qui est habituellement posé comme le lieu du politique, à savoir 
l’ensemble des institutions de l’État, n’est précisément pas un lieu 
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homogène. Sa configuration est déterminée par un état des rapports entre 
la logique politique et la logique policière.164 
If the place (lieu) of politics is a contested and heterogeneous place, the meeting of two 
logics or two worlds that determine its configuration, then it follows that there is no pure 
space of politics, as there is no full closure of the police logic. As a reconfiguration of the 
spatial order, however, politics does not act in the spatial order of the police – the lack of 
separation is not to suggest their identity, but an in-between (un entre-deux; Rancière 
1998a, 119) of those identities assigned by the spatial logic of the police order: 
“intervalles construits entre des identités, entre des lieux et des places” (Rancière 1995, 
186).165 Yet, as the disruption and reconfiguration of the spatial order of the police, these 
intervals are the taking place of politics, the making of space into a place for addressing a 
wrong and demonstrating equality. It is a place that has no proper place, and one that 
cannot be determined in advance. This is not a literal place, as in a square or public 
meeting hall – these would be determinations of places for politics and thus the erasure 
of politics. Rather, place here is a functional space, an indeterminate space that emerges 
                                                
164 “Politics acts on the police. It acts in the places and with the words that are common to both, 
even if it means reshaping those places and changing the status of those words. What is usually 
posited as the space of politics, meaning the set of state institutions, is precisely not a 
homogeneous place. Its configuration is determined by the state of relations between political 
logic and police logic” (Rancière 1999, 33). 
165 “Intervals constructed between identities, between spaces and places” (Rancière 1999, 137). 
Dikeç (2005) points out that this enmeshing of the police and politics permits Rancière to avoid 
attributing to politics an ontological status, which, as will be recalled, is the issue with the idea of 
a “political difference” (la/le politique).  
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in those intervals in-between identities. As Rancière (1998a, 241) states, “Le travail 
essential de la politique est la configuration de son propre espace”.166 
By presenting a counterworld, or metapolitics of a sensory community, political 
art is the disruption of the self-evident of the sensible world by allowing us to see the 
world differently: 
 
L’art n’est pas politique d’abord par les messages et les sentiments qu’il 
transmet sur l’ordre du monde. Il n’est pas politique non plus par la 
manière dont il représente les structures de la société, les conflits ou les 
identités des groupes sociaux. Il est politique par l’écart même qu’il prend 
par rapport à ces fonctions, par le type de temps et d’espace qu’il institue, 
par la manière dont il découpe ce temps et peuple cet espace (Rancière 
2004, 37).167 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In the following chapter I will explore the arguments outlined by Rancière in the context 
of my fieldwork research with Palestinian artists in Israel. Importantly, my turn to 
Rancière and the framework he offered was undertaken during my fieldwork as I was 
faced by the refusal of these artists to have their work interpreted in terms of identity 
politics. Being completely unacquainted with his writings prior to my fieldwork, my 
                                                
166 “The essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space” (Rancière 2010a, 37). 
167 “Art is not, in the first instance, political because of the messages and sentiments it conveys 
concerning the state of the world. Neither is it political because of the manner in which it might 
choose to represent society’s structures or social groups, their conflicts or identities. It is political 
because of the very distance it takes with respect to these functions, because of the type of space 
and time that it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space” 
(Rancière 2009b, 23). 
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reading of Rancière developed alongside my conversations with these artists, some of 
whom, I quickly discovered, were already familiar with his work. Even those who were not 
familiar with him or his work, as I shared with them the ideas he was outlining there was a 
near immediate approval and a rapport was established, with a couple of the artists 
asking me to share with them his books and articles. As such, there was often a degree of 
co-theorizing (or co-philosophy to use the term of Paul Radin) taking place within my 
fieldwork, with conversations often centered on a number of key points within Rancière’s 
arguments. This “collaborative” process inevitably led me to approach his writings with 
particular questions and problems in mind, with my returning to these artists to further 
develop their relevance and limits (see Strohm 2012). As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, there was a strong resonance between this theoretical framework and the 
works of these artists. If my attempt to rethink the politics of contemporary art of 
Palestinian artists in Israel goes beyond accepted models, both in terms of anthropology 
as well as Palestinian discourse on politics, it is done with the hope that my 
interpretations of their practices and works allows for the taking place of politics they are 
staging.  
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Sharif Waked: Rupture 
 
Before starting my research I had read about Sharif Waked and his work, how the 
Guggenheim had recently purchased his piece, To be continued…, (Figure 19) and how he 
was emerging as an eminent Palestinian artist on the international art scene. When I 
started my fieldwork I was unaware, however, that he lived in Haifa, indeed in the same 
neighborhood as myself. My friend Riyad, who worked at Elika, a well-known café in the 
area, and who knows Sharif, told me he often passed by in the evenings, usually to have a 
couple beers, and that he’d let me know the next time he was there so I could come by to 
meet him. I asked Riyad to in the meantime let him know about me and that I’d be 
interesting in meeting and talking with him. Not shortly thereafter Riyad told me he 
talked with Sharif, but that he was reticent about meeting with me: “He said he doesn’t 
like interviews,” Riyad said. “But did you tell him I’m an anthropologist, not a journalist?” 
It seems Riyad had told him as much, and it mattered little. At that point Riyad and I 
conspired to have me run into Sharif when he was at the café. There seemed no other way 
he was going to meet me, and it seemed to me regrettable to have him living in the area 
and not be part of my research. And given his reticence for interviews, I knew I had to 
prepare myself.  
Some weeks later Riyad gave me a call: “Come, he’s here.” I quickly grabbed my 
coat and headed out the door, unfortunately forgetting my notebook in the rush, which 
was probably for the better. When I arrived at Elika Sharif was sitting at the bar, a beer in 
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hand. As I took a seat adjacent to him and ordered a beer, Riyad introduced us. Sharif 
already seemed to have an idea of who I was, and did not appear all that surprised I had 
conveniently shown up. We greeted each other and, before I had a chance to ask him 
about his work, he immediately launched into asking me what my research was about, 
not something that I was unaccustomed to (everyone new to the neighborhood went 
through a vetting process, a sort of process of identification regarding one’s allegiances 
and affiliations). Our conversation then took a more indirect path, my avoiding any 
outward indications that I was interviewing him, he, understandably, seeming to want to 
avoid any customary or conventional question and answer session; he was, after all, out 
for a beer, to relax. As we talked, there was a moment in our conversation that stuck out, 
something I kept recalling for days and months after. After telling me about his work 
recently being acquired by the Guggenheim in New York City, I asked Sharif how it was 
labeled: “Sharif Waked: Palestinian? Palestinian Israeli? Arab Israeli? Israeli?” Sharif 
paused and very matter-of-factly answered, “I don’t know; it doesn’t matter.”  
Sharif and I had met a few times over the next year, mostly over a beer and each 
time him promising to invite me to his home to see his work. Nearly a year after our first 
meeting, with some not-so-subtle prodding on the part of friends, Sharif finally did invite 
me to his apartment to look and talk about his work. Joined by his wife Sherene, we 
talked about art, Rancière, other Palestinian artists living and working in Israel, about 
why his work was different from many of these artists, and most importantly, about how I 
should not get caught up with questions of identity when looking at contemporary 
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Palestinian art. As we talked about other artists, including those with whom I had been 
working, Sharif was unforgiving in his comments about their work. As we discussed many 
of these artists he noted that there work remained unsophisticated and too literal in their 
politics. Showing him Michael’s painting Fragile (Figure 12) he was unimpressed and said 
that, while he respected him as a painter, the work itself was boring and obvious. When I 
then asked him about the difficulties Palestinian artists face in Israel, both in terms of 
exposure and funding, he was even less forgiving by suggesting that if they were good 
enough this would not be a problem: “No one is stuck here, you have to get your work 
abroad, it’s a global art world now.” When I asked him more precisely about the 
difficulties for artists in Israel, particularly in terms of funding and support, he replied, 
ever so slightly exasperated: “We [Palestinians] can’t blame everything on Israel.” 
Finally he asked if I wanted to see his work, to which I enthusiastically replied, “of 
course!” He promptly sat me down at the side of the room in front of his computer and 
put on Chic Point, a video installation from 2003 (Figure 20). This was followed by To be 
continued… (2009), then a series of shorter pieces, some finished, others still in progress, 
including the mesmerizing Beace Brocess (2010; Figure 23). What captured my interest 
that afternoon was To be continued…, a piece that was bought by the Guggenheim, and 
which we discussed the first time we met. It is also a piece that, as of late, has started to 
garner significant attention. As Sharif started the video he gave me only a couple details, 
the two key elements of the video, specifically the narration being 1001 Arabian Nights 
and the video being looped. As I watched it I was admittedly unsure what to look at: I 
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listened to the story being told, I looked closely at our story-teller, the person sitting 
before me reading 1001 Arabian Nights, trying to imagine what it would be like to see this 
installation in a museum such as the Guggenheim in New York City. At one point, after 
watching for about 10 minutes, Sharif passed nearby to let me know that the video lasts 
41:33, and again reiterating that it will loop, after which I slowly became self-conscious 
sitting there watching a video as he and his wife went about their day.  
In the end I didn’t watch the entire video, and yet despite this I left that day with a 
vivid impression of the impasse between the visual and the audible. More than that was 
the temporal suspension, not just in this work, but in all of Sharif’s works, from his video 
installations to his prints. Having watched not only this video work but also three others, 
including an in-progress work, Beace Brocess, I was struck and curious by the prominence 
given to time throughout his work.  In what is becoming an extensive body of work, the 
question of time is deployed in various manners, each inviting a timelessness, whether 
through the slow unfolding within Jericho First (Figure 21; 22), Chic Point with a 
checkpoint turned into a fashion run way (Figure 20), Beace Brocess, a looped blue and 
white video that transforms Arafat and Barak shaking hands into them dancing in a circle 
that never ends (Figure 23), or To be continued… (Figure 19). For all his emphasis on time, 
however, I was never able to get much time with Sharif.   
That particular afternoon with Sharif was the longest and most extensive time we 
had spent together and he was unusually more open and talkative than usual. That said, 
he often would never answer my questions, instead changing the subject or not 
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responding at all. Fortunately he and I have stayed in touch and he has shared with me 
copies of his video works and in return I have shared with him the texts I’ve written in 
which I discuss his work. He hasn’t responded to these in general, but when I do give more 
precise comments he will acknowledge them, often thanking me for pointing out 
something he hadn’t seen. He seems more interested in seeing how his work is discussed 
than in offering an “authorial” voice.  
As I slowly discovered during my fieldwork, between those times of seeing Sharif 
and trying to pin him down for another meeting, was that he was quite actively involved 
in the Palestinian community. I found out about this through mutual friends working at 
Adalah, who happened to also point out that he did all their graphic design work for all of 
their publications. He was also involved as artistic consultant and designer in Elia 
Suleiman’s, The Time that Remains: Chronicle of a Present Absentee. 
Of all the artists with whom I worked, Sharif was the only “present absentee,” born 
in Nazareth to parents who were refugees from Saffuriyya. He never mentioned this to me, 
nor for that matter much else about his past. As I thought about his and his family’s status 
as present absentees, about the area of Nazareth in which they settled, how he was out of 
time and out of place, a story he shares with Elia Suleiman also from the same area of 
Nazareth and a present absentee as well, the issue of time, expressed most often in 
repetitions and silences. My conversations with Sharif are to be continued.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Sharif Waked, To be continued…, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Sharif Waked, Chic Point, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Sharif Waked, Chic Point, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Sharif Waked, Jericho First, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Sharif Waked, Jericho First 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Sharif Waked, Beace Brocess, 2010 
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Chapter 5: The Politics of Palestinian Art in Israel 
 
“In the eyes of Jews I’m an Arab, in the eyes of the Muslims I’m a Christian, and 
Christians are not really Arabs.” -Michael Halak  
 
 
The Temptations of Identity 
 
Some months before I had left the field, during a conversation with Michael, he told me 
about an exhibition being organized on his work at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art. The 
exhibition was to be part of the prestigious Rappaport Prize he had won as young Israeli 
artist of 2011.168  He told me the curator would be preparing a text for the show and that 
he would send me a copy as soon as he received it. About a year later he sent me a copy of 
the catalogue text, a proof version that awaited his approval.  
 As I read the text that accompanied the catalogue, entitled Michael Halak: Faces 
and Landscapes, I was surprised and encouraged to see that many of the ideas presented 
in the catalogue were similar to those in my own research. Yet, there was also something 
troubling about the interpretation of Michael’s work as put forth by the curator of the 
exhibit, Efrat Livny. From my conversations with Michael I sensed that he too was 
uncomfortable with certain aspects of this text, which seemed torn between wanting to 
                                                
168 The Rappaport Prize, in the name of Ruth and Baruch Rappaport, is an annual award for 
recognizing two artists, one for an established painter and one for a young painter. The prize 
includes a money award and an exhibition at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art and accompanying 
catalogue. As the media reported, Michael was the first “Arab-Israeli” to have won the prize. The 
exhibition opened 16 March 2012 and ran until 25 August 2012. 
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reaffirm Michael’s art as a manifestation of his identity and the need to acknowledge his 
art as an act of disidentification. It seems she was struggling to find a vocabulary that 
would capture or give a sense to Michael’s own refusal of identification but inescapably 
she was pulled back to the idea of art as a statement about his identity. Situating his work 
within the idea of what she refers to as the “present-absent,” and with reference to 
Rancière, Livny (2012, viii) writes: 
The anger of being silenced is thus redefined by means of a new division: 
the existence “in-between” ceases to shape a bi-furcated identity, and 
allows for a simultaneous experience of identification and disidentification, 
of belonging and not-belonging. The subjective presence in these paintings 
is not shaped by the figure’s identity as an Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, or 
Christian but rather by its simultaneous definition as Israeli and non-Israeli, 
Palestinian and non-Palestinian, Arab and non-Arab, Christian and non-
Christian. In this manner it ceases to represent multiple, competing 
identities, and ruptures the hierarchical structure within which they are 
organized. 
According to Livny, then, Halak’s work is an act of identification and disidentification, 
both a matter of identity and a non-identity that is exposed through the dialectic of 
presence and absence. Intriguingly, her reference to the category of the “present 
absentee” is crucial to her analysis of Michael’s work. Livny has transformed the term, I 
would even say, mistranslated it. In referring to David Grossman’s book Sleeping on a Wire, 
which is the title for the English translation of the original book in Hebrew, םידקפנ םיחכונ 
(Nokhekhim Nifkadim or Present Absentees), she not only translates it as “present absent” 
(“which may be translated as…”) but also claims it to be a “paraphrase” of the “term 
absent-present, which was coined in the 1950s in Israel” (Livny 2012, vii). This particular 
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rendering (and mistranslation) is not only present in the English translation of the 
trilingual catalogue, but also in the original Hebrew and the Arabic translation. In an 
effort to frame Michael’s work as a paradox of present and absent, Livny drops the “ee” 
from absentee.   
This slight maneuver might not seem to be significant at first glance, a mere 
matter of grammar, but I would argue that this grammatical maneuver allows Livny to set 
up her argument around the play between identification and disidentification, identity 
and non-identity, and finally Palestinians in Israel as present and absent. It is a 
grammatical decision, moreover, that effectively depolitcizes and dehistoricizes the 
category of “present absentee.” This is exactly what Livny does in her discussion of the 
painting by Michael, in which two men, their backs turned toward the spectator, are seen 
urinating on a cactus shrub, a cultural motif for Palestinians that was appropriated by 
Jewish Israel society as symbol of the “Sabra” or New Jew (Abufarha 2008). As Livny (2012, 
xi-xii) explains: 
Neither of these young men is characterized by any attributes that reveal 
their ethnic or national identity; they are almost identically dressed in jeans 
and white t-shirts, and are both wearing sunglasses. The choice to depict 
them urinating on the prickly-pear plants acquires a double meaning; on 
the one hand, it may be read as an attempt to strip this plant of its symbolic 
Israeli-Palestinian charge, to ridicule it – and perhaps also to deride the 
national identities it represents and to express a sense of revulsion towards 
them. At the same time, this act alludes to the manner in which animals, 
and especially members of the feline family, commonly define their 
territory and establish their control over, and connection to, a specific place. 
In either case, it seems that when Halak chooses to situate his figures in a 
local landscape, his paintings become even more noticeably charged with 
the central tension that shapes both his life and his work – the question of 
the connection between man and place, and related concerns regarding 
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presence and absence, identification disidentification, witnessing and 
silencing, memory and intentionally imposed oblivion. 
Here Livny acknowledges that their identities are unknown, that to determine these 
figures is impossible. Yet, she then proceeds to interpret the piece in terms of identity 
politics by reinserting the play between identification and disidentification, presence and 
absence. Is it possible that there is no identity at work in this work of art? What would it 
look like to interpret this same work without reverting to questions of identification?  
 This particular permutation of “present absentee” is also visible in a recent article 
by Sunaina Maira and Magid Shihade, “Hip Hop from ’48 Palestine: Youth, Music and the 
Present/Absent.” As with Livny, Maira and Shihade (2012, 5) interpret the colonial 
category of present absentee as “present/absent,” with the addition of a slash between 
the two to underline the “constant shifting” between them. The aim of the authors is to 
use the category of present absentee in order to capture the liminal condition of 
Palestinians in Israel: “This state of exception has had ongoing implications for how ’48 
Palestinians inhabit, think through, and challenge their present/absence” (Ibid., 5). In 
their eyes, hip-hop, as a form of embodied political critique, represents a concrete means 
of challenging the injustice brought on by the presence/absence of Palestinians. Thus, for 
Maira and Shihade, the category of the present absentee is positioned as a state of 
presence/absence within which all Palestinians in Israel live and struggle against, and 
hip-hop is seen as a tool for combatting this problem. I would argue, however, that like 
Livny, their reliance on identity as a justification for equality only tends to further 
depoliticize a category which is, in Rancière’s terms, a place where politics takes place.  
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While I agree with the idea of thinking through the present absentee more broadly, as a 
concept for making sense of the social and political condition of Palestinians in Israel at 
large, I think there is reason to be concerned about the use of models that reduce the 
work of art as an affirmation or manifestation of identity, even if they call attention to the 
multiple nature of identities that Palestinian artists feel compelled to claim.  
 There is no doubt that Palestinians in Israel are living in a regime of 
presence/absence, but this should not, I would argue, be conflated with the category of 
the present absentee. Maira and Shihade’s (2012) argument is that hip-hop among the 
Palestinians in Israel, primarily through its lyrics, reasserts the presence of a Palestinian 
identity against its absence and invisibility, both in Israel and in the Palestinian 
community further abroad. This form of resistance criticizes those narratives and policies 
of the Israeli state that claim it to be democratic and inclusive by countering with an 
alienated Palestinian identity whose objective is to reconnect those Palestinians inside 
Israel with Palestinians “outside,” in the Occupied Territories and the diaspora. What 
makes these acts political, according to this logic, is the assertion of a particular identity, 
a difference.  As I have argued, this assertion of difference is precisely what depoliticizes 
the situation of Palestinians in Israel, since identity politics is always in danger of being 
recuperated by the social that Rancière refers to as the “logic of the police”. In short, 
identity claims remain within the logic of the given sensible order by being that which is 
countable and recognizable, precisely the means by which the state sustains what is 
seeable, sayable, doable, thinkable. The trouble here, as with Livny, is a broader 
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disciplinary tendency that stretches across anthropology, cultural studies and art 
criticism; it is the inescapable trap of identity politics within our practices and theories, an 
unspoken fear that without identity claims politics will disappear.  
I would contend that the political moment within the hip hop of Palestinians in 
Israel is not in the identity being asserted but rather the taking place of the hip hop 
performance as spectacle, an act prior to any form of identification. For instance, when 
hip-hop groups such as DAM perform on Israeli television, it is their “appearing” within a 
society and public culture from which they are absent that politics begins to take place, 
much more so than what is being said. It is the appearing of a figure that is out of time 
and out of place by which the fabric of the sensible order is ruptured. Without wanting to 
belittle the work of DAM and other hip-hop artists who are speaking out about the 
Palestinian cause, the lyrics within their songs tell most Palestinians about a situation 
with which they are intimately aware. Indeed, when I would talk about Palestinian hip 
hop with friends among the artistic community, they all laughed and told me that the 
lyrical content of their music is completely obvious and nothing which Palestinians in 
Israel, and arguably most Jewish Israelis, find particularly new. As Nardeen once told me: 
“They are not telling us anything we don’t already know.” 
From the hip hop of DAM, who take on capacities that they were not supposed to 
possess, to Michael’s paintings where identities are not given, what emerges is the 
appearing of a figure that is disruptive. It is at this juncture that the appropriation of the 
figure of the present absentee, a figure out of place and out of time par excellence, is most 
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visible. In other words, the political potential within the category of the present 
absentee – an appropriation of a colonial name as a form of political subjectivity – is 
subverted and juxtaposed to the regime of identification that sustains the order of Israeli 
society, its partage du sensible. My aim now is to understand this process by which the 
category of the present absentee is being appropriated and how this process entails an 
enactment of an impossible identification, a heterology that denies given categories and 
roles.  
The present absentee is a compound of an adjective (present) and a noun 
(absentee), specifically an attributive adjective and a proper noun. To start, the absentee 
refers to a person or persons who were required and expected to be present in a specific 
place but were not. It does not refer to a state or condition but to a person or people that 
were out of place. The attributive adjective “present” then qualifies and defines this noun, 
this person or people. As an attributive adjective “present” refers to a temporality, an 
existing or occurring now of those persons not in their place. It is important to remember 
that this temporal period is quite specific, between the UN date of partition and the 
establishment of the state. Again, this is not “present” as in here and now, but present at 
a designated time. In qualifying the absentee qua person or people, the attributive 
adjective “present” further delimits these people within a specific period of time. The 
present absentee describes a person or people that were not in those places required or 
expected during a definite time period. The effect of the attributive adjective “present” is 
that it excludes anything coming before or after. Falling under this designation, no claims 
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to property, home or land could be made even with proof of ownership, such as a deed or 
title. To be “in time” would have meant being in the right place, given their inability to be 
in their required or expected place, these people had no claim to their land, either past or 
present. 
 The following section of this chapter will delve further into this notion of the 
present absentee as a polemical and political gesture, how this colonial category is being 
appropriated by Palestinian artists in Israel as a figure of political subjectivity, as an 
impossible identification that ruptures the sensible order. The next section will continue 
this exploration by turning to a selection of works from the artists with whom I worked 
and how these works can be seen as acts of disruption of the sensible order. While my aim 
here is largely descriptive, I will also be providing an analysis of these works, both as art 
objects and as political gestures. In the subsequent section I will then consider how these 
sensible disruptions can be seen as the taking place of politics, that is, how they rupture, 
suspend, and interrupt various aspects of the spatial and temporary configuration of 
Israeli society. In the final section I will return to the idea of the appropriation of the 
category of the present absentee as an act of political subjectivation in which an 
“impossible identification” becomes the condition for reimagining the common and 
being-in-common.   
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The Figure of the Present Absentee 
 
One cool afternoon in February 2011 I was sitting with friends at Elika where many 
Palestinian writers, actors, artists and intellectuals would spend their time. The 
conversation that afternoon covered a wide variety of topics, but as usual it eventually 
gravitated toward matters having to do with politics. At one point, after the group began 
teasing the one person in the group from Nazareth, the conversation turned to those 
people from Saffuriyya. A village that was completely destroyed and cleansed in 1948, 
most of the community of Saffuriyya fled to Lebanon, while those who stayed settled on 
the edges of Nazareth in the overcrowded Safafri quarter, only a few kilometres from their 
village. Those who remained were forbidden from returning to their village and were 
henceforth identified by the Israeli government as “present absentees,” internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  Palestinians in Israel generally referred to these people as 
refugees (Arabic: laji’een) or exiles/displaced (Arabic: mub’ad) or estranged (Arabic: 
ghurba), those who were physically present but legally absent in relation to their homes 
and lands at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel.169  
While I was aware of the story of Saffuriyya and the historical and political 
background of the “present absentee,” as the conversation continued I was caught off-
guard by my friend Adi’s proclamation, in English—“we are all present absentees”—which 
was immediately affirmed by nearly everyone at the table: “sahh” (right, true). This struck 
                                                
169 Following its destruction in 1949, the village was planted over in pine trees and renamed 
Tzippori; in the present official history of the village no mention is made of its Arab or modern 
history – official history jumps from the Roman and Byzantine period, with a brief mention of the 
Crusades, to the present, without a word about Ottoman or Arab periods.  
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me as a provocative statement insofar as the present absentee category was typically 
reserved specifically for those Palestinians that were internally displaced and forbidden 
to return to their villages after 1948, but none of the people sitting around the table were 
personally affected by this status. Indeed, the emergence of the present absentee as a 
political issue since the late 1990s as part of a larger discussion of the refugee problem 
(Jamal 2011) underlined the significance of their plight, thus appropriating this category 
for all Palestinians therefore struck me as odd. And yet, Adi wasn’t merely being flippant; 
his statement was intended as a performance of a particular political gesture. In addition, 
he was fully aware of force of the ideological statement “we are all…”. In other words, his 
speech act was not merely a novel utterance, but also a political gesture.170 What did it 
mean to appropriate this category and generalize it to all Palestinians in Israel? Moreover, 
isn’t it possible that this appropriation would run the risk of belittling the struggle of 
those legally classified as present absentees? Finally, what did it mean to make this claim 
neither in Arabic nor in Hebrew, but in English, a third language for Palestinians in 
Israel?171  
                                                
170  It later occurred to me that Adi was making an implicit reference to the uprisings in Egypt and 
the declaration, “We are all Khaled Saïd.” 
171 As was pointed out to me by Sawsan Zaher, a lawyer at Adalah, the notion of “present 
absentee” is rarely if ever used in spoken Arabic outside it being a legal term, and often in 
quotation: hadereen ‘aebeen. As noted above, either refugee (Arabic: laji’een) or exiles/displaced 
(Arabic: mub’ad) or estrangement (Arabic: ghurba) are the words used by Palestinians in Israel 
when discussing the present absentee. Hence Adi’s switch to English, not even Hebrew, is 
significant not only in terms of is talking to me but to a table of Arabic, Hebrew and English 
speakers. As I will show, this choice of register is central to the overturning of this category as a 
polemical or political gesture.  
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As discussed in chapter 1, the demands of present absentees in Israel that 
emerged over the last 20 years centered on giving visibility to IDPs, a group that has been 
neglected in various peace talks and discussions of the Palestinian refugee question more 
broadly. As such it has become the cornerstone of the demand for collective rights of a 
national indigenous minority. In Adi’s proclamation there is surely an allusion to this 
emergence of the present absentee as somehow related to the Palestinians in Israel, also 
to the fact that the plight of the internal refugees is not limited to them but is a situation 
that confronts all Palestinians. In appropriating this category, in overturning it, however, 
it is not in order to explain or define a condition but to mark an event of political 
subjectivation.  
So far I have claimed that the category of the present absentee is an irreducible 
utterance. As such it is impossible to divide the two words in this unit and to transform it 
into a play of presence and absence, even though this play clearly reflects a certain aspect 
of contemporary Palestinian experience. The logic of the category of the present absentee 
has the hallmarks of what Giorgio Agamben (1998) has referred to as an “inclusive 
exclusion.” For Agamben the original exclusion of bare life from political life has become a 
logic of “inclusive exclusion” or what he also refers to as the “ban.” The exclusion of “bare 
life,” a state of being stripped of any legal quality, is, according to Agamben (1998, 23), at 
the same time, an inclusion: the excluded is part of the space of the polis itself: 
He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and 
made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and 
threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, 
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become indistinguishable. It is literally impossible to say whether the one 
who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order.   
This is the basis of Agamben’s conception of biopolitics, which he sees as constitutive of 
the political sphere itself. Indeed, for Agamben (1998, 68) the state of exception is the very 
horizon of political existence in modern life (the rule of modernity): “we are all virtually 
homines sacri”. Agamben (2000) reasons that only politics conceived as a means without 
end, of potential beings not founded on identity, can overcome the violence of this 
inclusive exclusion (see Agamben 1993). While this framework is surely relevant to 
understanding the present absentee as a historical and political category, what precisely 
constitutes these “potential beings” and how their presence might signal a new age of a 
non-juridical politics remains underdeveloped.172 More significantly, however, by framing 
the rule of modernity in terms of the bare life of a normalized state of exception, Agamben 
has arguably precluded the possibility of politics as dissensus. The limitations 
encountered here are addressed by considering the question of what happens when 
categories of actors not designated by the status of present absentee appropriate this 
category for aesthetic or political purposes. It is here that a politics as dissensus takes 
form. 
The performative force of the affirmation “we are all present absentees,” by 
creating an equivalency between the present absentee and the we, dislocates the 
specificity of the category of the present absentee, releasing it from designated order of 
                                                
172 For a consideration of the limitations of Agamben’s thought for thinking politics, see e.g. Bailey 
(2009), Laclau (2009) and Selmeczi (2012).  
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the state and its regime of identification.173 By aligning itself with a name that cannot be 
appropriated, the gesture reveals an impossible identification. The we are not present 
absentees but the anyone and everyone. This means that the appropriation of the present 
absentee, as that which cannot be appropriated, is an impropriety. It is a polemical 
gesture in which a political subject appears.    
The we is such that anyone and everyone are now seen as present absentees, what 
might be better put as the impossibility of inclusiveness (of including all people). To be 
sure, when I pressed Adi that day to specify what he meant by this we, he said: “Hada. Kull 
wahad” (Anyone. Everyone). As I have suggested, the impropriety of appropriating a 
category that is in-appropriable makes it into an impossible identification. Thus, this 
alignment also entails that the present absentee assigns to the we a property by 
identifying it. If the present absentee is out of place and out of time, then the we that 
stands for it is also out of place and time. As Rancière (1999, 59) puts it: “Neither the we or 
the identity assigned to it, nor the apposition of the two defines a subject”. In other 
words, the identity assigned to the we is an impossible identification. The appropriation 
of this category through the affirmation “we are all present absentees” thus overturns the 
colonial category by opening a gap between the two, between a designated identity and 
                                                
173 One of the first uses of this phrasing, “we are all…” was in May 1968 in Paris. As one of the 
leaders of the student movement at the time, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, was attacked by opponents on 
the basis of his being a German Jew and barred from re-entering France after a brief absence. In 
his defense, student protesters took up the ideological slogan “Nous sommes tous des Juifs 
allemands” (“We are all German Jews”). In an anonymous writing published at the time, Maurice 
Blanchot referred to these events follows: “Never has this been previously said anywhere, never at 
any time: it was an inaugural moment of speech, opening and overturning borders, opening, 
overthrowing the future” (Blanchot cited in Hill 1997, 219). (See also chapter 3.) 
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anyone and everyone. By aligning and equating a people out of place and out of time with 
an unspecified and indeterminate anyone and everyone, this affirmation becomes a 
disruptive political gesture, and, as we will see, a verification of equality.  
The act of appropriating this colonial category through the affirmation, “we are all 
present absentees,” can be seen, following Rancière, as an event of political 
subjectivation. It is an argumentative demonstration of a wrong by those who have no 
part (part sans-part). In being appropriated by Palestinians in Israel who are not legally 
present absentees, a collective body is formed with the anyone and everyone of the “we.” 
But there is more to this affirmation as a process or event of political subjectivation; 
political subjectivation further demands a taking place, a staging of the affirmation “we 
are all present absentees.” The argumentative and polemical affirmation also entails the 
transformation of the space of the regime of identification of the present absentee into a 
space for the appearing of a political subject. 
 
Appearing 
 
The polemical gesture of affirming “we are all present absentees” is but the first step in 
the process of political subjectivation. Another key factor in this process is that of 
appearing or making visible. Here politics as appearance and visibility counters the 
interpellation of the police that says: “Move along! There is nothing to see here!” 
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(Rancière 2010a, 37). The aim of the police logic is to dismantle the taking place of politics 
as appearing and visibility by returning bodies to their proper places and capacities.  
The process of political subjectivation in Rancière has a distinctive theatrical 
quality: “… je pense que la politique a toujours plus ou moins la forme d’une constitution 
d’un théâtre” (Rancière 2004, 4).174 When he refers to politics as the “affirmation of a 
capacity for appearance” (Rancière and Hallward 2003, 202), there is a clear sense that 
this space is the taking place of politics: “The essential work of politics is the 
configuration of its own space” (Rancière 2010a, 37). While such acts can take the form of 
demonstrations, strikes, occupations, or the space of art itself, the aim is principally a 
claim to visibility (taken broadly to include being seen and heard). As Peter Hallward 
(2006, 118) has provocatively argued: “Peopled by multiple voices, the theatre is likewise 
the privileged site of a more general displacement – a place for the out-of-place”. 
Following this idea, I want to now focus more closely on the work by the artists so 
far discussed in the vignettes as “stagings” or “appearings” of a political subject, or, more 
broadly, the taking place of politics. To do this, I have chosen several works from each 
artist and how they can be viewed as processes of political subjectivation by aligning with 
the figure of the present absentee as an impossible identification. To view these works in 
this manner requires us to look at how they are spaces or stagings of the polemical 
                                                
174 Rancière’s metaphor of politics as a form of theatre needs to be distinguished from the work of 
Guy Debord (1967). For Debord, the theatre is the separation of the spectator from the work, and 
thus the task is to eradicate this separation whereby the theatre becomes a form of life of the 
community (Rancière 2008b). Debord’s concern is that theatre has come to be a social relation 
mediated by images, and not in a good way. In this sense, Debord’s Society of the Spectacle should 
be considered in the same vein as Nicholas Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics (1989). It is precisely 
this separation or distance that Rancière claims is pivotal for politics to take place.  
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utterance “we are all present absentees.” It is then through these stagings that politics 
takes place and acts of disidentification are at work. My analysis will follow what I see as 
the key tropes within works of each of these artists: suspension; interruption; distancing; 
deferral; rupture.  
 
Disidentifications 
 
Suspension  
 
I want to start with a work from Michael that I first saw when he and I met (Figure 14). This 
is not Michael’s most recent work, and arguably not his most provocative, but it does offer 
an initial stage for thinking about what I have referred to as a polemical gesture. On a 
white surface sit three green apples, forming a triangle. With one apple at the top left of 
the tableau, half of it out of the frame, the two others are placed below it, moving 
downward from left to right, both in full view, each in contact with the other. Below the 
three green apples, further down and nearly at the bottom right corner, and out of 
contact with them, is a single cherry placed below and in line with the middle of the two 
bottom apples, its stem still intact. Looking more closely, the top apple in the right 
upward corner has a small white oval decal in a downward angle with the number 48 
followed by a blue line. In this otherwise anonymous still life, the decal undoubtedly 
meant to signify the state of Israel and the year of its establishment.  
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From the top left corner is the principal light source, creating a shadow on the 
bottom right of the objects. The immediate effect is a daunting posture, the three large 
apples seemingly moving downward from left to right as if they were about to overtake 
and push the lone small cherry into a corner, literally the bottom right edge of the frame. 
In principle, a still life is not about the movement of objects but a non-hierarchical study 
of inanimate objects that are part of everyday life. Yet, in a sense, Michael’s painting both 
reinscribes a hierarchy and, at the same time, undoes it. The position of the apples 
descending from the top left, reinforced by the direction of light behind them, establishes 
a sense of movement in which the apple is dominant, assertive and overpowering. The 
cherry is outnumbered, outsized and cornered. A hierarchy has been clearly established. 
At the same time, as Michael revealed in our conversations, neither of these fruits 
are native to the land of Palestine/Israel. Both are foreign, apples being first imported and 
cultivated in the 1950s by Ashkenazi immigrants, and cherries, a staple of classic Syrian 
and Persian cuisine, and found natively only in il-Julan (the Occupied Golan), being 
cultivated since the 1980s. Being non-native, the result is that a natural hierarchy of 
belonging between the two is contingent and thus unsustainable. That is, if both are 
foreign to the land, neither has a demonstrable right to the land. The fact that these 
elements cannot be placed in a hierarchical relation, something that is not immediately 
obvious to the viewer, overturns the more visible hierarchical effect described above. In 
this way, through their suspension these elements are now out of place, an effect 
reinforced by the white surface that serves as a background. Indeed, were it not for the 
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blue and white 48 decal attached to the most top left apple, which is itself half hidden, we 
would not know where we are in terms of time or place. But what is this place other than 
a suspension of any given place? If the apples are dependent on the decal to establish 
their identity, the staging of these elements puts them out of place.  
A similar play of suspension is found across Michael’s works. In Figure 13 we again 
see three apples, this time in a glass vase within and surrounded by an orange/red box. In 
their particular placement the apples are suspended, the containment of the glass vessel 
the only means for their remaining united. Yet, this is an inherently fragile unification 
insofar as the glass vase is breakable, hence the box within which to further contain and 
protect them. It is a box whose colors signify a state of emergency, an orange/red line that 
surrounds something without ground, without a firm and definite place. Again in Figure 
12, Fragile, we see another suspension, this time that of the Blue ID carried by all Israelis. 
This ID is here attached with masking tape to a shipping box, thereby forcibly removing it 
from its context and putting it in motion, undermining its determinate location. Further, 
by remaining closed, its content unavailable to the spectator, its specific identity is put on 
hold or temporally suspended; we have to wait to know what is inside. This same trope is 
at work in Figure 11, Wadi el Salib, an old Arab quarter of Haifa that is now, in its 
fragmentation, presented on a plain brown backdrop, a spatial and temporal dislocation 
and suspension. Finally in Figure 15, Landscape, there is another suspension through a 
series of memories written on paper and attached to a wall whose concrete grain and 
texture is indeterminate: is it the separation wall, the walls of homes built in camps, the 
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vertical additions to homes? It is a memorandum written on small piece of paper that had 
been kept in a pocket, maybe shirt pocket, and unfolded and suspended, again with 
masking tape, to a surface that is unidentifiable. A final point, though no less important, is 
the ubiquitous use of masking tape by Michael to achieve some of these suspensions. As a 
popular adhesive for artists to mask areas not to be painted and easily removable without 
leaving a sticky residue, Michael transforms its function by leaving it in the work itself and 
attaching to it the role of holding things out of place and out of time. In other words, what 
was once supposed to contain the paint of the artist is now what supports the 
suspensions within the works.  
 
Interruption 
 
Living and working in Tel Aviv has earned Durar Bacri an unfavorable reputation. One 
curator I talked with dismissed his work as uninteresting and insignificant. This reaction 
to Durar and his work stems from the perception that a Palestinian Arab living and 
working in Tel Aviv, the main Jewish city of Israel, contaminates his work and diminishes 
its impact. I sat with this curator shortly after she made these comments and showed her 
Durar’s work, which she admitted to not knowing very well. As we looked and talked 
about a number of his paintings her attitude started to slowly change. At first glance 
Durar’s paintings seem to convey little to the spectator: The landscapes, portraits and 
self-portraits are outwardly nothing remarkable. This initial reaction, however, can easily 
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miss the subtlety within Durar’s work; its understated but trenchant interruption of the 
spatial order of Israeli society.  
One of the first paintings that most struck me from Durar is the piece entitled Self-
portrait with Goat (Figure 7). In what is clearly a nod to the classical Orientalist painting 
genre, this work is a landscape with what appears to be an Arab man alongside a goat. 
The landscape is rocky, not unlike that found across the central and northern areas of 
Palestine/Israel. Just to the left of center in the background is an olive tree, the only tree 
in the frame. Surrounding it are bushes and rocks, and in the foreground an open area of 
earth. The sunlight coming from the right side suggests either the end of day or its 
beginning. Standing directly in front of the tree is a young man in blue jeans and a red t-
shirt, a trimmed beard with tightly coiffed hair. Standing directly in front of this young 
man, facing away from the spectator, at forefront of the painting, closest to the spectator, 
is a goat. The young man, his body turned slightly to the right, hands in his pockets, is 
gazing downward and to the side toward a goat. His body and facial expression are 
relaxed but suggest a gaze of suspicion and doubt. Yet, although the body of the goat is 
aligned directly in front of the young man, the goat is looking elsewhere, away from the 
young man.  
 The subtle play of elements within the painting work on multiple levels. The young 
man is not the figure we are expecting or is required in an Orientalist-genre painting. He is 
dressed inappropriately. Instead of an old man in a galabia (traditional Arab robe-like 
garment) and kuffiyeh, the spectator is presented with a young man in modern dress. But 
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this isn’t any modern dress; his jeans, belt and t-shirt are all from the Israeli retail chain, 
Crocker (the emblem on the belt is the visible evidence). As I have noted already, this is a 
chain that had a policy of not hiring Arabs, yet it was not unheard of for many Palestinian 
Arabs to wear their clothing. The inappropriateness of this young man’s attire is further 
reinforced by his standing directly in front of the spectator’s view of the olive tree. In 
classical orientalist painting the Arab figure is often presented as alongside and as part of 
the landscape, thus reinforcing their traditional-ness or lack of contemporaneity.175 The 
effect of the young man blocking the spectator’s view, in addition to his attire, is the 
interruption of the spatial field with which the Arab is assigned, that is, where he or she is 
expected and required to be. 
 It would be remiss of me to not discuss the tension at the center of the painting 
between the young man and the goat. While the previously mentioned elements are 
fundamental to the structure of the painting, its mise-en-scène, the ambivalent 
relationship between the young man and the goat, by being the focal point, requires 
some commentary. It is typical in the analysis of art works to start with the subjects, 
objects or situations that are center and front in a work. The trouble is that these 
elements are not separate from that place made in the work itself. We, the spectators, are 
not sure of what is happening, what has happened, what will happen. There is a tension 
between the two: a young man looking down at the goat in what appears to be a gaze of 
contempt and disgust, or perhaps it is a playful exchange, the sharing of an inside joke, or 
perhaps it is a misunderstanding? The surrounding structure of the painting – the young 
                                                
175 I want to thank Kirsten Scheid for pointing out this aspect within this painting. 
196 
 
man inappropriately dressed and standing in the wrong place – offers hints for justifying 
each of these explanations, thus the possibility of interpretive closure is precluded. The 
play between the place created in the painting, a place where elements are out of place, 
and the relationship between the young man and the goat are indeterminable.  
 The interruption of space and the play of foreground and background is again 
found in Durar’s painting South Tel Aviv, looking from the roof, Lewinsky St. (Figure 10). 
Here an innocuous looking street view of Tel Aviv quietly places an Arabic-style arch in the 
middle of the painting. In the background is the city, sunlight behind it. As Durar pointed 
out, this sunlight gives the impression that the city is slowly overtaking the 
neighbourhood in which he lives. Again, in Self-portrait (Figure 9) we see Durar at work, in 
the middle of painting another view of Tel Aviv. Here the Palestinian Arab painter is 
making place while simultaneously breaking the continuity of the city as a Jewish space. 
In Acre’s marina (Figure 8) the spectator is presented with Akka but devoid of those 
elements that would identify it. While Durar was commissioned to do this work 
specifically without any religious symbols, once he had finished the painting he admitted 
to me how proud he was with the result. He had made a place without identity, 
interrupting any spatial configuration in a town in an accelerated process of Judaization.  
 
Distancing 
 
Maisa’s work was always an enigma to me, and this mysterious aspect of her work kept 
me coming back to it and our conversations again and again. If Maisa never said much 
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about her work, neither did her work easily reveal itself. As I noted in my vignette on 
Maisa, the work that challenged me the most was the view of a town with white lines 
(Figure 1). In a series of subdued browns, greens, greys, yellows and a bit of white, this 
painting presents a view of typical overcrowded town, not unlike what I saw throughout 
Nazareth. Homes are here built one on top another, each a different size, a different 
colour, a different shape. For the most part windows have their shades down. Electric and 
telephone lines and poles are scattered chaotically across the homes, on top of them, 
cutting in front at various angles as if to suggest a single thread running between. If the 
detail at the center are of work is meticulous, the edges of the canvas are unfinished with 
the town appearing to disappear into a small white band surrounding the work. The 
bottom is even more pronouncedly diffused, as if unfinished and unsure of its location. It 
is a chaotic image, much like the reality it depicts. But unlike Michael and Durar, Maisa is 
not a realist or hyperrealist; there is an impressionist quality to this painting. And again 
unlike Michael and Durar, there is no source of light, no dimensionality that would give a 
layer of depth to this view. There are no shaded areas, no shadows, no lights. If this were 
all there was to this painting there would still be much to say, much to think about. The 
town view that Maisa has painted was not unfamiliar to me during my fieldwork, its style 
very much in line with art students. 
Yet, what is most striking and disturbing in this painting are the four white lines 
that overlay the image and run vertically at equidistance from one another. Unlike the 
edges of the painting, which have a chaotic feel to them, these four lines, which adjoin 
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with the white edges, are clean and precise. They are incontrovertibly the cleanest lines in 
all of this painting. I’ve accepted that these lines have no determinate meaning, but 
instead must be approached from the sensible effect they create. In this painting we are 
presented with a place, though considering its faded edges and lack of dimensionality, it 
appears to be a place out of place. With the addition of these overlayed crisp white lines 
our view is sensibly disturbed: the spectator’s vision is fractured, blocked, disintegrated, 
split. The lines disrupt by segregating, dissociating and distancing the spectator. They are 
lines whose content is empty, without content, without meaning. In this way, there effect 
is sensible, without a narratability. But there is more to these lines. They give the image 
behind a depth and dimensionality. The lines are not perfectly straight lines from top to 
bottom; rather these are lines that seem to bulge in the middle and even come out of the 
canvas, as if the town behind is pushing them toward us. In this sense they give a sense of 
a space behind, albeit a space that is contained and separated from the viewer.  
Interestingly, Maisa made two paintings of this town view, one with the lines and 
one without. The one without the white lines almost never appears in galleries or 
exhibitions. But all those I talked with about the painting with the lines, none could 
articulate what it was that affected them. What they did say, however, is they felt it 
separated and distanced them from the image of the town. A variation of this sense of 
separation and distance is visible in Maisa’s portrait work as well. In Figure 2, a series of 
small sketches in pencil and charcoal, a series of bodies in various positions are depicted, 
and yet none have a face or any other identifiable trait. If and when the spectator does 
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see a face or head, it is nondescript: without eyes, without a mouth, without any features. 
The repetition of these identity-less figures, their distance from us, is all the most 
disturbing not only by their sheer repetition, but in the demand upon the spectator to 
inspect them from up close. When I first saw this series at Azad I found myself, along with 
others, standing centimeters from the work, inspecting each image, each no more than a 
few 4-5 centimeters in height, each personage in them in a lightest grey. This trope is 
apparent in Figure 3, with a similar sensible affect being produced. Even though we can 
see clearly a young man, he is neither in color nor well-defined. Indeed, the kuffiyeh 
around his neck, the only thing in the painting in color, is far more discernible. It is as if 
we, the spectators, are being kept at a distance from this person, with his identity being 
kept unclear and even unsure.  
If Maisa’s work requires that the spectator work harder to understand what is 
being presented in her works, whether by demanding that we approach the canvas up 
close or struggle to see past white lines, at the same time she undermines our efforts by 
continually refusing us entry. Put differently, the closer we get to Maisa’s works the 
further and more distant we find ourselves from them and any determinate meanings and 
identities; the closer we look for something identifiable the greater the distance. 
 
Deferral 
 
When I had first met Nardeen she had stepped away from doing art and was focused on 
making sets and costumes for theatre and film. She and I had often talked about the 
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artists I was meeting and she frequently expressed her desire to return to art, but hadn’t 
yet felt ready. In spring of 2012 she sent me a number of photos of a piece she had just 
completed and was exhibiting at the Bet Hagefen gallery in Haifa, entitled Ehtiqan (Figure 
17). I was impressed. After nearly eight years Nardeen had returned to her art practice 
with an installation that was formidable and profound. The piece is an installation 
comprising a large and oversized reflective metal funnel suspended above a small brown 
glass bottle. The material of the funnel gives the work a distinctive industrial quality: an 
oversized metal construction of multiple individual pieces held together by welding, 
rivets and screws. The top half of the funnel is a large cone at least a meter in width at the 
top, while the bottom half is a narrower and longer nozzle type shape that tapers to a 
small opening of only a few centimeters. Below is a small brown glass bottle that sits on 
the floor, a round and symmetrical receptacle with a short neck and a slightly lipped 
opening at the top. Placed carefully underneath the large and daunting funnel, centered 
precisely at its end with only a few centimeters separating them, this small brown glass 
bottle seems somehow impervious to its threat. 
At first glance there is an obvious and glaring disproportion between the funnel 
and the bottle, an inconceivable relationship in which whatever could be contained and 
moved through the funnel would clearly never fit in the bottle. The title of the piece 
reveals this particular relationship: Ehtiqan means congestion, blockage, obstruction, 
oppression. As Nardeen told me, this word has a strong political resonance in Palestine, 
and can both refer to the object of the funnel and these various political meanings. 
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Looking at the piece it quickly becomes obvious that its very size and height leave the 
spectator in the dark as to what is or could be in the body of the funnel. Even the small 
brown bottle is empty, disclosing none of the secrets of the contents above it. As 
spectators, we cannot see over the top and into the funnel, nor can we look in from the 
small opening at the bottom. Moreover, if the opacity of the metal casing conceals its 
contents, or lack of contents, it also deftly reflects a slightly distorted image of a spectator 
back onto us. Being left on the outside, we only see ourselves. 
There is a disturbing untimeliness to this work. We are left waiting. Waiting to 
know what is in the funnel, what is being congested, what is being oppressed, blocked, 
obstructed, as it moves through this invisible space. Similarly, we do not know what is 
causing the congestion, obstruction, blockage, oppression either. This deferral is 
indefinite, the piece creating a place for such an event but it never taking place. And how 
will whatever is meant to go within this funnel ever pass through it? On the other hand, 
the very structure of the piece, the disproportion of its elements, means that a blockage, 
obstruction, oppression, congestion will have already arrived. But where? When? We do 
not know and cannot know.  
This trope of deferral is again visible in another recent work of Nardeen (Figure 18). 
Here a boat glossed in white is suspended in a gallery wall, part in the wall, part out. The 
boat is suspended in time, neither coming nor going. The angle of the boat, leaning 
downward from left to right, its position in the wall having it just hovering over the floor, 
readily reveals to the spectator an empty deck, a boat without passengers, without any 
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objects to divulge its occupant’s identities. Indeed, unlike Ehtiqan, there is nothing hidden 
from the spectator. But is it supposed to be the boat of Palestinians fleeing in 1948? Or, is 
it the boat of Jewish immigrants arriving? Glazed in white, with little texture or detail, the 
visual effect is an abstraction or ghost like appearance that defers and resists 
signification. This same attention to time is a theme explored in Nardeen’s earlier work 
too. In her series, Sabr (Patience), with rows of cactus/human like figures placed between 
the events of a young woman coming of age and the spectator, she has created a private 
and intimate place that is also shrouded by the multiple layers of spectators. As in her 
other works, the events taking place are stayed; there is a waiting and even untimeliness 
that impedes any fixing of meaning and determinate identity. If the spectator is given 
access to this place, we are also asked to be patient.  
 
Rupture 
 
I want to now look more closely at a video installation from Sharif, the first piece from 
Sharif that I saw. Entitled, To Be Continued… (Figure 19), at first glance, the video visually 
presents an almost typical martyr video of a suicide bomber: The backdrop in calligraphy, 
a passage from the Qu’ran, verse 78 from Sourat al-Hajj, while in the foreground a gun 
lying across the table with a young man (Saleh Bacri) seated facing us. His clothes are 
unremarkable: a greenish cap and a black sweatshirt with a green army-type vest over it. 
Our protagonist’s presentation is unaffected, a near monotone and steady reading of a 
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classic Orientalist text, 1001 Arabian Nights, with the occasional pauses.176 There are the 
occasional fade-outs, mostly between the stories, and on a number of occasions the 
camera zooms in for a few minutes and then back to its original position. In addition, 
there are a few times when our narrator stops reading and looks directly at the spectator, 
a short pause after which he returns to his story. On the surface is an obvious 
contradiction: the would-be suicide bomber preparing his final testimony, to be released 
after his mission has been accomplished, a document. As would be the case, we, the 
spectators, are now the witnesses. But this very act, the sure end of this young man, his 
finality and the finality of the video itself, is delayed and even suspended, not only by the 
rhetorical force of the story he has chosen to recount, but also in the looping of the video 
itself. The narrator, our protagonist, has become Scheherazade, and the viewers, the 
spectators, have become the King.  
Over the months that followed my visit to Sharif’s and my viewing of To be 
continued…, I continued to think back to the video and it’s juxtaposition of two 
heterogeneous elements: a document of the final testimony of a suicide bomber 
alongside the fictional re-telling of a story without end. This juxtaposition was, of course, 
intentional, but to what effect? The suicide bomber who is saved through the re-counting 
of a story without end, whose conclusion must always be suspended for another time? A 
rhetorical gesture reinforced through the looping of the video. It was tempting to think of 
                                                
176 Following Said (1978), I refer to 1001 Arabian Nights as a classic Orientalist text due to its 
historical status in the West or Occident (through its multiple translations) as representative of 
the “mysterious and magical world of the East” (see Bouagada 2011). Interestingly, it is also been 
argued that, despite being picked up by a handful of Arab writers over the years, these stories 
were long considered vulgar and of “small literary value” in the Arab world (Knipp 1974).  
204 
 
Sharif’s video in the context of suicide bombers and all of the various ideas associated 
with their image in the West, especially when one considers that the audience for this 
piece is the Western spectator. Was the juxtaposition with 1001 Nights, therefore, a 
message telling us that even those taking up the martyr operations were reluctant agents 
and would do anything to suspend their fate? Contrary to the image of the suicide 
bomber as a brainwashed religious fanatic, as is portrayed in the Western media, are we 
the spectators confronted with an agent, a person unwilling to blindly follow? This would 
seem to be one reading, an entirely justifiable interpretation of Sharif’s video in line with 
the elements with which we are presented, and echoes of the movie Paradise Now. And 
who knows, maybe this was precisely Sharif’s intention. It seems to me, however, that 
such an interpretation is pernicious, a case of what Jessica Winegar (657, 2005) has 
referred to as the humanity game, or, “art as evidence of humanity”. Here we enter into a 
story, all too familiar, in which the Arab, against all odds, can productively contribute to 
humanity.   
Some months ago I had another opportunity to view Sharif’s video when he 
agreed to send me a copy. As I watched the video again, without interruption, without any 
pauses, I found myself brought into its juxtaposition of worlds, a world of documentary, 
i.e., the martyr video genre, and a world of fiction, i.e., Arabian Nights. To be sure, the 
artwork as an event, by bringing together these two worlds, effectively establishes a 
proximity between these heterogeneous elements, and in so doing created a particular 
affect upon me, an experience of defamiliarization. As I continued to watch the work I 
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found myself forgetting about the visual context, the martyr testimony, the document 
with its assigned identities, and instead was pulled into the recounting (and re-
appropriation) of the first book of the Arabian Nights and the multiple embedded 
narratives (a Russian doll) in which each story is a suspension, each conclusion delayed 
and suspended. This temporal estrangement had the effect of rupturing the spatial 
context represented in the documentary message, and oddly fictionalizing it as well. 
All of the works I saw from Sharif play on this temporality and its spatial 
complement. In Chic Point (Figure 20), the checkpoints in Palestine are transformed into a 
fashion runway, the effect of which is a rupture of the spatial and temporal coordinates of 
these militarized spaces. In Jericho, a site-specific installation (Figure 21), Sharif takes an 
image from a floor mosaic, a lion attacking a gazelle, and over 18 individual images and 
one wall mural, abstracts these two figures into one. Starting with a red on white 
background image of a lion attacking a gazelle, by the time the spectator reaches the last 
of the individual images they have become one large an unidentifiable red mass (another 
version of this work was done in black with the two animals morphing into a line, Figure 
22). Throughout his works this temporal and spatial rupture is played out in various 
figures and forms, each time transporting the spectator into another world. 
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The Cause of the Other 
 
So far I have suggested that the process of political subjectivation, which is to say the 
emergence of a subject of politics, can be understood to require three aspects: a 
polemical argument, a staging and a disidentification. It is important to note here that 
these three aspects are not chronological; there is not a linear temporal movement 
between a polemical statement, a staging and disidentification. Each of these three 
aspects of political subjectivation can be prior or concurrent. My distinction is thus merely 
heuristic, a way of breaking down this process in order to better understand and explain 
how it works. So far I have presented the polemical argument at work in the statement, 
“we are all present absentees.” Through a close reading of the art works from several 
artists I have further looked at the staging of this polemical argument by focusing on a 
selection of tropes within their work. Now I will turn to the last aspect of the process of 
political subjectivation, the act of disidentification.  
Across the works considered there is a disavowal of identity through the staging of 
being out of place and out of time. It is here that the paradoxical alignment of 
Palestinians in Israel with the present absentee takes place. The process of 
disidentification, as demonstrated by these artists, removes bodies from their prescribed 
roles and assigned capacities, the spatio-temporal locales to which they have been 
designated.  For Michael it is a matter of suspending various objects from their proper 
time and place such that their arrangement becomes removed from any hierarchical 
ordering. In the case of Durar this process is one of interrupting the spatial and temporal 
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configuration of the given visible order by realigning bodies and what can be seen. In 
contrast to the proximity that is achieved within the work of Michael and Durar, Maisa 
forces the spectator to remain at a distance, thus accentuating the detachment of people 
and places from their assumed locales. Focusing on the temporal, Nardeen’s installations 
and prints undo time and leave the spectator in a state of waiting, a deferral of anything 
and everything given. Finally, Sharif’s video work and site-specific installations circle 
around the play of time and space to the point that the viewer is drawn into a world in 
which both are ruptured. 
Through these different tropes, each of these artists aligns themselves with the 
present absentee through an act of disidentification.177 None of them affirm an identity, a 
place and time, but instead their works all create a place in which to demonstrate out of 
place-ness and out of time-ness, of not being in the required and expected place at a 
required and expected time. This taking of place establishes a relationship between those 
included and those excluded, between those who were still in their homes and on their 
property in 1948 and those who were not, without prescribing any given group identity. 
Across these works is thus a taking place of politics, a process of making visible what had 
been excluded from the perceptual (Rancière 2004f).  
 At its core, the process of political subjectivation is an impossible identification 
with the cause of the other (see Rancière 1998a). For Palestinians in Israel this other is the 
present absentee, those whom the state has counted and deemed out of place and out of 
                                                
177 As I noted earlier, this alignment was my own interpretation, the various dimensions of which I 
shared with these artists throughout our conversations about the tropes within their works, and 
with which they agreed. 
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time. If Palestinians in Israel, through their citizenship, have access to certain rights as 
citizens, even if these rights are often curtailed and restricted through discrimination and 
segregation, the present absentee, as the minority within the minority, are those who are 
invisible and in many ways kept from visibility. Thus, by employing a series of aesthetic 
tropes as acts of disidentification with the state and its categories, names, expectations, 
these artists are aligning themselves with the present absentee as a political gesture.  
An impossible identification is two-fold: in not being inhabitable by a defined 
group or person, it first permits the subject to extend beyond itself; second, it creates new 
forms of subjectivity in the excess of the already identifiable community; a communality 
that belongs to no one and everyone. In aligning their practices with the present absentee, 
Palestinian artists in Israel are inverting a category of the state that was meant to exclude. 
This act of solidarity renders the colonial category of the present absentee an impossible 
identification. If we are all present absentees, the category and its exclusions are 
rendered meaningless, and the category is no longer able to contain those designated by 
its terms and conditions. The identity of the present absentee, in other words, is opposed 
by a political subjectivity that belongs to no one group or person, but to anyone and 
everyone. The other side of this, of course, is that those Palestinian artists in Israel 
aligning themselves with the present absentee are also contesting their own 
identification as citizens according to a juridical status defined by the state. In taking on 
an impossible identification, these artists and others are refusing their allocated 
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identifications within the state and their designation as “Israeli Arabs” within a 
democracy that claims to speak in their name.  
The forms of political subjectivity that “take place” within and across these works 
are now an excess that foster new forms of commonality or being-in-common. With the 
colonial category inverted and turned inside out, with the relationship of those included 
and excluded undone, the possibility of a community of equals, an equality of anyone 
with everyone, emerges. This is not a community with an identity, whether group-based 
or culture-based; it is a community that is the manifestation of a wrong or miscount. As I 
have argued, throughout the literature on the present absentee there is considerable 
disparity and disagreement as to how many fell into this category when it was established, 
and neither is there any agreement as to how many are today present absentees. The 
counting was always already a miscount. The exposing of this miscount or wrong is thus a 
demonstration and verification of equality without reverting to identity, to those given 
categories and names that enable the appearance that everything and everyone has been 
properly counted.  
In its aesthetic form, this equality is demonstrated in the counterworld or 
aesthetic community that takes place in and through works of art. The taking place of 
politics in art is a demonstration of an aesthetic subject/community that is separate from 
a world governed by the names, identities, and categories imposed by the state. Indeed, 
the figure of the present absentee as a political subject does not pre-exist its 
subjectivation; it is the advent of a subject indiscernible to the accounting of the state. In 
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this sense, art is not political because it represents a pre-existing group, but instead 
because it is a disidentification that creates a place for those unaccounted and 
miscounted, a place of aesthetic equality. 
The analysis presented above demonstrates a relationship between art and 
politics that is not necessarily tied to identity claims. It establishes that politics in the case 
of Palestinian artists in Israel is a form of disidentification, specifically through the 
alignment with an impossible identification with the category of the present absentee. 
The central tropes found within the works of these artists are disruptive aesthetic forms, a 
taking place of politics between art and non-art, between given identities, with new forms 
of commonality and an affirmation of a radical and anarchic equality of anyone with 
everyone. What do such aesthetic practices offer in terms of the struggle of Palestinians in 
Israel for civil and political equality? How does this aesthetic community offer the 
promise emancipation to a society riddled with deep ethnic and religious divisions? If 
these artists and their works are the noise of democracy, is there hope for a state for all its 
citizens? 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A couple days before my first meeting with Durar, a friend met me at Elika to show me the 
most recent issue of The New Yorker. Silently he opened it to a photo of “Self-Potrait with 
a Goat” by Durar hanging on an office wall, a somber older man in a striped dress shirt 
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and black pants standing in front of it. The title of the article was “The Dissenters: Haaretz 
prides itself on being the conscience of Israel. Does it have a future?” by David Remnick.178 
This is one his paintings that most impressed me and that we talked about when we first 
met. When I met Durar a couple days later I showed him the article and asked him how 
Amos Schocken had come to have this painting in his office. Durar told me he had bought 
it a few years before and that Amos often buys his work, and that they have been good 
friends for some time. When I asked Durar if he bought other Palestinian artists work or 
just his, he told me to visit the Haaretz office to see. I did not just want to go to the 
Haaretz office, however, I wanted to meet Amos Schocken. With Durar’s assistance, within 
the week I had a meeting scheduled with Amos at his office.  
When I met with Amos a few weeks later, I had to first go through the public 
entrance to Haaretz, on Schocken Street in Tel Aviv. Through the main entrance there was 
a corridor with a reception area at the end. On the walls were artworks covering most of 
the available space. As I slowly made my way to the reception area I stopped to look at 
some of the works of art, which were signed by a mix of Jewish and Palestinian artists (his 
collection so far only includes those Palestinian artists living and working in Israel). At the 
reception I was met by Amos, who told me he would be with me in about thirty minutes 
and that I should walk through the offices to see the art while waiting. The space is a 
veritable art gallery. Every imaginable space is adorned with a piece of art, from the walls 
in the individual offices and the hallways to the passages leading to the washrooms and 
parking garage. The art itself is made up of paintings with a mix of styles and subjects, 
                                                
178 28 February 2011 ( http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/28/110228fa_fact_remnick ) 
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including portraiture, disfigured maps and anti-war collages. Mixed in with these I saw 
works by a number of the artists I had met and worked with – Michael, Durar, Mahmoud – 
as well as others I had heard about, but never met. After having explored for about half an 
hour, I sat down outside Amos’ office to take notes, also taking the chance to ask his 
secretary what she thought of all the art. Do people here really look at the art? Do they 
ask questions? What does she think about this art? She told me about how people 
generally enjoyed having the art around, many often taking time to see new works Amos 
acquires. They can also request to have a piece in their office changed, she explained, 
something Amos was apparently quite proud of sharing with everyone.   
Amos started focusing on collecting Palestinian art around twenty years ago. It 
began with Ibrahim Nubani (see Zohar 2011), he told me, in order to help the artist 
financially and to help him get his first exhibit. One of his conditions for buying art, at 
least early on, was that purchases remain confidential: “This did not work. I always buy 
more than one work; it helps me see the context in the development of the artist.” In the 
case of Durar he has developed a paternal relationship with the artist (patron-client 
relationship with the artist?): “Durar is unable to deal with everyday responsibilities.” 
With Mahmoud Kaiss he was intrigued to see a very young talent and interested in helping 
him get into art school. Amos explained that he did not buy Palestinian art as an 
investment, which is typically why people buy art; he did not see this type of art as 
something that would appreciate in value. Instead, the reasons he gave for collecting 
were primarily political: “[Palestinian] artists are not fully appreciated and are 
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underrepresented. There is an opportunity being lost to appreciate how Arab Israelis [sic] 
want to be Israelis, part of society.”  
If Amos saw art as a means to embrace and integrate the “Arab minority” into 
Israeli society—an opportunity he felt was being squandered—in the same breath he was 
unwilling to discuss the politics within this art. I asked him about Durar’s painting, a 
tableau of 2 x 2.5 meters hanging on the wall next to us. I described to him what I saw, the 
figure in front of the tree, the Crocker-brand clothing, the ambivalent relationship with 
the goat. Nonplussed, he said he does not see the work as having any particular political 
message: “I tend to keep personal political opinions of artists separate from the art. For 
example, recently Ibrahim Nubani approached me, angry with what is going on 
[politically], but I put it aside and the following day he asked me to buy more of his work.” 
Not satisfied with this response, I pushed Amos on the matter of politics; I wanted to 
know why he was ignoring the political within the art works. It seemed to me that he was 
prepared to embrace politics when it was coming from Jewish Israeli artists but not 
Palestinians. At this point Amos reiterated that Israel has a chance to embrace and 
integrate the Arab minority but is failing to do so. This was the politics that mattered to 
him. As I was leaving my interview with Amos I asked him about the organization of the 
works. Who chooses them? Who decides on the hanging? Does he have a curator? “I do,” 
he replied. “I’ll send you her name and phone number.” About a week later I got a 
message from him with the name and number of his curator: Efrat Livny. 179   
                                                
179 The curator of Michael Halak’s show, “Faces and landscapes” (see chapter 5). 
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As arguably one of the most important collectors of Palestinian art in Israel, Amos 
has been a pivotal figure in raising awareness about Palestinian art among the Israeli 
public. Indeed, his efforts go well beyond the purchasing of art and the support of 
individual artists; he has been active in organizing and raising money for exhibitions, 
promoting artists such as Ibrahim Nubani and Michael Halak and in his own terms 
contributing to the integration of the Arab minority. There is little doubt that Amos 
intends to give visibility to these artists and to Palestinians in Israel in general. But at the 
core of Amos’ reasoning is the firm belief that “Arab Israelis” not only need to be 
integrated into Israeli society, but that they want to be integrated into Israeli society. This 
claim runs counter to everything I was told by the artists with whom I worked. It also 
contradicts the assertion by these artists that they are not Israelis and do not want to be 
Israelis. What these artists expressed to me, both in our conversations and through their 
work, was not a desire to be integrated within Israeli society, but rather to be visible, seen, 
heard.  
Many of the artists with whom I worked, the curators and cultural workers that I 
came into contact with, believe that art is a “universal language” which they can use to 
show Israelis and the world what is happening with the Palestinian struggle. They 
consciously use “contemporary art of the West” because, as a global phenomenon, it can 
more easily be “read” by a broader audience. As I often heard, it offers a more 
sophisticated way to express their struggle and show their presence in the world. At the 
same time, most acknowledged that it can be used in a cynical way, as a form of 
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propaganda for Israel to present itself to the world as democratic and tolerant. Still, even 
if the state is playing a game, contemporary Palestinian art is clearly an opportunity for 
Palestinians to be seen and heard. And even if the state has manipulated artists in this 
manner, with the possible negative consequences of increased divisions among 
Palestinian artists in Israel, there might still be some advantages to this situation.  As 
Michael stressed, this fragmentation can be seen as a good thing since it allowed 
individual artists to be free from the restrictions of past ideologies. Indeed, it was this 
freedom that permitted these artists to explore their practices as forms of place making 
that did not revert to more classical modes of representations of place dominant 
throughout the history of Palestinian art (Boullata 2009).  
The primary aim of this thesis was to explain how Palestinian artists in Israel were 
making a place through acts of disidentification, becoming visible without marking or 
inscribing this visibility within received categories of cultural and religious identity. These 
artists did not aim to assert a counter-identity against the dominant Israeli identity, but in 
claiming an impossible identification in the figure of the present absentee sought to 
disrupt and reconfigure the spatiotemporal order of Israeli society by demonstrating new 
ways of seeing, thinking, talking, hearing, and acting. As such, artists were not demanding 
integration into a particular sensible order. Nor were they seeking to become Israelis. 
Rather, they demanded a transformation of this order that would make it possible to 
achieve an equality of anyone with everyone.  
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It is here that cultural production, far from being secondary to the struggle of 
Palestinians for civil and political equality, is deeply political, making up the noise that is 
democracy itself.  As the Palestinian activists in Israel struggle to change the laws that 
continue to keep Palestinians in the position of second-class citizens, not fully equal, 
Palestinian artists are asserting and verifying their equality through artistic practices and 
particular works of art: “We don’t ask for our equality,” my friend Bilal told me in the 
beginning of my fieldwork, “we are already equal.” This announcement was reaffirmed 
throughout my fieldwork, and it is this affirmation that makes Palestinian art in Israel 
political. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
After laying out the background for this research in chapter one, chapter two of this thesis 
describes the sensible world within which Palestinian artists in Israel work and live, a 
particular spatiotemporal order following the Zionist ideology of Israel as a Jewish state. 
Developing this focus on space, chapter three examines the spatial moorings underlying 
the idea of culture as a “site” of difference and contestation in the contemporary 
anthropology of art, arguing that this spatial conception of culture leads to an 
understanding of the affinity between anthropology and art as practices of place making. 
Chapter four turns to the relationship between art and identity by rethinking how politics, 
as a verification of equality, is a disruption of the sensible order. It then explores how this 
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notion of politics is related to art and to the idea of aesthetic equality. Chapter five 
inquires into the notion of the present absentee as a political gesture by seeing how this 
category has been appropriated by Palestinian artists in Israel. Here I focus on a series of 
tropes within the works of these artists as instances of this alignment and how these can 
be understood as instances of the “taking place” of politics.  
Inevitably this project has left certain stones unturned, certain areas 
uninvestigated, and certain avenues unexplored. As with any such undertaking, this 
research was necessarily limited, due to limitations having to do with resources and time. 
I want to mention three areas where this research might be further developed. These 
aspects are not only weaknesses within the present project, but can be seen as areas to 
be taken up scholars working on Palestinian art and society in the future.  
The first area concerns the reception of Palestinian art in Israel. While my 
conversation with Amos Schocken was moving in this direction, it came too late in the 
fieldwork to be explored more fully.  In many ways, the methodological and conceptual 
complexity of reception studies makes this aspect one of the last great frontiers of 
ethnographic research (White and Yoka 2010). As I underlined at several points 
throughout the thesis, the spectator plays a crucial role in art. To be sure, without a 
spectator, the aesthetic experience is incomplete, indeed, unimaginable. As Rancière 
argues (2008b) in regard to art (with reference to his work on Jacotot), there is an equality 
between the spectator and the work of art, a non-hierarchical relation in which the 
spectator is not a passive recipient but active in making sense, or interpreting and 
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framing the artwork, much in the way that Barthes has made clear for literary theory. I 
would refer to Gell’s notion of abduction (1998) as a way of approaching the spectator. 
Recalling Panagia, who suggests how sensible disruptions have a political force (2009), for 
Gell, abductions bring about a disruption between an inner state of mind (our 
preconceptions) and the outer world. Many of these ideas have been worked out in the 
context of art history and cultural analysis, but might be developed further with a more 
robust methodology of observation and ethnographic inquiry.  
The second area for development would be the development of a broader 
ethnographic field within which to situate my research. The analysis presented in this 
thesis focused on artists living and working in Haifa, and in particular the Masada 
neighborhood, which although small has a disproportional representation in terms of the 
contemporary Palestinian arts scene within Israel. As I noted, this decision gave me 
access to artists on a near daily basis, including the spaces outside of their studios and in 
other aspects of the art worlds in which they lived. For these reasons I see this choice as a 
strength, but it was also a weakness as it excluded other important artists, many of whom 
I met but was not able to work with more closely. Specifically, Palestinian artists such as 
Jumana Abboud and Raeda Saadeh, both working in Jerusalem and both of whom I met, 
are both important and influential artists that I imagine would have much to add to the 
research on Palestinian artists living and working in Israel. There are also Palestinian 
arists in Tel Aviv/Jaffa area, such as Raafat Hattab and Selma and Salim. There is little 
question that the inclusion of these artists within this project would have strengthened 
220 
 
many of my arguments by showing a greater diversity of artistic practices among 
Palestinian artists in Israel. At the same time, those artists working in Jerusalem would 
have also posed a number of challenges and counterpoints. 
 This brings me to a third area of development for this research, namely some type 
of additional comparative study. In talking with those Palestinian artists working in 
Jerusalem I discovered that their artistic “community” was centered around Ramallah, 
and their art often reflected this association. Given the proximity between Jerusalem and 
Ramallah this was understandable, especially for those artists unable to move across 
checkpoints. Over the period of my fieldwork I had spent time in Ramallah, visiting 
galleries, art schools and attending exhibitions. It struck me that the art being made in the 
Occupied Territories was considerably different from those Palestinian artists inside Israel. 
This should not be a surprise as the social, historical and political issues facing 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are not the same as Palestinians in Israel. It was 
for this reason that I wanted to include Rana Bishara in this project as a Palestinian in 
Israel who decided to live and work in the Bethlehem area in the West Bank. A future 
project looking at these two art scenes (as well as art from refugees in neighboring Arab 
countries and the diaspora) would be an invaluable addition to the research on 
Palestinian art.  
 Limitations aside, this project attempts to open spaces for contemporary 
Palestinian artists who are often forgotten and overlooked. At some level this thesis set 
out to create a place for contemporary artists and to understand how they are engaging 
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the struggles facing Palestinians in Israel. This research is not intended to be 
representative of all Palestinian artists in Israel, nor of all Palestinians in Israel. My aim in 
working with these artists, an objective that became clear to me as my interactions with 
them intensified, was to explore the possibilities for rethinking the relationship between 
art and politics by challenging the sensible order of mainstream Israeli society. Progress 
toward these goals became possible through the critical analysis of what can only be 
termed an impossible identification, one that allowed for a disidentification that was both 
spatial and temporal.  At the same time, this thesis also revealed limits to anthropological 
thinking about the homology between art and identity, in the process bringing into relief 
the place of politics contemporary artistic practice and cultural analysis. 
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